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From

the early nineteenth century through

World War

II

Springfield,

Massachusetts was one of the world's preeminent metalworking centers.

On

the eve of the

skilled machinists

and

industry

produced machine

components

precision
steel,

Second World War hundreds of firms and thousands
tools, fixtures, castings, forgings,

of

and

for the nation's automobile, electrical appliance,

aircraft industries.

commenced an

However, by the mid-1950s Springfield

inexorable decline, interrupted briefly by

Vietnam War defense spending. Firms were purchased by outside
investors
local

and work moved, while foreign firms gained market share from

companies.

Springfield's

elsewhere
decline

is

fall

from manufacturing prominence mirrors events

in the industrial

Northeast and

examined mainly through

is

important to understand. The

a history of the

vi

American Bosch

Company,

workers, and their union. Established in 1911, unionized in

its

1936, Bosch specialized in the design
fuel injections

investors

and

After the

war

New

most profitable firm

York

it

II it

Street

of a small corporation

By the early 1960s

City.

diesel

employed thousands

was purchased by Wall

became part

in the early 1950s

headquartered in

corporation.

During World War

components.

of skilled machinists.

and manufacture of precision

it

had become

the

in the diesel products division of a Fortune 500

By the time

it

closed in 1986 Bosch

few hundred workers owned by

a

plant with a

Fortune 100 corporation.

From 1950 forward management attempted
strategies to reduce costs

was an aging

and maintain market

to

implement numerous

share, including the

construction of a low-wage plant in Mississippi, the acquisition of overseas
factories,

and in-plant schemes

to streamline production.

The union

resisted in-plant restructuring efforts, but offered token opposition to the

company's world-wide maneuvers. Throughout, unionists believed
machining

skills

produced were

coupled with

assets the

their

knowledge of the products being

company needed

shared this perspective, and unresolved,
the closing of the plant.

It is

their

to succeed.

The company never

this disjuncture

contributed to

argued here that management's

efforts failed

because workers were treated as appendages of their machines.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
"You Don't Believe She

The shout "Make Them Stay

or

the walls of the Local 206 meeting hall

hours

earlier

is

Going

to Dip"

Make Them Pay"
on February

4,

reverberated off

1986. Just a

few

union members learned that United Technologies

Corporation, owner of the 76-year-old Springfield American Bosch plant

would shut

down by

it

the

end of

July.

The announcement was

the

culmination of a series of permanent layoffs made by United Technologies

Corporation (UTC) since

it

acquired the

facility in 1978.

The production

workforce was already slashed to 800 from the 1,130 in 1979 as product
lines

and

and machine

tools

were shifted

to a

new UTC

facility in the

South

factories abroad.

Management had presented union
scenario in 1981: ratify the

new

incentive

negotiators with a closing

payment system we want and

$10 million to $20 million will be invested in the plant or no further

investment will be

made

in the facility.

Outright closing was not

threatened, but the implications were obvious.
for the retiming of all jobs

The company's proposals

under a new measured time system was

accepted by the narrowest of margins in a membership vote. At the time

many workers
to

believed that the system provided the

company with

a

way

study jobs before moving them elsewhere.

Union
plant

officials

was going

to

had warned repeatedly

since the 1981 vote that the

be added to the region's lengthy

manufacturers, but few paid attention. Elected
labor leaders

and most workers

in the

I

list

of shuttered

officials, state

shop had chosen

and national

to believe

UTC

assurances that the plant would never close.

and angry

as they

main

the factory's

crowded

Now, everyone was

into the tiny hall several

gate, eager to decide

on

upset

hundred yards from

a course of action. 1

Bosch had been the only place many of the unionists had worked.

The union sponsored
area

amusements

several athletic teams and hosted family outings to

parks.

Since the 1930s the union-company Athletic

Association ran clambakes, supported youth and adult sports teams,

mainly in baseball and basketball, and sponsored outings
baseball, basketball

and hockey games.

arrive at the plant an

news

hour before

was not unusual

It

for

would

to

send his two sons

to college

steady wages he received as a chucking machine operator.

intended to work in the plant over the

New Hampshire on

University of

city of Springfield

me

till I

summer

the G.I.

beckoned

Hampshire. Reflecting back he
to

said:

It's

"It's

his

sad.
it.

I

the

He had

I

boy from

didn't realize

can close

Staples said he

two sons had followed him

on

money was good

my

you your mother's

like they tell

don't believe she's really going to die."
if

But the

Bill.

He was

of 1948, then return to the

to a country

think about not having

through the building.

proud

create a

in the sprawling facility for 36 years.

always active in the union, and able

meant

to

in the center of their lives.

Donald Staples worked

and the big

workers

their shift to drink coffee, discuss the

of the day, and just be with friends. The closing

gapping hole

to professional

into the trade.

New
how much

it

eyes and walk

sick,

but you

would have been

Now

he was happy

they did not. 2

"
The whole industrial base from
In June, 1985 a union press release stated in part:
Greenfield to Springfield is being eroded. There may be jobs available, but they're not good

1

paying

jobs." Holyoke Transcript-Telegram,

1985; Springfield Daily

News (SDN)

June

26, 1985;

Local 206

July 16, 1985.

2 Interview, July, 1993; Springfield Union, February

7,

1986.

news

release, July,

Overview

of Bosch Plant History

The Bosch had thrived
in 1911

in Springfield

from the day

its

doors opened

under German ownership and management. Even the national

economic contraction during the 1930s did not

and employment increased through

World War

the 1930s

affect the Bosch, as sales

and grew rapidly during

This 15 year period of growth could not withstand the

II.

sharp decline in defense orders

at the

end

World War

of

From

II.

this

point on wild swings in employment, largely a consequence of erratic

demand generated by

the company's automotive, agricultural equipment,

aerospace, and defense customers, coupled with management's inability to
figure out

and bust
1980s.

how

to

maintain consistent production levels to avoid

cycles, characterized the plant's history until

For example, blue collar jobs dropped

2,600 in the Fall of 1946,

War, and

down below

jumped

managers attempted
procedures in the

part of the

late

ARMA

This

made

new manufacturing and

was tenuous

Korean

when

plant

quality control

at best.

mergers and acquisitions

1940s resulted in the Springfield

Corporation, headquartered in

would soon operate

from

training difficult

continuity in the workforce

to job insecurity, a series of

beginning in the

to 1,200 in late 1948

1950 and early 1960s. Workers and union leaders

late

realized that job security

Adding

little

to introduce

closed in the late

to over 2,600 at the height of the

1,200 again in 1958.

and expensive and provided

it

boom

factories across the U.S.

and

facility

New

York

in Europe.

becoming
City.

ARMA

In 1953 an

assembly plant was built in Columbus, Mississippi and several high

volume automotive product
the late 1950s

lines

and throughout

were transferred

there.

Beginning

the 1960s manufacturing facilities

3

were

in

purchased in the United

England,

States,

and the Netherlands, and

Italy,

production licensing agreements were negotiated with plants in
South

America

to build fuel injection

manufactured

originally

The corporation's name became

in Springfield.

Industries, Springfield

components and assemblies

was one

of six

company

For a time the corporation developed
the burgeoning defense electronics sector.

AMBAC

divisions.

new products

for

markets in

Several million dollars

was

spent on machine tools, a state-of-the-art computer systems to keep track
of in-plant inventory,
plants.

This

is

and

the construction of engineering

and assembly

not, then, simply the story of corporate disinvestment in an

aging factory, and for

Management

this

reason the Bosch story

articulated

and employed

a

important.

is

range of strategies to

increase profitability, including southern low-wage expansion, joint

production ventures in Europe and South America, plant acquisitions in
the U.S.,

and an in-plant modernization and

Springfield.

Almost immediately

determined that ways had
1953

on

to

after

Union

World War

II

program

in

management

be found to work more cheaply. As early as

management warned workers

the firm.

cost control

of the impact of cheaper foreign labor

leaders could not help but notice the corporation's

aggressive efforts to build a plant in Mississippi and establish several joint

production ventures in Europe and South America. At the same time
$12 million investment was

made

in Springfield to

a

improve production.

Despite the investment, employment levels dropped, falling under 750 by
late 1959,

the

from over 4,000

at the

end of World War

Korean and Vietnam wars stimulated both

II.

sales

For brief periods

and

job

growth, but peak employment levels never exceeded the
post World

U high point established

in the

;

l

all

of

c
l

>53.

The story of the workers, the plant, and the

important chapter

in

workers were highly
agricultural,
a

automotive and defense

prosperous manufacturing region,

Vermont

components

for

and the

sectors;

C

this rich legacy

built

regional closings, nor could

was

not

machine

enough

arrest the decline of the

it

rational dialogue

Were

interests so

tor the

had been

part ol

the

tools

and

country and

in the

Could managers and workers have prevented
valley's industrial base'

city

The

onnecticut and White River

every other manufacturing sector

around the globe. Yet

economy.

up and down

stretching,

had designed and

that

11

produced components

Connecticut River Valley between Hartford,
function,

provides an

city

understanding the post-Word War
skilled; the plant

War

to

stem the

tide ot

American Bosch.

the collapse ol the

mutually exclusive

was impossible? Were workers and

their

that

unions

sufficiently interested in production-related issues to offer solutions to the

problems i^ccd by industry? Were managers amenable
input in constructive

ways

to

improve

the [Want?

drawn, was management so adamant regarding

shop

floor, that

workers and

their

Were

to utilizing

worker

lines so rigidly

their right to control the

union turned from trying

to

make

the

factory run smoothly, in favor ot preserving a semblance ol job security as

long as possible?

And

like

having

a

Donald

Managers manage and workers work was
Staples,

one could not find

son or daughter follow them into

factory gates

were locked

lor

good.

5

a

the paradigm.

Bosch worker desirous

that

ot

paradigm well beiore the

Chapter Structure

Chapter 2 describes the evolution of the metalworking
industry
greater-Springfield.

Early growth, sparked in large measure by the citing
of

a federal

armory

in the city,

home

to large

numbers

as

in

propelled the city into a preeminent position

of highly skilled machinists

innovative companies by the end of World

War

I.

and many

While many

cities in

Massachusetts suffered through skyrocketing unemployment and business
failures

during the Depression, Springfield metalworking firms

confronted a shortage of skilled machinists and responded by starting
innovative training programs.

War

II

tool builders

worked around

new equipment. However,

with

levels soared

as industry received millions of dollars of

machine

Employment

industry growth.
Viet

Employment

Nam

the

war

during World

contracts

local

the clock to supply U.S. companies

end of

the

war marked

the

levels fluctuated dramatically.

war production stimulated

and

local industry while

fundamental problems companies faced, including aging

end

of

Korean and

masking

factories

and

equipment, outside ownership of once locally-controlled firms, and
increased competition from abroad.

Chapters 3 and 4 review the history of American Bosch. Starting in
1911

Bosch employed thousands of

who produced
equipment,
1986.

Long

and assemblers

precision products for the country's automobile, farm

aircraft,

At the end
Island,

skilled machinists

of

New

and

electrical industries before

World War

II

it

closed

the Springfield plant

its

doors in

was purchased by

York holding company and eventually became part of

world-wide corporation headquartered in
production shifted in the mid-1950s to

6

a

New

new

York

City.

Springfield

factory in Mississippi.

a

a

By the early 1960s more work was relocated

and

Italy.

to plants in England, Holland,

During these years the corporation spent several million

improving the Springfield

plant, but as chapters 3

and 4 show, the

investments did not result in stable employment or

product

lines

dollars

new work

to replace

shipped elsewhere.

Chapters

5, 6,

and 7 describe

start-up through 1960.

Chapter 5

the history of workers in the plant from

is

concerned mainly with union

organization, with particular attention to the important role of skilled

workers.
control

Chapter 6 discusses the acrimonious internal struggle

waged

after

World War

up-start International
close attention

is

Union

II

between the United

of Electrical Workers.

Electrical

and

union's reaction to the

company

The chapter

5,

this

also reviews the

decision to build a

Mississippi and shift Springfield production to

the

Here, as in chapter

paid to the positions skilled workers took during

decisive episode in the local's history.

union

for

it.

new

factory in

Chapter 7 reviews the

union's use of the grievance procedure and contract language on job
classifications to

determine

how workers responded

plant modernization program.

to the

The chapter continues

company's

the discussion

and

started in chapter 4 regarding union attempts to play an active

constructive role in shop-floor improvement efforts.

and early 1960s the
efforts to

Through

local presented a thoughtful critique of

improve productivity.

in-

However, management

the 1950s

management

steadfastly

refused to discuss any union-initiated suggestions. The chapter concludes

with an analysis of the union's 1958

illegal eight

day walk-out

in support

of the plant's engineering union.

Chapter 8 unites the protagonists and continues

their history

through the 1960s and early 1970s, paying particular attention

7

to the issues

surrounding lengthy strikes in 1968 and 1971. The
concluding chapter
analyzes

why

in the region.

the Bosch closed

How

and discusses

the decline of metalworking

could Springfield, once a world-wide metal working

center with thousands of well-paying skilled jobs, lose
that nucleus of
plants

and jobs so

rapidly.

Conclusion: Take as a Starting Point

Work and

It is

pride in

the Tob

the contention here that the rich tradition of worker skills and

workmanship present

city's rise to

in Springfield

was instrumental

metalworking preeminence. From the Springfield Armory,

through the early construction of automobiles,

developments in machine

was

at the root.

meant

in the

tool design

to the significant

and construction

In addition, the rapid diffusion of

that the entire region

made

quantitative

that occurred, skill

what was being learned

and

qualitative leaps in

production capabilities. As the reputation of the region grew

it

magnet

for the

for skilled workers,

and those entrepreneurs looking

proper blend of hands-on expertise and engineering

make

became

its

a

ability required to

their enterprises successful.

On

the eve of the Second

World War

there

was

still

room

for

highly skilled tool and die makers, gage makers, and mold designers to
contribute their expertise to

making

a firm

run well. Through the war

workers participated on production committees and were largely
responsible for the dramatically increased output from local factories.

8

But

at war's

end, after seeing their shops unionized and being
forced through

vigorous worker organization to bargain collectively with
their

employees, managers sought to reassert control in the plants.
Eventually skilled workers and their unions began to withdrew
their intimate

production knowledge from management, and simply did

the basic job required of them.
for the skill

No amount

and product knowledge
The Bosch record

U.S. industry.

lost, to

is clear:

of technology could substitute
the long-term detriment of

Through

the 1950s

and

into the

1960s the union fought as vigorously to be included in plant

improvement

efforts as they did to

defend their members from

illegal

terminations and the denial of seniority rights.
In the face of the tremendous changes under

economy,

it is

way

in the global

quite unlikely that a single plant, union-initiated

production strategy could have succeeded in keeping the firm open. But
the history

is,

nevertheless, a healthy antidote to

characterizations that persist in the literature:

industry lost
their

way

its

way because

the

simplistic

first,

and the second

that

American

that unions lost

about 1948 and were interested in wage and benefit gains

after

the exclusions of

Finally,

of unions;

two

I

to

all else.

concur with ideas expressed by historian David Brody in a

1978 speech to the Organization of American Historians, and hope

study does his thoughts some

justice.

this

Brody reviewed American labor

historiography searching for a synthesis that could bring together the best
in economic, cultural, ethnic,

that the

model

E. P.

Class provided for

and

institutional scholarship.

Thompson's The Making

England was inappropriate

9

He argued

of the English Working

for the

United

States.

If

not

through a

common

culture,

Brody questioned, where

approach that provides some

common ground

is

the alternative

applying to

all

American

workers, establishes historical continuity, and captures the
dynamic forces

shaping the experience of workers. For Brody "These
requirements can
probably best be met by an economic approach, taking as

its

starting point

not culture but work, and the job, and broadening out from there. "3
Skills

played an important part in the history of the plant, union,

and region. Workers
at

toward

attitudes

work, their continual attempts

and

quality conscious,

and

to

their jobs, especially fair treatment

make

the shop floor

their deep-seated desire to

more

efficient

be heard and

respected on the shop floor are themes that run through what follows.
In June, 1940 the Congress of industrial Organizations issued a labor

policy for national defense.

Its

cornerstone

was

the statement that "Our

industrial unions constitute a great reservoir of productive, technical and

administrative

skill

and resourcefulness. The brains

of labor should be

utilized to serve the nation...

."

Walter Reuther,

and die maker himself, assembled

a skilled tool

Also in 1940, the United Auto Workers'

design engineers and tool- and die-makers
in

automobile plants

who had

a

team of

spent years working

to craft a detailed plan for converting underutilized

auto plants to aircraft production. In 1941 Julius Emspak, SecretaryTreasurer of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, put

forward

a

program

UE-organized

for the establishment of production councils in every

factory.

Councils were to focus on improving methods of

work, improving shop- floor planning, better

3

David Brody, "Labor History

Kammen,

in the 1970s:

Toward

utilization of

a History of the

machinery,

American Worker,"

Contemporary Historical Writing in the
United States (Ithaca, 1980) p. 268. The essay was first delivered as a paper before the
Organization of American Historians meeting in 1978. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class (New York, 1968).
in

Michael

ed.,

The Past Before Us:

10

and training and
wrote,

that

"is

workers do have

increase production in their

established

"The whole idea of such councils," Emspak

re-training.

a considerable

own

plant,

that

whereby the workers can combine

management, increased production

of

and

knowledge of ways
if

a

their

will result."

machinery

factories,

output through World

War

management by

II,

were instrumental

Reuther's plans were

problems on the factory

failures to

available

floor.

The

management

in

in maintaining high

meet shipping schedules

when needed

to

to

do

a better job

running

of the five major issues causing
five were:

equipment resulting

job process sheets

the consistent failure to

in excessive lost

production time and

to customers; a lack of

proper tooling

complete set-ups; incomplete information on

and work orders leading

to inventory

difficulties; the generally dirty conditions in the plant;

and production bottlenecks,

resulting in a lack of

departments and excessive overtime
to

up

set

the early 1950s.

and provided an analysis

repair defective

that

and most quickly dismantled by

In 1968 Local 206 challenged
the plant

is

knowledge with

never implemented, while the councils Emspak described were

hundreds of war-time

to

management they were following

Reuther and Emspak's statements.
consider the union's thoughts

for others.

work
In

and scheduling

and poor work flow
for

some

making

this

a rich tradition exemplified

statement

by

In management's failure to even

lies at least

part of an explanation for the

failure of U.S. industry over the last 25 years. 4

4

American Council on Public Affairs, The CIO and National Defense (Washington, D.C.,
1940) p. 5; George Clark, "The Strange Story of the Reuther Plan," Harpers Magazine, 184
(1941) p. 645 - 654; Julius Emspak, "Labor -Management War Production Councils," Science

and

Society, 7 (1943) p. 91;

Local 206 Labor Bulletin, February, 1968, p. 3.
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CHAPTER 2

THE SPRINGFIELD ECONOMY
Introduction

Springfield's nineteenth

predicated

upon

and early twentieth century prosperity was

a well established, diversified

manufacturing base rooted

in a set of industries that required a core of highly skilled workers.

chapter will examine the
attention to

its

city's

This

economic development and pay particular

A

metalworking industry.

review of the 19th century will

be followed by sections on the development of several firms, including
the Springfield

Armory. The Armory

innovations and worker
firms in the region.
structures will be

Massachusetts.
studies of the
will

skill

and union

included because machine tool
issues influenced events in other

Springfield's industrial

compared

to those of

Finally, the federal

New

is

development and workforce

Holyoke, Lowell and Worcester,

government conducted two detailed

England economy, one in 1929, the other

be discussed. Each posited that a

critical

in 1951, that

aspect of economic

development was the region's vibrant metalworking industry.

Early History

Springfield secured

primarily because

it

was

its

the sight of the Springfield Armory. Congress'

decision in 1776 to locate a

weapons production armory

meant slow, steady growth. At
the

War

manufacturing history during the Civil

government intended

to

the conclusion of the

move

in Springfield

Revolutionary

War

the armory across the Connecticut

12

River to West Springfield, where a

power

of the

Agawam

Springfield got the

River.

was

to

be built

to

harness the

But West Springfield farmers protested,

Armory and

The investment helped

facility

economic stimulus.

its

1

the Connecticut River Valley gain a

reputation for precision metalworking and machine tool building,
and
fueled industrial expansion in the

machine shops,

city.

By the 1830s Springfield had 73

six cotton factories, three

paper

mills, four printing

concerns, two tool factories, one saw factory, and several saw and grist
mills.

Development was coupled with population growth,

large pool of skilled labor.
1790.

The

city

grew

to 18,000 in

especially a

1850 from 1,500 in

In the early 1840s rail line connections to Boston, Worcester,

Hartford, and Albany sparked further growth. 2

The Armory's engineers and

skilled craftsmen

worked

diligently to

design machine tools and develop the production techniques necessary

manufacture

problem

-

rifles that

solving approach sunk deep roots in the

Challenged

River Valley.
the Civil

defied existing standards.

to

produce weapons

War, the Armory improved plant

to

This innovative,
fertile

faster

Connecticut

and cheaper during

efficiencies.

In addition,

rigorous standards were developed for small, area subcontractors

including the use of precision gauges and fixtures. Output jumped an
incredible 400 percent in the war's
rifle fell to

first

year, while the cost of producing a

$12 from $20. Throughout the 19th century local firm owners

Michael Frisch, Town into City. Springfield, Massachusetts and the Meaning of
Community, 1840 1880 (Cambridge, 1972) p. L6.
2 Frisch, p. 15. The city grew 400 percent between 1820 and 1850, third highest in the
1

-

13

state

studied these designs, manufacturing techniques and
methods of
organization, helping improve their plant efficiencies immensely.3
Civil

War-induced demand fostered relationships between the

Armory and
letter

other regional firms.

Historian Michael Frisch quotes an 1861

from Springfield mayor Daniel Harris

which amplifies

The James

this point.

to

Armory

Director Ripley,

Ames Company, one

T.

of the

biggest suppliers of large cannon to the government during the war,

made

production machinery for the Armory as well. Mayor Harris learned that

was scheduled

the firm

asked Ripley

if

with them."

He

he "might

make
like to

several large

cannon

for the

Armory, and

have carriages manufactured here

then asked "whether Wason's car shop here

the place to get that

work

and the carriages were
the regional

to

is

to

go

not just

well and expeditiously done." Ripley concurred,

built locally.

economy, boosted the

Inter-firm collaboration strengthened

city job base,

valley as a national manufacturing center.
that war-related boosts to the regional

This

and established the

would not be

river

the last time

economy launched rapid

industrial

growth. 4

From

the 1830s forward Springfield enjoyed a comparative

technological advantage based
their diffusion to area firms.

Nathan Rosenberg who

on Armory manufacturing

practices

Historian David Hounshell cites the

closely analyzed

how

and

work

of

production techniques

perfected at federal armories and small arms manufacturing plants
diffused to several other industries.

Rosenberg established that the

3 Frisch,
p. 74; Derwent Whittlesey, The Springfield Armory (1920) p. 265. For an indepth look at the Armory and how its production methods and shop floor organization
influenced manufacturing see Michael Best, The New Competition (Cambridge, 1990).

As succeeding chapters will show, production and
dramatically during both world wars and the Korean and Viet Nam wars.

4

Quoted

in Frisch, p. 79.
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jobs increased

transmitters of ideas

who worked

and innovation were

the makers of

machine

with manufacturers in various industries as they

encountered and overcame production problems. He called
technological convergence.
solved,

tools,

States Hounshell, "As each

new knowledge went back

into the

machine

this

problem was

tool firms,

which

then could be used to solve production problems in other industries."

Between 1830 and 1860 the Armory engaged
that

it

in

widespread diffusion of

was learning about mechanized production,

utilization of gauges, fixtures, jigs

machined

parts.

and

especially the

dies to insure uniformity of

"The Armory acted both as a clearing house for technical

information and a training ground for mechanics
private

all

arms makers or

for

who

later

worked

for

manufacturers of other goods," Hounshell

found. 5

The

'Industrial Beehive'

Aided tremendously by
Springfield

Grows:

1880

industrial center.

the Connecticut River provided easy transportation
1880,

it

Nathan Rosenberg, "Technological Change

Its

prime location on

down

river to

New

led the region in the manufacture of

heavy equipment and machinery, with 437

*

1930

the region's technological convergence,

became an important

York markets and beyond. By

-

mills

and shops employing

Machine Tool Industry, 1840 - 1910/'
Journal of Economic History (1963) quoted in David Hounshell, From the American System
to Mass Production, 1800 - 1932 (Maryland, 1984) p. 4. Hounshell points out that two keys to
Armory success were an early reliance on private arms contractors as a source for innovation
in the

and the perfecting of various ways to inspect parts in the process of manufacture. This
concept spread to other metalworking establishments in Springfield and over time added
to the region's reputation for high quality work (Hounshell, p. 33 - 34, 44). Hounshell also
Deyrup's Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley (Smith College Studies in
History, 1948) for its documentation of instances when the Armory's patternmakers and
skilled foundrymen made "castings of valuable machines developed by contractors"^^)

cites Felica
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7,000 workers.
percent.

Between 1885 and 1890

In 1910 the city

alone,

machine production rose 158

had 251 manufacturing

plants employing 12,361

workers, and by 1930, even though industrial employment in

Massachusetts declined,

it

increased in Springfield.

Foundries, machine

shops, machine tool builders and electrical machinery firms
led the

growth.
In the early 1900s trolley lines extended

downtown
and

center to

streets laid

new neighborhoods. Hundreds

out between 1900 and 1925,

well-known automobiles

-

home

and the

to the

the country,
city's

city's

North End. East Springfield would become
first

automobile factory

and the Westinghouse Company, while over

was

of

manufacturing centers started in East

Stevens-Dureya Car Company, the

Nicknamed

built

names

carrying the

most important manufacturers soon gravitated

Springfield

homes were

in population increases of 5,000 to 10,000

New

people every five years. 6

many

of

Chalmers, Packard, Ford, Duryea. Residential

neighborhood growth resulted

Springfield

outward from the

a

to the

dozen of

in

the

North End. 7

the "Industrial Beehive of Massachusetts," by 1930

a diversified

manufacturing

city

with over 300 firms and

18,000 workers producing a variety of machine tools, assemblies, and

components
electrical

for the country's

equipment

machine

industries.

tool,

automobile,

steel,

and

The North End, bordered by the

Connecticut River to the west and Chicopee to the north, was dotted with
large metalworking companies employing mainly skilled

and semi-skilled

machinists, machine operators, and precision assemblers along with small

6 For

photographs of early

History
7

factories see

D'Amato,

(Virginia, 1985) p. 138.

D'Amato,

p. 139.
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Springfield

-

350 Years:

A

Pictorial

tool

and

die shops

fixtures, tools,

and foundries

specializing in the production of

and spare parts needed

keep production

to

lines running.

Occupational Stmctiirp

A

comparison of Springfield's occupational structure with near-by

Holyoke, Massachusetts and other mill
skill

cities in the state

demonstrates

base, as well as the distinction between Springfield's workforce and

that of textile mill

Table

2.1:

communities across Massachusetts (Table

2.1) 8

Occupations in Springfield and Holyoke, 1885.
Springfield

Gun makers

250

Machinists

219

Iron workers

154

Steam car builders

174

Woolen

mill operatives

Cotton mill operatives

Holyoke

225

1,125

-

2,205

-

Paper mill operatives

With

2,820

the exception of machinists, the cities are mirror opposites.

Holyoke never had
it

significant

numbers

of

metalworking firms, and those

did have produced machines and attachments for

paper industries. As mills began
skill

this

base contracted as well.

industrial base

was

to exit

Holyoke

after

Springfield's richer,

a source of innovation

its

World War

more

late 19th

its

this

reputation

and early 20th

8 Figures from the 1885 Massachusetts Census for occupations employing 100 or
show the following: Massachusetts Census, 1885.
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I

diversified

and renewal, and

served as a magnet for skilled workers in the

and

local textile

more workers

centuries.

Skilled, foreign-born

union and

political affairs in Springfield

workers would play

a significant role in

along with making a

vital

contribution to industry. 9

By 1939 17 percent of
its

Springfield's manufacturers

and 57 percent of

manufacturing workforce were in metalworking. By comparison,

Worcester, Massachusetts, another large and well diversified

manufacturing center located approximately 50 miles from Springfield,

had 28 percent

of

firms and 46 percent of

its

metalworking. The two

cities

Employment grew slowly

and were scrambling

in

both

to establish training

programs. Observers were impressed with the
of skilled work,

and the innovative

From 1939

years, factories that

much

of

it

shuttered or hollow shells.

in metalworking.

However,

of workers

vital to the successful

war

were

is

evident through an

leaders had. This will be discussed in detail in ch.

The Bosch company newsletter aptly
in

effort,

Firms that remained were smaller: The

many union

highly skilled workers played

in just 40

and produced both

y Evidence of the impact immigrant skilled labor had in Springfield

analysis of the in-plant jobs

legacy

manufacturing employment

employed thousands

machines and components

city's diversity, rich

qualities of firm owners.

to 1947 Springfield's

increased 62 percent,

5.

state's

during the early 1930s, but by mid-1936 employers reported shortages

of skilled metalworkers

the

workforce in

accounted for over half of the

precision metalworking industries.
cities

its

The Craftsman contains evidence of the role
production. The December, 1948 issue carried the names
titled

who had

reached twenty-five years seniority in the factory.
Seventeen of the forty-nine were foreign born, including six from Germany and four from
Italy. Among the group were four toolmakers, three die makers, two set up men, a
of forty-nine workers

production engineer, and the foreman of the experimental machine shop(Craftsman, Vol. 5,
no. 8). Issues of the Craftsman from 1944 - 1958 are located in the Pioneer Valley Historical
Society company archives, Springfield, Ma. For an important analysis of the role
immigrant, skilled workers played in the formation of the United Auto Workers see
Babson, Building the Union: Skilled Workers and Anglo-Gaelic Immigrants in the Rise of
the

UAW New Brunswick, 1991) esp. ch.
(

1
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and Appendix A.

average Springfield-area manufacturing firm

from 1947

number

to 1977.

This

is

fell

from 79

to 35

workers

partly explained by the fact that the total

of firms in the Springfield-area metalworking sector
increased to

355 from 200 while the workforce

fell

to 15,570

from 22,071

in this period.

In greater-Springfield, metalworking firms employing
over 500

workers had been plentiful through the immediate post-war period. By
1958 there were less than

20.

Close to 90 percent of

all

metalworking

establishments employed fewer than 20 workers. 10 The once strong and
vibrant greater-Springfield labor movement, dominated throughout the

post-war period by industrial unions representing skilled and semi-skilled
machinists and metalworkers, was no longer recognizable. 11

Major Firms in Springfield on Eve of World War

On
nation's

deal of

the eve of

World War

mass production economy, while

work from

military production.

historical continuities;
tools,

the city

II

was well
it

integrated into the

continued

to derive a great

Integral to this success

the region's ability to design

and the large numbers

TT

were two

and build machine

of skilled machinists in the Connecticut

River Valley. 12

Arms production dominated
War

to

World War

I.

the regional

In addition to the Armory, the Smith and

Company and Savage Arms employed hundreds

10 United States Department of
firm size

fell

from 90

economy from

Commerce

of assemblers

Manufacturing Censuses.

In

the Civil

Wesson

and

Worcester average

to 30 workers.

Data on firm size and workforce is taken from United States Department of Commerce
Census of Manufacturers and Population Censuses for the years under review.
12 Planning Services Group, The Regional Economy; Federal Population Census, 1920, 1930,
11

1940.
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By the 1870s

machinists.

a

second industrial concentration had grown up

around the Wason Car Manufacturing Company. Founded

Wason produced

railroad cars for virtually every major rail line in the

United States and exported to China,

Wason employed

height in the 1870s

Company

Carriage

in Europe.

In 1892

built carriages
it

built the

The Smith

and wagons sold across

the country

for the first gasoline

States.

In 1895 the

automobile corporation, the Duryea Motor

also incorporated.

tools for both companies.

built

and motorcycles were

New

the Indian Motorcycle
J.

Other firms engaged in the

A cylinder

paperin 1822

Envelopes, dictionaries, lawn mowers,

also

made

in city factories. 13

firms incorporated and began to design and build machine

tools for these

and other

national markets.

The

local industries.

fact that these

Products were also sold in

machines were built

area firms a competitive edge as they were the

advantages

turned out

and operated by Ames and Company

that revolutionized the industry.

elevators

major U.S.

built several of the production

development of many new processes and products.

making machine was

and

Both firms were owned in part by the

Arms and Tool Company, which

machines and

first

its

powered

Wagon Company,

The Knox Automobile Company and

Company were
Stevens

Venezuela and Canada. At

Brazil,

close to 700 people.

body

automobile built in the United

its first cars.

in 1846,

new

technologies provided.

invented an upright

drill.

threading machines and

first to

locally

gave

gain the productivity

The Stacy Machine Works

Bauch Machine Tool Company specialized

worm

gears, universal joints

and cutting

tools.

The Hampden Grinding Wheel Company developed and produced

13 Orra Stone, History of Massachusetts Industries,
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Vol.

1

(Boston, 1930) p. 7

-

10.

in

its

own brand

of precision grinding wheels.

Company, incorporated

in 1900,

was one

By

1930,

Moore Drop Forging

of the largest firms in the city,

with 1,400 workers producing machine beds

for the

mid-West's huge auto

Storms Drop Forge's 1,000 employees manufactured forgings

plants.

export world-wide out of

steel, brass,

for

and bronze. 14

Other machine tool builders and precision metalworking firms

found

in Springfield

on the eve of World War

Gear and Machine Company with 350

and other precision

parts;

II

included:

skilled machinists

the Baldwin-Duckworth

the Perkins

producing gears

Company,

a

maker of

high-grade transmission chains for several machine tool builders; Van

Norman Machine

Company with

Tool

500 workers manufacturing

grinding and milling machines and a machine capable of grinding
bearings;

Chapman Valve Company,

ball

operating three foundries to produce

the castings for hydrants, pipe fittings, sluice gates and valves ranging

from one-quarter inch

to nine feet in diameter;

and Package Machinery,

builder of automatic package wrapping equipment.

Incorporated in Springfield in 1890,

employed 25 workers, producing bench
equipment and other small hand
designed and built the

and the

first

first

The

First

lathes,

tools. In

molding

initially

dies, engravers'

1910 the firm's engineers

milling machines with adjustable cutter heads

cutter grinders. There

in Springfield.

Van Norman

were ready buyers

for these

machines

World War helped Van Norman gain

a national

reputation for designing and building a machine that produced ball
bearings.

Germany.

Through 1915
U.S.

14 Stone,
p. 489

-

ball bearings

were

largely imported

war production would have been

495.

21

from

crippled without this

engineering success. The

through World

War

II

company continued

to

grow

with employment reaching

after the

1,500.

war and

Production

focused mainly on machine tools for the automotive industry
and multi-

purpose milling machines. 15

Chapman Valve was founded by John Chapman

in the 1870s

quickly developed an international reputation for custom valves.

and
only

Its

competitor was the Chicago-based Crane Corporation, which mainly built

On

general purpose valves.

the eve of

World War

$3.6 million foundry adjacent to the Springfield
a steady

supply of valves, and soon employed

foundry was sold to Chapman

II

the U.S.

Chapman

3,600.

Navy

built a

plant to insure

At war's end

the

for $916,000.! 6

Package Machinery formed

in 1912 as the result of a

merger of

several smaller companies based in Springfield, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,

New

Louisville, Kentucky, Chicago, Illinois

and

New

to eliminate costs associated

York. The merger

was designed

York City and Brooklyn,
with

each firm's pursuing parallel technology and to establish greater
production

efficiencies.

approached $2

First year sales

million. 17

The Westinghouse
city's largest

Electric

and Manufacturing Company was

the

manufacturing firm in the early 1930s, with employment

averaging 3,000.
rifles for

were $140,000; by 1930 they

It

received

its first

the Russian government.

contract in 1915 to build one million

When

the

government collapsed

during the revolution, production quickly shifted
the U.S. government.

to

Browning

Rifles for

Here, as with the Armory, a manufacturer that was

15 Forrant, Plant Closings and Major Layoffs in
1987).

16 Forrant, Plant Closings.
17 Stone, p. 539.

22

Hampden County, 1967-1986

(Springfield,

to play a

dominant

role in the city,

had

its

impetus in war and military

spending.

At the conclusion of World War

I

Westinghouse turned

production of small motors and automotive equipment.

grew

to 4,500

fold increase.

to the

Employment

workers by 1930 up from 500 in 1920, an astonishing nine
In addition to motors, the pant

now produced

commercial

radio apparatus, electric fans, and washing machine parts. Westinghouse

purchased $800,000 a year in
transporting
city.

local materials

raw materials and shipping

The American Bosch Corporation,

manufactured
heaters,

fuel injection

equipment

and magnetos and other

and spent $335,000

finished goods in

started in 1911

and out

of the

by Germans,

for diesel engines, gas

water

ignition devices for the automobile.

needed 10,000 miles of wire monthly

to

It

produce magnetos, which kept

area wire-producing firms very busy. The firm employed approximately
1,000 workers in the early 1930s. 18

By the early 1940s Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Westinghouse

and Bosch workers were

affiliated

Machine Workers Union, giving
most

significant

a

One

Electrical,

powerful voice in the

manufacturing plants in the

significant voice in the

18 Stone,
p. 547.
19 D'Amato, p. 140.

it

with the United

city,

Radio and

affairs of the

and by implication

a

development of the Springfield economy. 19

of the best sources for information about early industry

Massachusetts is Orra Stone's two volume study, Massachusetts Industries,
published in 1930. The book devotes chapters to each of the state's largest industrial cities
including Worcester, Lowell, Lynn, Haverhill and Springfield.

development

in

23

The Artman Report: Metalworke rs Importance

Almost immediately

after the

Sp ringfiplH

October 1929 stock market crash the

United States Department of Commerce commissioned

England economy

to

a

study of the

as part of a national effort to "marshal

and analyze

pertinent facts bearing

upon

the economic

life

of the Nation."

New

William

Cooper, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
stated in the report's forward that one of
industrial assets

was

operatives.

theme repeated

In a

Cooper remarked
and

it

New

England's greatest

supply of skilled workmen and seasoned factory
in other observations of the region

that "With long experience in business

in labor organization,

New

England appears

to

management

be increasing

harmonious relationships between labor and industry. According

to

Cooper, "the large number of successful firms, including Van Norman,

Chapman

Valve, Westinghouse, and Bosch relied on worker

skills to

design and build

new equipment and

combined with

group of innovative and forward-looking employers

a

products. This rich

provided the region with an advantage over the

skill

base,

rest of the nation. 20

Charles Artman, an economist employed by the U.S. Department of

Commerce

to prepare the

1910 and 1920

New

England study, determined that between

Hampden County had

the highest percentage increase in

population of any county in Massachusetts, Maine,

Vermont.

New

Hampshire and

Over the same period Hampden County's manufacturing

20 Cooper, forward to Charles Artman, The Industrial Structure of New England
(Washington, D.C., 1930) p. xi. The report is based on information gathered from close to
5,000 manufacturers regarding methods of manufacturing, plant organization and marketing

supplemented by Federal manufacturing census data. It contains richly detailed
analyses of the metalworking, machine tool building, textiles, leather, paper, printing and
publishing and wood and furniture industries.
strategies

24

value added increased 150 percent. Artman attributed

employment
mills

and

in manufacturing, mainly in the Holyoke's
textile

Springfield's metalworking

by decade's end, and
England the decline

into the 1920s

and machine

tool firms.

growth waned. Across

set in earlier, as

from 1914

added and average manufacturing wages

A

this to increased

fell

-

However,

of

all

and paper

New

1925 manufacturing value

below the national average. 21

massive, negative restructuring of the manufacturing economy

took place that continued until war-related production picked up in the
late 1930s

and early

industries

were

1940s.

The once dominant

textile

and boot and shoe

in decline as production shifted to mills in other parts of

the country

and abroad. For

World War

1.

textiles, the crisis

was

in the

However, increased demand during

that

making before

war

resulted in an

expansion of production capacity. Old plants were reopened and new
plants built to

war

meet European export demands. At the conclusion

textile material

consumption dropped sharply and

changes in the types of

textiles

gave way, in large measure,
style

was

new market demands
for

New

to fancy specialties

England

it

."

New

difficult to alter

required.

were

and

novelties, in

England

mills,

organized for

shop floor methods that

Artman described

The periodic ordering

the implications of this

of large quantities for a

whole

season which had been the prevailing practice has

way

in recent years to smaller orders for

current requirements, repeated at frequent intervals,

whereas orders were formerly placed twice

21

Artman,

p.

147

-

149.

25

lines

which

mills:

given

radical

which the market demanded. Staple

the primary consideration...

quantity production, found

"there

of the

a year for

four to six months ahead.

production plans to these

Difficulties in adjusting

new

conditions, account,

in large measure, for the depression of the

England

The number

New

textile industries. 22

of active spindles in place

is

normally used as an

indicator of mill production capacity. In 1927

Hampden County had

cotton textile mills with 663,000 spindles,

highest of

counties, behind Bristol

fifth

and Middlesex counties

Providence, Rhode Island and Hillsborough,

County, with the

cities of Fall River,

7,157,574 spindles

New

and 93

New

England.

mills,

by

New

Hampshire.

that

down from

Artman used,

England was declining,

England

and

Bristol

Bedford and Taunton, had

such concentration in

England mills contained 43.6 percent of

more accurate measure, one

New

New

in Massachusetts

far the largest

cotton spindles in the nation in 1927,

Here, too,

New

all

ten

falling

nation's total in 1922 to 31.5 percent in 1927.

all

the active

50 percent in 1922.

is

A

active spindle hours.

from 40 percent of the
Intensified national

competition resulted in decreased cotton mill activity and employment
fluctuations of

some 30,000 workers

a year

out of a workforce that

averaged around 200,000. 23
Like cotton, the woolen and worsted industry had contributed
significantly to the

New

England economy: By the mid-1 920s 443

employed 106,155 workers, with 42 percent
the workers in Massachusetts.

From 1880

of the mills

mills

and 52 percent

to 1925 the industry

was

of

stable:

22 Artman's observation that the failure to shift production strategies to respond to changes
in the demand for good produced is an important one and it is picked up again in the 1950s

when

the federal government commissions another study of the

(Artman,

p. 280).

23 Artman, Table
in

New England economy

Place 1880

-

-

New

1927, p.

England Compared with Rest of United States
290; For workforce levels, p. 294.

26

in

Cotton Spindles

There were
while the

just five

state's

fewer firms

in

Massachusetts in 1925 than in 1908,

share of total U.S. output rose slightly. Firms and
output

diminished however, as a result of changes

Consumers wanted

industry.

meant

to

purchase ready-to-wear goods. This

a greater portion of mill sales

something

New

England

mill

in the internal structure of the

were

directly to

owners were slow

garment makers,

to recognize.

now

Mills

resorted to sharp price-cutting to keep customers, ultimately weakening
the entire industry in the state. 24

Artman was

pessimistic about the prospects of every

New

England

industry with the exception of metalworking: "The industries which

depend primarily upon metals
important group of

all

New

for their

raw materials comprise

the

most

England manufacturers when regarded as

a

source of revenue to the region." The industry's average wage of $1,347

exceeded

all

other manufacturing sectors by 16 percent, and 33 percent of

all

manufacturing value added in

its

3,662 metalworking firms.

New

England in 1925 was generated by

The value added of the

electrical

machinery, and foundry and machine shop products sectors in
Massachusetts

England

state.

now

exceeded $280 million, higher than any other

While manufacturing value added

boots and shoes

still

in cotton

New

goods and

exceeded metalworking, the gap was narrowing. 25

^4

Artman, p. 354. Artman was able to gather detailed information from 1,100 New
England firms engaged in metalworking to shape his discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the industry.
25 Artman,

Firm size differed as well, with metalworking and textile
companies averaging 86 and 160 workers respectively. The top five value added industries
in 1925 were: cotton goods - $252M; boots and shoes - $163M; electrical machinery - $153M;
worsted goods - $133M; foundry and machine shop products - $133M. Artman, comparisons

by

p. 155, 158, 197.

state in Tables, p. 178

-

180.

27

Artman probed
and identify

their sales

Middle Atlantic
from

there.

states,

further, asking

owners

their competitors.

to indicate the origin of

Fifty-three percent sold in the

and 27 percent indicated

that they

had competition

Almost 10 percent had customers abroad, and

close to four

percent indicated they had overseas competitors. Artman
concluded that

metal manufacturers had nation-wide markets and faced strong and

growing national competition. 26

Artman next inquired about
factors in starting a firm in

markets second

among

New

the relative importance of various

England. Labor

the responses.

skills

ranked

first

The more complicated and

the product or part being produced, the greater

was

and

precise

the importance of

access to skilled labor. "With the heavier and less highly fabricated metal
industries, location of markets
location.

was given

as the principal reason for plant

This includes such enterprises as foundries, structural iron

work, sheet metal and wire work. In several machinery
textile

lines, particularly

machinery, the near-by market afforded by other industries was the

principal reason for the given location." 27

26 For these figures see Artman, "Location of Markets and of Competitors as Indicated by
New England Metal Manufacturers," p. 198. It is important to note the level of competition

metalworking firms already perceived from the Middle Atlantic states and abroad in the
mid-1920s. When plant relocations and sizable shifts of work took place after World War
II economists, labor unions, and political officials expressed a great deal of surprise at this
turn of events. They should not have been caught so off guard.
27 Artman, p. 199.

28

Artman

a nd

Mptalworking

Artman's review of four metalworking sectors

machinery and appliances,

and foundry and machine shop products

these

made up

-

is

very important since

the core of Springfield metalworking

Machinery.

electrical

machinery and equipment, machine

textile

tools,

Electrical

-

The manufacture of

by the

electrical

appliances accounted for 15 percent of the total value of

produced by metalworking industries
to 41,000

in

New

machinery and
products

England and employed

workers in 1927. Such firms made equipment

power industry such

all

1920s.

close

for the electrical

as generators, transformers, control apparatus,

batteries, electric motors, electric lamps, radio apparatus, insulated wire

and

electrical appliances.

between 1904 and

1925,

Product value increased slightly over eight times

comparing favorably

where value increased nine
companies were

in

The

times.

to the country as a

whole

largest concentrations of

Southwestern Connecticut, around Providence, Rhode

Island and in the Northeast and Western portions of Massachusetts, with
just eight

sector

such firms in

all

a healthy

maps

New Hampshire

was expanding rapidly and was

Textile Machinery.

on

of Maine,

and expanding

to indicate

many were

Textile

where

firmly rooted in Springfield. 28

machinery production was dependent

textile industry.

textile

Artman developed

location

machinery plants existed and found that

in Bristol County, Massachusetts

28 Artman, p. 203; plant location map,

and Vermont. The

p. 202.

29

-

where

textile mill cities Fall

River,

New

Bedford and Taunton are located

line in Providence,

Rhode

Island.

-

and

directly across the state

Other machine builders were located

near mills in Lowell, Massachusetts.

Artman asked owners why they

believed they were successful.

Their responses included:

"Better accounting

methods have added materially

in

controlling purchases;" "Standardization of products,
materials, equipment,

importance to

us;"

and performance have been

of greatest

"Reduced costs have resulted from

standardization of products;" "Expenses have been cut by

reduction in number of executives;"

"We have

and

in styles."

They were

better

machines

to

meet changes

clearly grappling with several of the

built

new

key issues central to

maintaining a profitable enterprise. 29

Machine Tools

.

employment increased

In the machine tool sector output,

wage

rates,

By 1927

New

England

steadily during the 1920s.

and

firms produced 25 percent of the country's machine tools, tools, and

attachments. Average annual wages of $1,501 were the highest of any

New

England industry. Several owners indicated they were doing

research to develop better designs, standardize tools, and gain a greater

understanding of customer needs. Firms also invested in
tools to increase productivity

remove

through "greater speed and accuracy, which

bottle necks in the flow of production."

29 Artman, p. 206

-

new machine

210.

30

One response captured

this well:

"Much

of our

work

is

special;

improvements

cost or increase efficiency of machines claim

in design to reduce

most of our

attention. "30

Foundries and Mach ine Shops Foundries and machine shops
relied

on subcontracts from

larger manufacturers to supply

designed castings, highly specialized

machine

tool attachments.

they solicited

work

tools, fixtures, jigs,

Firms were referred

a job at a time,

them with

gauges, and

to as 'job shops'

and often one part

pre-

at a time

because

from

customers. Eight hundred and fourteen such shops were located in

their

New

England, with slightly over 60 percent in Massachusetts. The Northeast
region of Massachusetts had the largest cluster of these firms, with
additional large concentrations in Worcester and Springfield.

hundred and twelve firms supplied Artman with

Of

those, over half

less

employed

less

One

detailed information.

than 25 workers, while 75 percent had

than 100. Sixty-four firms had more than half of their sales in

England, the

rest

had

a geographically diverse

markets were insignificant.

New

customer base. Foreign

Firms placed emphasis on continuous plant

maintenance. Since the ability to produce a customized part quickly

customer

is

a

good measure

of shop performance, this

could not afford to have equipment

down

30 Artman,

p. 212.

p. 213

-

31 Artman, p. 222

-

215; plant location

map,

makes

sense.

for a

Shops

for lengthy repairs. 31

The geographically diverse customer base is surprising in an
industry that relies heavily on contact with customers and is most likely indicative of
precision work done by Massachusetts shops.
227.

31

the

The Springfield Labor Force

On
specialty

the eve of

World War

greater-Springfield

had

close to 200

machine shops and metalworking firms producing precision

components and machine

tools.

enterprises overall in the city.
States

II

There were close

to

400 manufacturing

Figures taken from the Fifteenth United

Census show that the three largest sectors were the iron and

steel

industry with 4,900 workers; the electrical machinery industry with
2,710

workers; and miscellaneous manufacturing with 4,400. According to a
1941

Work

Projects Administration Study of Springfield:

Springfield's products have been for the most part the
essentials of other industries, the machines, the tools,

and

units that turn the wheels of industry the world over.

Because of

this inter-relationship

and the

diversification of

her industries, Springfield has suffered less from economic

upheaval than single-industry

Skill

cities of

New

England. 32

Levels and Ethnicity

"Without the Armory, Springfield was destined
transportation center, and the coming of the railroads

to

become

a

would have brought

with them commercial and perhaps industrial development of the

wrote Armory historian Derwent Whittlesey in 1920.

The character

of the city's industrialism,

and the

nature of the commodities produced has, however,

been largely determined by the

32 Works Progress Administration,

activities of the

Springfield, Massachusetts, p. 57.

32

place,"

Armory. Highly
steel

skilled labor,

producing

fine

grade

goods, has given Springfield an economic

which has fewer drawbacks than
manufacturing
Springfield

cities....

As

that of

most

a consequence,

neither a sleepy village resting

is

past glories, nor

is it

conspicuous for

its

life

on

its

a coarse factory town,

slums and

Springfield's skilled workforce

tired workers. 33

and perceived labor peace led

to the

establishment of a major foreign automobile company. In 1919 Rolls

Royce,

Inc.

undertook a thorough investigation of potential sights

manufacturing

Reasons given

facility in the

United

States,

and

settled

on

for the choice included access to a constant

for a

Springfield.

supply of skilled

machinists and easy access to high quality drop forgings. According to
Rolls Royce's press release announcing the selection:

In 1919, Springfield

Royce of America,

was chosen

Inc.,

for the

works of Rolls

only after the most meticulous

country-wide survey. In addition to being the

from labor troubles
Springfield

work

-

-

in the United States, the artisans of

from long experience

were found

workmanship

city freest

to possess the

in fine precision

same pride

in

as the craftsmen of England.

Cars costing $20,000 were soon being produced by Rolls Royce's 1,400
workers. 34

Seventeen years

later

Henry Ford had much

the

same

praise for the

region's metalworkers.

33 Derwent Whittlesey, The Springfield Armory, 1920,
34 Stone, p. 550.

33

p. 265;

Stone, p. 482.

The

skill

of Springfield's engineers

traditional.

known

Less well

wide search

is

and workers

the fact that in

is

its

world-

never ending improvements, the Ford
Motor Company has found in Springfield dependable
for

sources for a substantial portion of

its

equipment and

parts used in building Ford cars. 35

These observers were

correct:

There was

a higher proportion of

workers in Springfield than in Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell. In

skilled

addition, from 1930 through the 1950s there

was

a higher ratio of skilled

machinists, toolmakers and millwrights to semiskilled metalworkers in
Springfield than other cities (Table 2.2

Employment).

How

be discussed in

later chapters.

Springfield's
late

this affected

-

Distribution of Total

union organization in Springfield, will

It is

important to point out here that

most prominent union organizers and

officers

during the

1930s and early 1940s consistently came from the ranks of highly

workers in firms

skilled

like

Bosch and Westinghouse.

In addition to the skill distinction Springfield's ethnic

make-up was

distinct

from that of Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell: From 1890

the city

had

35 SR,

a lower percentage of foreign born residents

November

21, 1936, p. 13.

34

to 1940

and residents

.2:

Distribution of total

employment

in selected cities 1930

Holyoke

Springfield

Worcester

Lowell

Manuf./Mechanical 54 percent

38 percent

44 percent

54 percent

Trade

12 percent

17 percent

13 percent

14 percent

Clerical

9 percent

14 percent

8 percent

9 percent

Professional

7 percent

8 percent

7 percent

9 percent

Craftsmen

13 percent

17 percent

16 percent

12 percent

Operatives

33 percent

21 percent

26 percent

38 percent

Clerical/Sales

19 percent

26 percent

22 percent

17 percent

Professional

7 percent

7 percent

8 percent

7 percent

Craftsmen

2,444

9,631

11,091

4,182

Operatives

6,351

12,089

17,964

12,870

Craftsmen

14 percent

16 percent

16 percent

14 percent

Operatives

35 percent

24 percent

26 percent

37 percent

Clerical/Sales

22 percent

26 percent

23 percent

18 percent

Professional

9 percent

9 percent

10 percent

8 percent

Craftsmen

3,244

10,884

12,994

5,261

Operatives

7,989

16,404

20,833

14311

Y ear

1930

1940

1950

born of foreign or mixed parentage than these three

cities.

-

1950.

Forty-four

percent of Springfield's 1910 population was native born, as against 28
percent in Worcester, 20 percent in Lowell and 16 percent in near-by

Holyoke. In 1910 24 percent of Holyoke and 20 percent of Lowell's
residents

were born

in

French Canada or had

35

at least

one parent

who had

been (Table

2.3

-

Ethnicity in Selected Cities). In Springfield,

by

contrast,

only seven percent could make such a claim.
Springfield

had higher percentages

immigrants than other

cities studied.

skilled machinists

were found

during the Civil War. After the war

and German

These groups and native born

workers comprised the largest number of

German

of English

skilled

in large

metalworkers in the

numbers

city records

show

at the

that a

city.

Armory

number

of

small machine shops were started along with a brass foundry and the
largest

brewery

High

in the region.

skill levels

of

German immigrants

revealed in the 1885 state census as well; of 312 German-born males

almost 85 percent were

skilled.

German-born workers

the city's earliest labor unions, the Cigar

also started

are

listed

two of

Makers and the Journeymen

Tailors. 36

Further distinctions are possible

occupations in mill

Holyoke

cities like

contrasting the principal

Holyoke and Lowell with

in 1880 63 percent of the workforce

woolen, paper and cotton
British

when

mills,

Springfield.

was engaged

In

as operatives in

with 57 percent born in Ireland and

Canada. In Springfield, by

contrast, just 13 percent

were

in textile

mills. 3 ?

36 Data for these tables

is

taken from the

US

Population Censuses for the years

cited.

In

between craftsmen and operatives. On
Springfield's German population see Goff, Springfield's Ethnic Heritage: The German
1940 distinctions were

Community

made

for the first time

(Springfield, 1976) p. 10-11.

37 Massachusetts Population Census, 1880.

36

Table 23: Ethnicity in selected
1890

-

cities

by percent

of total population

1950.

Year

Holyoke

Springfield

Native Born

17 percent

49 percent

Foreign Born

83 percent

51 percent

17 percent

Worcester

Lowell

44 percent

31 percent

22 percent

42 percent

33 percent

37 percent

35 percent

41 percent

23 percent

32 percent

43 percent

16 percent

40 percent

28 percent

20 percent

44 percent

34 percent

38 percent

39 percent

40 percent

26 percent

33 percent

41 percent

23 percent

41 percent

31 percent

27 percent

48 percent

37 percent

43 percent

47 percent

29 percent

22 percent

26 percent

26 percent

22 percent

18 percent

21 percent

19 percent

17 percent

14 percent

17 percent

15 percent

1890:

1900:

Native Born

NB/Foreign

Pts.

Foreign Born

1910:

Native Born

NB/Foreign

Pts.

Foreign Born

1930:

Native Born

NB/Foreign
Foreign Born

Pts.

1940:

Native Born
Foreign Born

1950:

Native Born
Foreign Born

A
two

comparison of manufacturing employment
development through the

distinct patterns of

20th century (Table 2.4

-

in these cities

first

shows

three decades of the

Industry Employment in 1930). Springfield and

Worcester represented one path, Holyoke and Lowell the other. By 1930

Worcester had 23 percent and Springfield 13 percent of

employment

in Iron

and

Holyoke and Lowell the

Steel,

figure

its

manufacturing

Metals and Electrical Machinery, while for

was

eight percent

37

and

six percent,

respectively.

and

Mill occupations comprised only six percent
of Springfield

11 percent of Worcester's workforce, but

jumped

to 45 percent in

Holyoke, and 35 percent in Lowell. 3 ^

Table

Industry employment in 1930.

2.4:

Holyoke

Springfield

Worcester

Lowell

All industry

22,245

66,521

82,993

40,662

Iron and Steel

1,547

5,117

15,932

1,969

Metals

78

962

445

95

Electrical

154

2,710

2,366

252

Clothing

176

1,202

1,888

493

Shoes

7

27

2,130

2,880

Paper

4,966

1,179

1,385

227

Cotton Mills

751

424

183

5,274

Woolen

1736

34

1,320

2,268

2,465

1,285

2,360

3,324

Mach.

Mills

Other
Textiles

Statewide Workforce Structure

The

state's

concentration of metalworking helped

it

survive the

sharp reduction in mill work between the two world wars and in the

few years

after

benefits to

World War

some

cities

EL

and not

The

first

actual location of firms provided

to others,

even when communities were

contiguous as in the case of Springfield and Holyoke. Precision

metalworking allowed Springfield

to

late 1950s, after textile mill cities like

38 Massachusetts Population Census, 1930.

38

grow and prosper during

the 1930s

Holyoke and Lowell had ceased

to

-

increase their

numbers

employment gains

Table

2.5:

of production workers.

in Springfield

From 1939

were twice the

Production workers in the

state

and

to

1947

state average.

selected cities 1900

-

1987.

Year

State

Holyoke

Springfield

Worcester

Lowell

1900

438,200

12,519

8,152

22,593

29,254

1905

488,399

14,685

10,523

22,796

29,303

1914

606,698

17,493

14,240

29,452

29,904

1919

713,836

18,904

18,429

44,831

31,154

1929

547,509

13,770

17,414

31,636

17,097

10,646

12,490

23,160

13,308

1933
1939

460,674

8,539

13,846

31,659

13,828

1947

601,603

12,532

22,426

37,834

16,053

1958

498,612

8,606

18,811

26,548

13,045

1967

507,900

8,100

17,200

24,800

13,000

1972

416,000

6,800

13,200

19,700

11,700

1977

407,000

5,800

12,900

17,600

10,700

1982

397,000

5,500

11,300

14,500

13,300

1987

348,300

5,000

7,700

11,100

11,300

30 percent

46 percent

62 percent

19 percent

16 percent

32 percent

53 percent

42 percent

53 percent

33 percent

42 percent

60 percent

66 percent

71 percent

30 percent

1939-1947
increase wkrs.

1947-1977
decline wkrs.

1947-1987
decline wkrs.

Table 2.5

-

Production Workers in Selected Cities traces worker

levels in four Massachusetts cities

change.

These

from 1900

cities reflect the larger

1987 and demonstrates

this

trends in the state as a whole.

Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell reached

39

to

their

employment pinnacles

in

1919.

By

contrast, Springfield surpassed 1919 levels as factory

rose dramatically during
of job loss in Springfield

World War

II.

employment

However, from 1947-1987

was exceeded only by Worcester and

it

was

the rate
1.5

times the state decline.

Table

2.6:

Manufacturing firms in selected

Year

State

1880

cities

1880

-

1987.

Holyoke

Springfield

Worcester

120

437

633

Lowell

1900

10,929

158

278

465

286

1905

10,723

179

296

470

256

1914

12,013

222

395

606

300

1919

11,906

176

401

618

291

1929

9,872

155

318

533

217

1

11
15/

277

474

197

1937

8,619

143

291

516

204

1939

9,007

153

310

542

204

148

301

491

202

1943

1947

10,524

164

364

574

214

1954

11,205

163

328

595

211

1958

11,409

162

329

575

204

1963

11,311

165

311

537

218

1967

10,963

144

284

501

211

1972

10,770

143

260

452

191

1977

11,133

138

233

437

181

1982

11,017

130

216

377

174

1987

11,016

115

200

342

161

Firm gain/loss

492

-49

-164

-232

-53

5 percent

-30 percent

-45 percent

-40 percent

-25 percent

1947-87
Percent
gain /loss

40

Between 1939 and 1947 there was an upturn
in all four cities, but
2.6

-

none ever exceeded

Firms in Selected

immediately
Plant

after

Cities).

World War

Locally

in the

number

levels reached in 1919 (see Table

owned

firms started to change hands

This was most noticeable

II.

of firms

and equipment investments lagged

new owners

as

first in textiles.

built factories

overseas and in the South, and shifted work from Springfield to these

Forty-five percent of Springfield's manufacturing facilities were

facilities.

shuttered between 1947 and 1987. Skill counted for very

such dislocation, and as chapter 4 will argue, corporate
in the first
reliant

new

few years

after

World War

on production worker

skills

II

to

II

in the face of

strategic decisions

adopt production measures

less

contributed to this swift decline. 39

The Armory's Impact on

Throughout World War

little

the

the Region

Armory

trained

and employed

thousands of Springfield metal workers. Shortages of skilled machinists

and toolmakers had developed
1938.

In response, the

in the vicinity of Springfield as early as

Armory Apprentice School was

with 29 students ages 16

-

21 enrolled in

its

education classes were held for apprentices

pilot 4 year

Armory was using

the Fall 500

program. Evening

at the Springfield

in mechanical drawing, math, industrial science

1940 the

established in 1939,

Trade School

and business English. By

the school for night courses for

all

were enrolled, and by the Spring of 1941 extensive

mill

training

Commerce, Manufacturing Censuses. For
ownership changes and disinvestment see William Hartford,

39 Forrant, Plant Closings;

Holyoke story on

workers; in

US Department

of

Working People of Holyoke (New Brunswick, 1990) esp.

41

ch. 8.

the

was being given

in

Armory wartime

machine

civilian

set

up and operation

employment ranged from

Armory production

processes

made

skill,

7,500 to 13,500.

extensive use of gage controls

and powered equipment, complete inspection
division of

to 1000 workers.

with mostly piece-rate-paid

of parts,

and an elaborate

In the early years of the

labor.

20th century, with industrial productivity receiving national attention

through the

new

efforts of Frederick Taylor

and

others, the

Armory

established

piece rate systems and instituted time and motion studies on most

machine operations. Unlike other armories and large
U.S. there

were few organized

or influenced

protests.

Armory

factories across the

borrowed from

practices

by Taylorism included centralized planning

for better

routing of tasks and components, improved accounting systems for tools

and raw materials, introduction
reorganization of shop floor

of high-speed tool steels,

work

flow.

This peaceful process of

Taylorization needs to be examined to determine

influenced shop floor

work

and

how

it

may have

organization, labor relations and union

formation in Springfield. 40

During

WW

I

Armory workers

totaled 7,000.

The Armory

contracted extensively for gauges from area machine shops.

though many operations

in the giant plant

remained high according

to

Armory

But even

were standardized,

historian Raber:

skill levels

"Increased

mechanization and decreased handwork had never meant extensive
skilling' at Springfield.

necessary until World

On
War

the contrary, not only
II,

but

many machine

was some hand

'de-

fitting

operations required

40 Raber, Conservative Innovators and Military Small Arms: An Industrial History of the
Springfield Armory, 1794 - 1968, p. 11, 17. Study located in Springfield Armory research
library.

42

more

skill

when components were

managers turned

to

women composed
employed

number

women

taken closer to gage." 4 *

during World

I

and by the Armistice,

about 16 percent of the 5,000 person workforce,

principally in filing, inspecting,

also in

War

Armory

and packing, with

a small

machine work.

Between the wars the workforce was slashed

to 1880s levels, to just

over 1,000 workers. The Armory had to bid on other manufacturing
work

simply to keep the plant running and retain a core of skilled workers.

According

to

Armory

historian Constance

Green

production included

this

the manufacture of the water meter registers for the

new

District of

Columbia water works. 42

By the

Armory

late 1920s the

to find

and

improving economy made

retain skilled workers.

it

Records indicate that skilled

workers took jobs in other firms offering higher wages.

Armory began
there

was

replacing machinery in 1930 to produce

fear that the requisite skill

the city to manufacture
tools

and

were purchased

-

it.

For the

some from

tools already attached.

The

and

The increasing presence

the

new Ml

rifle

workers could no longer be found in

first

time in

Armory

Springfield firms

shift to

more

-

setting

history machine

with

jigs, fixtures,

simplified, single-operation

who had

little

up metalworking equipment.

of military officers

on the shop

1935, created sporadic disagreements. In 1937 an officer

Inspector General's office

When

its

production machines eased the training of new workers
prior experience operating

difficult for the

was scheduled

floors after

from the Federal

for a visit to Springfield to hear

41 Raber,
p. 19.

42 Constance Green, History of the Springfield Armory,
manuscript located in Armory museum) p. 24.

43

Vol.

2,

1948 (unpublished

complaints on pay issues.

"When

the stipulated hour of the

arrived, a line of workers stretched

from the door of the

day named

office in the

Administration building in Armory Square out the door
and

through the grounds into the

Armory

street.

The obvious impossibility

surprise.

complaints that afternoon led

officials

were

down

clearly taken

of the Inspector's hearing

many

of the

men

work benches" Within weeks workers turned

to return

by

all

unheard

to organization,

to their

and

in

June 1937, bypassing the small National Federation of Federal Employees
Local 101 in the Armory, the American Federation of Government

Employees Lodge 431 (AFL) was
This

new

established.

local represented a significant challenge to

management because

it

raised a

number

of

Armory

unanswered questions with

regard to federal workers' rights to collective bargaining. Lodge 431 also

challenged the American Federation of Labor; local union leaders insisted
that, rather

than organize just craft workers, every Armory employee was

eligible for

membership upon payment

cents a

month

of a dollar initiation fee

and 50

dues. The lodge withstood efforts throughout 1938 by

Springfield Machinists, Electricians and Carpenters unions to split off the
crafts. 43

The union's

first activity

was

a regional

Armory workers' pay could not exceed
work

in

surrounding communities.

wage

the average

survey. By federal law

pay

for similar skilled

The union's investigation

determined that payments in 45 job categories were too low; each was

upgraded

as a result.

By mid-1941,

as pre-war production picked up, 4,900

workers were employed around the

43 Raber,

p. 21;

Green, Vol.

2, p.

69b.

44

clock, five times

more than

in 1936,

and by December, 1941 7,500 workers packed
thousands of

month. Just as in the

rifles a

military officers

on

the

shop

floor

the

shop

producing

floor,

late 1930s, the

presence of

caused conflicts with the

civilian

workforce and led to worker protests throughout the war. Wartime
civilian

employment ranged from

composed 43 percent
from 26.7 percent

of the workforce.

and by mid-1943 women

Worker turnover rose

steadily

in 1939 to 34.5 percent in 1941, 38 percent in 1942,

An

percent in 1943.

7,500 to 13,500

and 42

interview with Lodge President Alexander Cardinal,

determined that in 1943 4,600 workers, only 40 percent of the

total

workforce were paying dues. Rapid employment growth and high
turnover rates
In 1944

newspapers

may have

contributed to

this.

union-management problems were reported

regularly.

in the local

Central to a long simmering dispute

was

the

union's determination to establish a labor-management committee with
authority over labor policy in the plant. Union president Cardinal saw
this

an opportunity

collaboration,

to set

up

a

scheme of management-worker

which could serve

as a

model

Government

for all

establishments and benefit labor in private plants as well.

Colonel Allan

Wody

offered to set

up four advisory committees

each major production unit in the plant
rejected this idea, insisting that

transferred

this

fifty

-

summer on

tug-of-war was being played out

sprawling

role

facility.

While the

one

for

job duties

was warranted.

this issue.

Armory management

workers from the Inspection Department

Manufacturing Department as part of an overall
in the

-

chief

but in March, 1944 the union

more than an advisory

Negotiations dragged on through the

While

Armory

to the

effort to reorganize

were

work

virtually the same,

conditions changed because, as Cardinal indicated, the inspectors would

45

now perform

work on

their

the

switch as an arbitrary demotion of

evidence has not been found, but
publicized disputes In the

The union viewed the

factory floor.

group of workers. Substantiating

a

is

it

likely

city's largest

such unresolved, highly

metalworking company did

little to

heighten unionism in Springfield. 44

A
The

1*^5

1

Second Look

Commission on

Twenty-two years

Metalworking

at

the

after Charles

New

:

England Economy

Artman's study of manufacture

President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers launched a similar
effort.

Truman and

occurring in

New

the Council were deeply concerned that job loss

England

in the early 1950s

would have

a deleterious

impact on future defense mobilizations requiring the rapid production of
military hardware.

Westinghouse employment climbed

War

II

as production shifted

equipment

to shell fuses

city factories.

Springfield

was designated one

dropped sharply: on V-E Day
4,440,

parts.

of 32

war production

late

December,

there

were 9,900

and by end of 1945 only

Westinghouse and others

"In 1929, 47,700 people

number reached more than

However, between August and

Day

over 4,000 during World

from refrigeration and air-conditioning

and tank

In 1941 the

to

laid off

1,700

1

worked

54,000 and
centers." 45

M5 Armory employment

C

civilian

employees, by V-J

workers remained. Bosch,

thousands of workers as well.

A

skilled

44 Raber,
Alexander
p. 21; Green, Vol. 2, p. 155; Green, interview with Local president
Cardinal, Vol. 2, p. 335; Green, p. 445 - 448.
45 D'Amato, p. 141.

4b

in

labor shortage quickly

enough

became an

to sustain a vibrant

excess,

and

skill,

by

itself,

was not

manufacturing region. 46

The Council appointed

a

committee of distinguished scholars,

including Seymour Harris of Harvard University, labor historian
Philip
Taft of

Brown

University, and Charles

I.

Gregg, a professor in the Harvard

Graduate School of Business Administration
time the project got underway the Korean

to

conduct the study.

War had broken

By

the

out,

heightening interest in the Committee's findings since factories in the
region played such a significant role in World

War

II

weapons

production. 47

Members wasted no time
major problem confronting

New

zeroing in on what they believed to be the

England industry. Late 19th and early

20th century industrial leaders often attained success only after
considerable struggle with competitive forces, they reasoned. Successive

generations became more conservative, "turned their attention
industrial progress"

the status quo."

and exhibited greater

away from

"interest in the preservation of

This led to deep-seated problems that threatened the

existence of a strong manufacturing economy.

In the report's introduction

they wrote:

To some extent manufacturing
and the

early part of the 20th century seems to

lethargy and complacency

which handicapped
regions.

success in the 19th century

among New England

the region in

Historical

The gap between ownership

Summary

47 Committee on the
-

New

industrialists

competition with newer

its

46 Green has a lengthy description of these training

Armory

have bred

policies

efforts.

of Activities 2 September 1945

-

motivated by

Green,

p.

413

30 June 1951,

England Economy, The New England Economy

iv.

47

-

416; Springfield

p. 103.
(July, 1951)

,

p.

iii

short-run financial considerations and the need for
long-run
modernization, research and product development has
also

intensified manufacturing

problems

in

New

Technological innovation, and the dispersion of

and approaches

viewed

Commission found

The 1919

Rolls

new production methods

David Hounshell and Nathan Rosenberg

that historians

as a key to the region's 19th

President's

England." 48

and

early 20th century success, the

sorely lacking by the early 1950s.

Royce location study, the 1929 Artman report

Department of Commerce, the

WPA

early 1940s

analysis

for the

and Henry Ford's

laudatory comments about Springfield workers had posited a bright

economic future
textile

for Springfield.

employment

across

Holyoke and Lowell, not

New

The downward

spiral in boot, shoe,

and

England had challenged the resiliency of

Springfield.

dominant manufacturers

Its

-

American Bosch, Westinghouse, Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Moore

Drop Forge, Smith and Wesson and

the

Armory

-

produced

for steadily

growing national and global markets, and made gigantic output leaps
during the war years. Though there were downward adjustments
1945 and early 1946 as war production stopped, city
labor leaders could not help but be optimistic.

recession hit

New

officials,

in late

business and

However, the 1948

-

1949

England harder than any other region of the country,

and Commission members called

this

optimism into question.

There were significant numbers of aging multi-story plants with
their inherent

problems whenever

a plant

manager wanted

production lines to get better work flow and
handling.

Newer

Committee,

one-story

facilities, like

p. xxii.

48

limit the

all

to reorganize

amount

of material

those being built across the

South,

from

made

New

this easier.

their acquisition of

World War
The

new

England competitors benefited, as
plants built with federal

money during

II.

lack of managerial foresight

the overall failure to invest in

commission members. The

new

and

strategic thinking, along

report's authors frequently

action," to describe industry

ingenuity during the Civil War,

with

plant and equipment alarmed

"inflexibility in thinking," "resistance to change,"

and

well,

and labor

used phrases

"inflexibility of

leaders.

like

thought

The Armory's

Van Norman's engineering

ability, the

Bosch's core of highly skilled precision machinists, had dissipated.

Regional solutions lay in recapturing that production advantage by
"adapting

its

existing manufacturing industries to changing technologies

and new products and diverting
industries

which involve

its

resources into newer and expanding

a higher ratio of value

Unfortunately, this required precisely the
that the

commission found

added

flexibility of

to

thought and action

lacking. 49

However, the Korean War rearmament boom acted
release valve

and made

it

value shipped."

possible for

New

England firms

like a pressure

to ignore

problems identified by the Commission. Between June 1950 and February
1951, for example, defense contracts to
million, 10 percent of the U.S. total.

Even though

the textile industry

New

England reached close

Over 50 percent

was

of this

demonstrate
there

was no

p. 26.

A specific

in textiles.

on the immediate

reference to the boot and shoe industry

was used

to

While the boot and shoe industry shed thousands of jobs
what was the most rapidly growing market niche in the country,

failed leadership:
shift into

$487

in a precarious position, millions of

dollars in contracts provided the rationale for focusing

49 Committee,

was

to

baby shoes.

49

as

opposed

much needed

to the

renovation in business thinking

Commission members advocated. 50

Conclusion:

Labor Declines as Defense Sppnding Wanps

and Plant Relocations Begin

The Korean War defense spending boom was not enough

to

stimulate sustainable growth and fend off plant closings. The assumption
that highly skilled

more

metalworking plants were somehow insulated from

familiar textile

and shoe

Motorcycle failed in the

production

facilities

plant which
in the city

-

began

4,600 people in 1950

a slow, painful 12 year

for this

Political leaders

phase out.

The World Takes"

Its

gates

were

skill,

their

precision

unions had no answer

New

Jersey's

motto

-

"Trenton Makes-

downward

spiral

p.

145

-

part

loci of firm

such contracts helped mask
ability to compete in commercial markets. These contracts

Here, as during World

weaknesses in the industry 's
only allowed the industry to 'buy

D'Amato,

is

and economic events, the clash between

what he terms Civic Capitalism and National Capitalism. The

51

economy

loss. 51

For Cumbler, Trenton's

larger set of political

56.

that

as indicative of the manufacturing prowess of the city

in the early 20th century.

50 Committee, p.

finally

down. The plant

in 1968 costing the local

and workers and

massive job and revenue

much

one of every seven workers

establish the city's identity as a high

John Cumbler uses Trenton,

of a

-

finally closed

metalworking region ceased operations
2,000 jobs.

its

the city's third largest employer, and

symbol of manufacturing innovation,

had helped

Indian

incorrect.

and the East Springfield Westinghouse

city;

Even the Armory,

locked in 1970.

proved

Package Machinery moved

late 1950s.

out of the

employed

mill closings

time'.

146.

50

War

II,

control

the

-

board rooms where investment decisions were made and

labor negotiation strategies set

-

slowly migrated from Trenton. "The

social

system put together by the entrepreneurs of the nineteenth
century

was

dynamic system.

a

place,

It

was

part of a process of social change; once in

continued to change both

it

itself

and

society.

The move from

civic

capitalism, or entrepreneurial individualism, to bureaucratic
corporatism,

or national capitalism,

not just Trenton, but

began

all

in the late nineteenth century

of the United States in the

first

and engulfed

half of the

twentieth century." 52

William Hartford found
Mills, a

major employer in the

stockholders

competition

-

the majority of

made

a similar

dynamic

were closed

city,

whom

in Holyoke.

in 1927 after a vote

by the

were Boston bankers. Southern

unprofitable to invest further in Holyoke.

it

The Lyman

Hartford

quotes Old Colony Trust, the major shareholder: "The amount to be
received per share through liquidation conservatively invested would

seem

to afford better possibilities of return than

Lyman

Mills."

During the 1930s several more

1938 Farr Alpaca, the
in spite of union
mill

not

city.

in Holyoke, but

As with Lyman

to

were shuttered. Hartford makes

a

"...

neither

offer of tax

abatements

Mills, critical decisions

by stockholders with no attachments

By 1940 machines had been sold

closings:

mills closed in the city.

In

with 4000 workers, was liquidated

wage concessions and an

remained in the

made

city's largest mill

an investment in the

if

the

were

to the city.

southern manufacturers and the mills

very important point about these two

company ceased production because

52 John Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business,
Trenton (New Brunswick, 1989) p. 5.

51

of an inability to

Politics

and Work

in

make

profit.

.1

Rather, faced with the need to modernize existing

operations, a majority of stockholders believed that
the distribution of
assets following liquidation

would generate proceeds

excess of the current value of

company

substantially in

stock." 53

In Springfield 'The Industrial Beehive'

became The City

of Homes'.

But what happened was neither spontaneous nor inevitable. The

city

and

the Bosch plant's history unfolded against the backdrop of
significant

national and international changes in the economy.

attempted

to deal

Union leaders

with issues of job loss and plant shutdowns

in,

what

they believed to be, a very aggressive manner. They also worked hard to

defend basic trade union principles
give

in to

management attempts

classification structures.

since Springfield
ol

work.

changes

53

How,

in the global

and were unwilling

payment systems and

to alter

Workers were surely aware

was small enough

then,

like seniority,

for

everyone

could a small union

local

economy commencing

Hartford, Working People of Eolyoke,

p.

52

m

-

L93.

to

respond

after

job

of closings

have

and

a friend
to the

World War

to

layoffs

put out

massive
II?

CHAPTER 3

THE AMERICAN BOSCH TAKES SHAPE:

1930

-

1954

Introduction

Immediately

World War

after

II

Germany and Japan began

to

rebuild their devastated industries and soon challenged U.S.

manufacturers in such sectors as

machine

steel,

automobiles, electrical equipment,

and farm equipment. The ingenuity and

tools,

American firms was now put

to the test as

during the war slowly opened.

ability of

markets virtually guaranteed

Springfield corporate leaders

now

believed that cheap labor elsewhere in the country and around the world

posed the biggest threat

to the city's

corporate strategies were
costs as

much

now

economic

designed

as possible. This

down

to drive

was done

As

viability.

at the

a

consequence

Springfield's labor

expense of good labor

relations.

At the American Bosch,

for

example, management eliminated

union-management production committee
to discuss

union.

met monthly

that

and resolve shop problems, prompting

During the 1950s Bosch management

on labor-saving technology and constructed
The decision

to

be build a production

work done

in Springfield to

non-union

labor.

it

at a

also

new

facility in

moment when

a

made

since 1942

rebuke from the

large expenditures

factory in Mississippi.

Mississippi and relocate

was predicated on

These and other decisions drove

management

a

a sharp

available, lower-cost

wedge between

and

the union and

leading competitor nations were
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a

beginning to establish mechanisms to forge closer
relations between

workers and managers

to resolve production problems.

The

unilateral

elimination of the Bosch committee epitomized shop floor
relationships

during the 1950s and 1960s.

Bosch management resolved that workers were not going
their skill

and knowledge

the flow of work.
in the plant

but only

of the production process to gain control over

However, the

when and

foremen

if

they wanted

to resolve this situation,

work and monitor

nor would

any greater

it

gain

ability to

the effort workers applied. In fact, as

shall see, the opposite took place as

for their lack of

time,

Eliminating a problem-solving

to.

in the various production departments

control the pace of

we

remained that high seniority workers

fact

were the ones who could get products out the door on

committee could do nothing
the

to utilize

workers ridiculed

their supervisors

production know-how. 1

Business historian William Lazonick makes the point that because
of the production

boom

during World

advantages U.S. producers

like the

War

Bosch had

amply afford cooperative shop-floor

earlier in the 1950s.

It

and the competitive
after the

relations."

collapse of cooperation in the late 1960s,

came

II

was worker

it

While he locates the

appears that in the Bosch

skill,

War

II.

devaluing worker input management denied

1

For a discussion of this issue and

ways

to integrate

Advantage on

the

its

it

coupled with engineering

success, that allowed Springfield firms to prosper

output gains before and during World

war, "firms could

and achieve spectacular

By discounting
itself

skill

and

the utilization of a

implications as Japan and

Germany grappled with

workers more fully on the shop floor see William Lazonick, Competitive
Shop Floor (Cambridge, 1990) esp. chapters 7, 9, 10.
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knowledge base

essential to long-term firm success.

What

make, when increased, and high quality output was
the

engage the shop-floor intelligence of men
Bosch 25 -year club in 1948? The ten

it

objective, to not

who

joined the

and die makers and set-up men

tool

group had production experience

in this

50

like the

sense could

in the plant totaling over 250

years. 2

Once management adopted

was

set in

were
little

motion.

Believing workers

rigidly supervised

reason to believe

that,

if

interests

seemed

the necessary skill

would not

to belie

prophecy

would not produce unless they

and pushed, U.S. managers, Lazonick

in shop-floor workers, the rejects

Union

this strategy a self-fulfilling

such

notes, "had

and authority were vested

pile up." 3

fears,

however. In February,

1951 for example, an editorial in the union newspaper read:

We

note that European unions have been guaranteed

the right of co-determination which implies union
participation in corporate financing, pricing, supply, and
all

other functions of management.

This theory has

been covered in some of Walt Reuthers's writings and

we hope
this

in

some

future issue to bring

tremendous advance

Workers were

in

and

in

also concerned about quality.

an

editorial

asked "Scrap

understood the importance of quality as

2 Craftsman,

it

a report

on

union responsibility. 4

newspaper contained an extended discussion about
quality work,

you

-

In 1954 the union
the importance of

What

Is it?"

The writer

related to in-plant costs as well

December, 1948. Management thought highly enough of these workers
place each of their photographs and a small biography in the newsletter.
3

Lazonick, Competitive Advantage,

4

Labor Bulletin (LB), February, 1951, p.

p. 291.
2.
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to

as long-term

customer

These are concepts that

satisfaction.

corporations only began to realize and articulate in
the

many

U.S.

last ten years.

means time wasted, money wasted, material wasted
and it's like water going down the drain. Each person

It

from any
to analyze

that

why

actually

it

maybe

American Bosch should take time
certain piece of work was scrapped and

level in the
a

means money out

of their pocket, plus

eventually loss of jobs, because

the necessary standards

we

cannot meet

and commitments of our

customers. 5

In the "Stray Bits" section of the Bulletin a milling machine

operator in Department 191 commented, "Production here has always

been

a

head ache. Be sure

know more about
complained

that:

the
"

to

make your new foreman understand

work than he

The machines

Workers

does."

are so old

it is

in

not possible to produce

and counseled workers
parts or in assembly.

still

to "Exercise

concerned about the quality issue

utmost care in the manufacture of

Take pride in your craftsmanship." In the same

front page article the union articulated
in the plant.

secure

it

by

5 LB,

that led

November,

management

"The business

quality, fair pricing,

same people

is

"Our

its

there,

vision of
it

Bosch on top once

-

the

how

things should

won't come to us,

and dependability.

It

we have

to

can be done with the

members

of Local 206."

7

1954, p. 4. This issue will be discussed again in ch. 6 as the union reacts to

reorganization plans that limit union involvement.

6 LB, April, 1954,
p. 3.

7

"Why put

a spot?" 6

By 1960 union leaders were

work

you

Department 180

products to blueprint tolerances." They asked management,

employees on

that

Jobs," LB, April, 1960, p.l.
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By the mid-1960s the shop
vital role to

floor sense that

union members had a

play in improving quality, solving shop floor
production

problems, securing

new work, and keeping

customers satisfied had waned

considerably. Piece

work

layoffs

the union

rate cuts

and management.

Bread", contained

Bosch via

drove

wedge between

a

Bulletin editorial, "Morale

-

And No

this:

go back

Let's

A

and deep

five years before the

New

York

Hot Shots took over

Machines not so

City.

fast;

the

parts good.

members were in the main contented to
week's work for a good week's pay and good parts
Local 206

give a good
to boot.

Morale was high, the Bosch wasn't the worst place to work.
Today, morale is what you can get a cup of coffee for if you also
have

a dime....

The human has

himself to any situation.

If

problems and no attempt

is

problems you

you

will

a strange

knack

for

you have 2,000 people with

made

to correct these

several years

meaningful way. Skilled workers did not want

foremen and supervisors they had
to

little

demanding

No

grew

into a

Bread," LB, June, 1966, p.l.
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more

simply take orders from

fuel injection

a deaf ear to these overtures, as after

the single Springfield plant

and

to

a

that they

respect for or confidence in

producing quality diesel pumps and

Management turned

8 "Morale

if

follow. 8

be allowed to participate in improving the shop floor in

came

same

have 2,000 people adapting themselves,

Union leaders and workers spent

it

adapting

when

components.

World War

world-wide corporation.

II

American Bosch: 1911

Early History: 1911

-

1945

-

1940

The Springfield plant was

built in 1911

on what had been

prosperous farm land along the banks of the Connecticut River by
Robert
Bosch, founder of the Bosch Magneto

Germany. From the

Company

early 19th century

metalworking region boasted highly

the Connecticut River Valley

skilled workers, firms responsible for

innovations in machine tool design, and

and die shops complementing

many

large producers

them. Robert Bosch chose wisely

in 1886 in Stuttgart,

when he

small foundries and tool

by providing services

built in Springfield. 9

Old photographs show lab-coated machinists
produce parts

for the

by the

U.S. vehicle industry

workers, up from 800 in 1917.

make

radio equipment in the

War

the plant

I

and sold

was seized by

interest in the firm in 1930

(AB).

equipment

In 1938

Main

company began

Street factory as well.

the U.S.

began

of the electrical starter

and employed almost 3,000

government

to

During World

for security reasons

Robert Bosch bought back controlling

and changed the name

AB

for the aircraft

all

In the late 1920s the

at auction to local buyers.

Company

utilizing their skills to

emerging automobile and truck industry. By 1920

the four-story plant turned out 50 percent of the

parts required

to

to

American Bosch

manufacture fuel injection

and automotive

9 For an overview of this

to the

industries.

Even during

development in the Connecticut River valley see Michael
The New Competition (Cambridge, 1990) esp. ch. 1 and David Hounshell, From the
American System to Mass Production, 1800 - 1932 (Maryland, 1984) ch.l.
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the

Best,

Depression the firm

made money;

sales increased to $7.5 million

from

$6.1

million between 1935 and 1936. 10
In the early 1930s workers approached

wage and vacation improvements and
union was established and

management on

seniority protection.

tried to negotiate

pay

raises

issues of

A company

and some

protections for high seniority workers against arbitrary layoffs.
Little

headway was made, and workers

eventually contacted and met with

representatives of United Electrical Workers Local 202 from the near-by
Springfield Westinghouse Electric plant.
secretly collected,

and on October

16,

Signatures were slowly and

1936 Local 206 was chartered and

recognized by the Congress of Industrial organizations as the bargaining
agent for workers. The local became the second in the region to be

recognized by the

CIO and one

of

many

significant

the Connecticut River valley to be organized

metalworking plants

by the U.E.

in

11

The War Years

The outbreak of World War
plant.

II

led to the rapid expansion of the

In 1941 the U.S. Office of Production

authorized Bosch

officials to

Management (OPM)

build a $700,000 facility for aircraft magnetos.

The Federal Defense Plant Corporation (FDPC) provided $400,000 worth

of

new machine

a

production
workers.

tools for the expansion.

facility in

In addition, the

company opened

Providence, Rhode Island that employed close to 600

Growth might have been

greater, but the

OPM blocked

10 Orra Stone, History of Massachusetts Industries, (Boston, 1930)

a

p. 543.

H

The development of Local 206 will be discussed in chapter 5. A great deal of
information on the early history of the local is contained in the 25th anniversary
issue of the Local 206 Bulletin, Sept. 1963,

Local 206 Collection,
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UMass

Archives.

special

$2,000,000 appropriation to
capability.

OPM

more than double

wanted magnetos

built in plants shifting

automobile production to war-related

modest expansion,
greater than in

all

Bosch's production

Even with the more

activity.

profits for the first six

from

months

of 1942

were four times

of 1941. 12

World War

Just as during

the loyalties of Bosch

I,

the

government was concerned about

management, and

at the

end

of 1941 the

US

Treasury

assumed operation

of the plant, seizing control of 77 percent of the stock

owned by Swedish

interests.

It

was

later learned that the

stockholders were serving as a front for

German

Swedish

industrialists closely

associated with the Robert Bosch Corporation. Responsibility for the day-

to-day

management

of the plant shifted to the federal Alien Property

Custodian's Office (APC), with Donald Hess installed as president.

The APC's Leo Crowley became

the

owner

foreign-owned stock, and had the authority

of

to sell

it

what had been
at his discretion.

in 1942, at the urging of the Treasury Department, 23 employees

US

citizens

-

were terminated as

With ownership and

vice president in charge

citizenship issues

satisfactorily resolved, the plant received $4,000,000

machine

tools

from the

FDPC

non-

Twelve of the 23 came

"security risks".

from the Engineering Department, including the
of product development.

- all

Also

more

in leased

in the Spring of 1942 to further

expand

production. 13

Bosch was

now immersed

in the military

-

industrial complex, a

connection that would contribute to wild employment swings during and
after

World War

II,

and the Korea and Viet

Nam

Wars. By 1942 every

12 Springfield Morning Union (SMU), February 14, 1941; Springfield Daily

March
13

15, 1942.

SDN, March

27,

May

7,

1942;

SMU, March
60

27,

June

22, 1942.

News (SDN),

purchaser of
for the

its

magnetos and

equipment worked

directly

Defense Department. These firms also benefited from
direct

government investments
Economist

in

Ann Markusen

investment in
federal

fuel injection

aircraft

government

machine

tools

throughout the war years.

indicates that close to 92 percent of the

and related manufacturing capacity came from

at this time.

Rapid war plant growth dramatically

reduced the country's unemployment according
In 1939 there

the

were 63,000 workers

in the aircraft

to historian

and parts

David Noble.

industries.

"During the war employment reached an all-time peak of 1,345,000 and
then dropped to 237,000 in 1946." Noble found that the machine tool
industry

were

boomed

less

as well.

"In 1940, only 28 percent of

machine

than ten years old; in 1945 the ratio had risen to 62 percent." 14

Connecticut River Valley machine tool builders
in Springfield, Massachusetts

and Bryant Grinders
to

tools in use

government

like

Van Norman

and Jones and Lamson, Fellows Gear Shaper,

Vermont owed

in Springfield,

efforts to retool military contractors.

their explosive

growth

Federal expenditures

stimulated employment gains in smaller metalworking companies as
well, in Athol, Greenfield

and Millers

Falls,

Massachusetts, located forty

miles north of Springfield, Massachusetts, near the Vermont boarder.

Greenfield Tap and Die, Millers Falls Tool, Union Twist

dozen firms manufactured

and engaged
producers

14

and excessories

for

machine

and another

tool builders

war

in direct sales to greater-Springfield, Massachusetts

like the

The United
of the job

tools

Drill,

growth

Ann Markusen,

Bosch, Westinghouse, and the Armory.
Electrical, Radio,

and Machine Workers Union, aware

in the Connecticut River valley,

Dismantling the Cold

Noble, Forces of Production

(New

made

War Economy (New York,

York, 1986)

61

p. 5, 8.

a concerted effort

1992) p. 42

-

43;

David

to place organizers in the region.

and around

and go

to

Vermont prompted

Springfield,

to call for the

For example, employment growth in

union to establish

work convincing

itself in

town

the

U.E. organizer

the city "on a

of our program."

Hugh

Harley

permanent basis
But, at war's end,

over 300,000 machine tools were declared surplus by the
government and

dumped on

the U.S. market at bargain basement prices, forcing
machine

tool builders to curtail production

and

layoff thousands of workers. 15

Since parts produced in the Bosch plant were
effort, tool

room, machine tool

set up,

and other

critical to the

skilled

war

workers routinely

received deferments and remained on the job throughout the war.

By

1942 Bosch magnetos powered virtually every plane, including those

produced by Boeing, Gruman, Vultee and Sikorsky

Battleships,

and submarines sported engines with Bosch

aircraft carriers, destroyers

fuel injectors.

Aircraft.

Highly skilled machinists, operators and assemblers were

turning out precision parts with tolerances as close as 39 millionths of an
inch, far less than the

Horizon,

width of

a

human

hair.

A

an industry trade publication, praised

1945 issue of Steel

this quality

work. "In the

manufacture of diesel fuel injection equipment tolerances are measured
not just in thousandths of an inch, which

generally accepted as precision

is

manufacture, but in hundred-thousandths,

a

degree of accuracy not found

." 16

in the finest of watches...

To maintain magneto production during
and engineers established

15 Markusen,
p. 42

Pittsburgh Library,

-

a

of letter between field organizer

organization. Letter quoted
16

The

7,

1944.

article,

is

"Top Notchers

a

in

war Bosch managers

wide-ranging network of companies to

43; Noble, p. 5, 8;

Hugh Harley

the

Files,

United Electrical Workers Archives, University of
File Folder (FF.) 440. This folder contains a series

Hugh Harley and James

Matles, UE's national director of

hand written note dated July
Production" was quoted in

62

17, 1943.

SMU

,

April

6,

1945;

SMU, June

contribute various components to the
Willi the

Whitin Machine Works

normally built

magnetos.

textile

in

final

product,

Engineers worked

Whitinsville, Massachusetts winch

machinery and

in the Fall

of 1942

began producing

it

Other firms involved included Rogers, Lunt and Bowlen,

Greenfield, Massachusetts silversmith and the Sacco-Lowell Shops

Biddeford, Maine.

Bosch engineers

set

all

at

each

parts

17

produced.

To

in

up quality control programs

participating site to encourage mutual interchangability of

a

further bolster

and insure output Local 206 took

pledge for the duration of the

conflict.

a no-strike

A Labor-Management War

Production Committee formed, with the aim of eliminating scrap
insure a steady shipment of high quality parts to
planes, tanks

final

to

assemblers of

and other equipment. At one point 27 workers stayed

in the

plant around the clock for four days to produce fuel injection equipment
for several battleships

the local

was awarded

excellence.

1

Sales

damaged
the

Midway.

in the battle of

Army and Navy

"E"

award

August, 1944

In

for production

H

and employment rose spectacularly throughout

the strength of such capabilities:

Sales

were $13 million

the

war on

in 1941,

reached

$31 million in 1942 and climbed to $50 million by the end of 1943.
the

same period employment jumped

1941.

Sales

and employment peaked

to 6,700

from slightly under 1,000

in 1944 at $61.2 million

The Al'C paid out small stock dividends during these
set aside close to $2 million in cash to assist in
a costly

17

to

files

what

it

and

in

7,300.

years, but chose to

anticipated

would be

peacetime production. These cash reserves would

American Bosch Company, A Story

business
18

adjustment

Over

of

Teamwork (Springfield/

of the Pioneer Valley Historical Society.

LB, Vol. 12 ^September, 1963.

63

1977).

It

is

looted

in

the

figure prominently in the return of the plant
to civilian ownership in
1948. 19

At war's end the Main
the

Rhode

Island plant closed.

workers by

jobless

Street facility

billion in orders

was

swiftly demobilized

and

National predictions were for five million

late Fall, 1945.

The Navy alone canceled

just

over $7

by the end of August. In Western Massachusetts and

Connecticut 823 contracts worth $250 million were abruptly halted on

August

16.

Firms losing work included Bosch, Cogswell Machine, Gilbert

and Barker, Package Machinery, Smith and Wesson, and Westinghouse.

One hundred thousand

greater-Springfield jobs were

now

Several

at risk.

firms began immediate layoffs while they attempted to plan for the future.
Jet

engine maker Pratt and Whitney in Hartford closed a plant

opened
1,200

in East

Longmeadow, Massachusetts during

and curtailed

25,000 workers.

all

production for two weeks, a

it

had

the war, laying off

move

that affected

Perkins Machine in Springfield and Westinghouse each

laid off 1,500 workers. 20

Between June and September 1945 Bosch employment plummeted
to just

under 3,000 from 7,300 and dipped

in 1946 to about 2,000 as the

APC

wrestled with what to do with the workforce and the plant's precision

metalworking equipment. Bosch order cancellations totaled $15 million

by the end
things, a

of August, 1946.

speedy

shift to

what was perceived

automotive products, and

19 LB,

March

23,

June

2, 9,

Company hopes were now
as

pent up

new product development

1943. Profits in 1943

were almost $4

attached to two

demand

for

taking place in the

million,

however

the

APC

held on to $2.5 million of it. LB, April 5, 1944, March 21, 1945.
20 SR, August 3,
p. 19, August 15, p. 1; August 16, p.l; August 17, p.l; August 20, p.l. These
layoffs were abrupt because as late as August 3rd local newspapers were running help

wanted advertisements

for area

metalworking

64

firms.

plant's research
its

and engineering

kind for any company of

The Emerging

its

laboratory, called "the

of

size in the country." 2 !

Electrical Manufacturing Industry

Bosch emerged from the war

components

most complete

as part of the electrical

sector of the manufacturing

machinery and

economy. Output

in this sector

declined by 12.2 percent between July, 1948 and June of 1949 before
making
a rapid recovery

during the Korean War. Electrical machinery sales

increased 106.2% between 1949 and 1950 to $16.7 billion from $8.1

by comparison
period.

The

all

billion,

manufacturing increased sales 50 percent over the same

entire industry contracted again during the 1953-1954

recession that followed the Korean
as output increased 22.7 percent

War build-down,

between 1954 and

then recovered again

1957.

Output dropped

again in 1957 and 1958. Economist Jules Backman characterized the
industry in the 1950s as follows: "Production in the electrical machinery
industry swings wildly during the business cycle. This

is

typical of the

behavior of durable goods industries." 22

Demand

volatility, in turn,

was exacerbated by
the industry.

caused employment

significant productivity gains per

This

worker throughout

Between 1939 and 1954 output per man-hour increased

percent compared to 40 percent for
this

instability.

gain to three things:

all

65.5

manufacturing. Backman attributes

capital investments, managerial

know-how, and

research and development expenditures. The percentage increase of

21

22

Springfield Evening News,

September

19, 1945, p.

1.

Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Manufacturing Industry (New York,
1962) p. 36. Output figures are taken from tables in Backman, p 33 - 36. Firms in this
industry numbered 7,066 in 1958 up from 1,979 in 1939, an almost 360 percent increase
(Backman, p. 77).
Jules
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capital expenditures in electrical

machinery

for all

to 1960.

manufacturing from 1939

amount

far

outdistanced the increase

'Trior to

World War

II

the

of capital invested per production worker in
the electrical

machinery industry was

had more than

By 1958 the amount invested per worker

$4,627.

tripled to $14,248.

This placed the sector third, behind

automobiles, instruments, and machine tools in investments
per

production worker. 23

amounted
and

textile

machinery research expenditures in 1957

Electrical

to 4.85 percent of total sales

compared

to aircraft, 2.62 percent,

machinery, 1.75 percent. 24

The impact

of research expenditures

on hiring

is

apparent

when

changes in the numbers of production and salaried workers in the
industry are analyzed and compared to other industries and

manufacturing generally.

Electrical

machinery employment increases

substantially in both categories, while production workers decline.

industries reviewed the

number

of Workers).

hiring of engineers

By 1960 the

3.1

-

Percentage Changes in

Salaried worker growth reflects the substantial

and

technicians. 25

electrical

persons, third highest

all

of salaried workers grows, but electrical

machinery percentage gains are double. (Table

Number

In

machinery industry employed

among manufacturing

excess of a half a million

more

industries.

1.3 million

The

jobs than either aircraft or

sector

had

in

motor vehicles

li Capital investments per worker were as follows: automobiles, $19,591; instruments,

machine
$3,400 (Backman,
$15,540;

24 Backman,

tools, $14,942; electrical

machinery, $14,248;

textiles, $8,950; apparel,

p. 191-194).

p. 180-185.

Backman

calculated 1957 expenditures

on research and

development and found the following aircraft, $2.54 million; electrical equipment, $1.17
million; machine tools, $688 thousand. Automobile research and development expenditures
were calculated with a broader group of industries including rubber products, tobacco,
furniture, and printing. This entire group's outlay was just $921,000 (Backman, p. 189).
:

25 Backman, p. 202-203.
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Table

3.1:

1947

1960.

-

Percentage changes in numbers of

workers

production

salaried

22.5

107.5

-6.2

57.7

All manufacturing

-4.1

63.2

Automobiles

-5.5

32.3

Blast furnaces /steel

-11.0

52.1

Electrical

machinery

Machinery except,

electrical

and provided more than twice
This

electrical industry

was

the context in

as

many

jobs as the basic steel industry.

which the Springfield Bosch took shape during

the

1950s. 26

The

It

AMRA

Connection

Is

Made

took until the middle of 1948 for the ownership issue to be

Until then the seven-person board running the plant
five lawyers.

Only one

board and he spoke out

local manufacturer,

that "in as

manufacturer of metal products rather than
get

more persons

July the

was dominated by

Roger Putnam,

sat

on the

for the sale of the firm to manufacturers.

Morning Union also pointed out

much

as

Bosch

legal briefs

familiar with the former production

APC's 77 percent share was offered

Interested bidders included Detroit diesel

Corporation, stockbrokers

Lehmam

settled.

it

on

is

The

a

might be well

the board." 27 In

in a sealed bid procedure.

pump

manufacturer Excello

Brothers, Electric

Auto

Lite of Toledo,

Ohio, and Belk Simpson, a small Greenville, South Carolina
manufacturer. The plant was sold to top bidder Allen and Company, an

26 Figures from Backman, p. 19.

27

SDN, September

19, 1945;

SMU,

April

7,
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1948.

to

investor group representing the

company

AMRA

New

York-based financial holding

Corporation for $6 million, or $11.28

a share.

Since in

April assets of the plant had been valued at $13.5
million, or $13.64 a share,
the price

was indeed

AMRA was

a

right.

two-year old financial holding company whose board

of directors consisted of partners in several Wall Street law
firms

and the

presidents of the American Securities Corporation and the American

Overseas Development Corporation.

Brooklyn and Garden City,

New

It

was

York based

manufacturer of gyroscopes and precision

the principle

of

ARMA Corporation, a
measurement

electrical

ARMA had

equipment, in business since 1918.

owner

serious problems at the

time of the Bosch acquisition because of the loss of sizable defense
contracts.

Its

down from

workforce of 1,800 was

the war, a staggering 80 percent decline. The

dependent on military contracts

new

9,000 at the conclusion of

company remained

to finance research

highly

and development of

products, including control systems, computer devices, and search

lights

and gun control technology

problems

after 1945,

and now

for the

AMRA

applications for products built in the

immediate

effort

was launched

computer controlled

lathe, the

to

Navy and

Air Force. This caused

was determined

two production

manufacture a

to find

facilities.

commercial

An

first-of-its-kind

Arma-Matic. The corporate relationship

with Bosch, and the establishment of a manufacturing presence in greaterSpringfield,

was

part of a strategy to gain access to the machine tool

68

building market and high-skilled precision
machinists capable of

manufacturing the

lathe. 28

Readers of area newspapers were reminded that Charles Allen
had

done business

in

Western Massachusetts

control of the Wickwire Spencer Steel

subsequently merged

When

operations.

would be

it

actually put

up

Iron, ceasing area

AMRA

ARMA,

APC had

It

The cash figure

some

would now run

it

was revealed

salted

away during

worker corporation. 29

AMRA may have

the sale

wrote

is

the

war

The

totaled close to $5

fund of $500,000. The Springfield

had gone, concerned

that a local buyer

that:

of particular interest because

it is

contended

quarters that ownership of the American Bosch

could have been brought to Springfield

men

that

of Springfield

two companies,

the

as divisions of a 2,000

a retooling

way

Union questioned the

had not been found.

moving Bosch out

and

than $1.5 million in cash to acquire the company.

augmented by

in

with Colorado Fuel and

after the sale

less

cash reserves the
million,

in the late 1930s

"unthinkable".

Two weeks

Allen acquired stock

Company

asked, Allen said

American Bosch and

before.

willing to put

up $150,000

the days are apparently gone

each.

when

if

But

that

had been 10

there
it

was conceded

amount

could be raised locally because of what seems

to

of

that

money

be a present

lack of interest in such ventures. 30

In 1949 the holding

corporation, American
28

SMU

company was reorganized

Bosch-ARMA (ABA), with
When job

into a

new

headquarters in

New

both companies is analyzed, the
merged firm went from a combined 16,300 to 3,800 employees. At the time of the merger
employment was 23 percent of what it had been at the height of war-time production.
29

SMU,

,

July 10, 1948. Noble, p. 88-89.

July 10, 1948.

30 SM!i, July

-

v

22, 26, 1948.
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loss in

York

City.

engineers.

ARMA's Brooklyn

Ostensibly the plan was

Brooklyn plant

machine

employed

plant

to Springfield

tool research

became the owner

it

ship production

work from

them

the

could locus exclusively on military ami

and development.

ARM A,

of

so

to

1,800 workers, 500 oi

Under

the reorganization Bosch

which made Bosch's substantial (ash

reserves of $7 million available to the merged corporation. These
reserves

had grown

when

1946 and 1947,

in

Bosch's showing a profit, the

in spile of

directors paid out no dividends to stockholders. In

merger statement detailed how $6.5 million
off

all

Bosch

bank loans including the
year before.

just the

A

$3.5 million

cash would be used to pay

in

A MR A had borrowed

a tidy profit

corporate control, though never firmly rooted
to

New

York C

Donald Hess, head

merged

ARMA

ABA
was

of

at

over

$1,1

to

buy

million

on the deal and

in Springfield, shilted

ity. 11

Bosch since 1938, became director

while keeping his

to

bold stroke, the

plant with assets valued

had changed hands. The purchaser made

permanently

a

title

of the

as president of the Bosch plant.

be led by Herbert (iuterman, an electrical engineer with

considerable manufacturing experience

at

General Hlectric and Raytheon.

Men who understood

in

charge, and the

production were

merged

corporation's manufacturing future appeared bright.
Indicative of the factory floor strategy

ABA would

pursue

throughout the 1950s, the Arma-Matic lathe received special attention and

became

a

symbol

of

management's emphasis on research and

development and labor cost

controls.

The lathe had been developed by

Workforce levels arc found in Local 206 membership and seniority lists, UMass Archives.
Manufacturing valued added in the industry rose from $ M million on the eve of World
War ll to almost $4 billion in L949 and $io.6 billion in 1958 (Schatz, The Electrical

11

l

I

Workers,

p. 8).
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology-trained physicist Frederick

Cunningham. According
examined

to historian

David Noble, Cunningham

ARMA

job orders for existing lathes in the

plant,

closely

and

determined that an automatic lathe could boost production considerably.

Cunningham wrote

that the objective

would be converted quickly from one

was

"to

make

a

job to another.

machine which
It

was intended

to

take only seconds to change a piece of stock and the tape, and only a few

minutes to prepare the tape." Business Week reported that the
of the

new machine

tool

stock through a machine.

is

that

"A

man

real value

doesn't have to be skilled to run

And, he could

also run

up

to four

machines

simultaneously."

Throughout the 1950s Bosch and other area manufacturers looked
to similar solutions to cut labor costs.

Machine

tool builders

made

direct

appeals to their customers that in order to stay competitive in the global

economy, automatically controlled machine

tools

designed to perform

several manufacturing processes simultaneously, needed to be utilized.

Bosch corporate management hoped that the firm would play
role in the transformation of not just their

own shop

floor,

a significant

but others

across the country. 32

Old-style

drill presses, turret lathes,

the focused concentration of a worker

and grinding machines required

who had

to utilize

eyes to insure the successful completion of a machining

example, the Kingsbury Corporation offered

a line of

both hands and

task.

machine

Now,

for

tools that

could take the place of several operators. "You need several general-

purpose machines and several operators

and one

operator...

32 Business

.

Week quoted

You pay

in

Noble,

for

more

p. 90.
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to

keep up with one Kingsbury

operators,

more supervision, more

handling and more space." The Bosch plant would purchase
several

machines

like this

Work

from Kingsbury during the

Lea ves Springfield:

A

late 1950s

and

early 1960s. 33

Southern Strategy Hmprg ps

Corporate decisions affected employment levels in a more dramatic

and

visible

was

to

way with

announcement

the 1953

be constructed in Mississippi. In a

President Donald Hess stated that such a
essential

large

the corporation

volume goods

motors.
for

if

Ford

was

workers,

letter to

move

to maintain

its

company

to a low-cost area

was

competitive edge in such

as voltage regulators, windshield wipers,

The Springfield plant
to

that a manufacturing facility

recently lost high

and small

volume production work

southern competitors, and had no intention of losing once

again. 34

Mississippi

development

was

irresistible to

Hess. Referring to economic

he commented: "They will help find

officials in Mississippi

a plant site; they will build a building

reasonable

rate.

They

and rent

it

to

you

at a

very

will arrange to put in railroad sidings; provide

good

roads to the plant; run in water and sewers and do everything else you

need

to

make

the proposition attractive."

more companies

start

He went on "When one

or

producing in an area where operating costs are

much

lower, other competitive companies in the same field also have to

move

in order to survive.

Its

either

move

or quit."

The 1953 decision

to

33 The American Machinist and other trade publications are replete with advertisements
promoting machine tools that will lower worker skill requirements, allow several
machining operations to be combined, and create the possibilities for an operator to run
several machines simultaneously. The Kingsbury advertisement is in the American
Machinist, June 12, 1950, p. 26-27.

34 Hess

letter

quoted

in

SMU,

April 15, 1953.

72

establish a facility in

Columbus was

big

news because

it

marked

the

time skilled metalworking jobs were lured away from
Springfield

would not be
To be

the

sure, northern

companies had

coke ovens, two cold rolling

South

36

a

built plants in the

Motor Company from

EL

mills, a

by work

The

BW

investment decisions placed unions
are additions, not replacements.

ultimately they

may

article, "Plant

Transfers

transfers since the

writer well understood the
in.

What

"In

two new
a turning

to block

shifting production out of Detroit.

lost 20,000 jobs

South

and

mill,

United Auto Workers' attempts

General Motors announced plans to build a

Texas.

is

continuous strip

1951 Business Week (BW)

Irk Unions," discussed

had already

it

last. 35

before. United States Steel decided in the early 1930s to
build

mill in the

-

first

new

Ford

Rouge Local 600

end

of

World War

plant in Arlington,

dilemma these corporate
expanding times such plants

bothers the unions

is

that

result in diminished operations at earlier sites.

This

a greater concern to local unions than internationals." 37

Southern Manufacturing Grows

Southern
least

efforts to

encourage industries to relocate dated back

twenty years. In 1937 the governors of nine Southern

states

at

agreed to

establish a $500,000 fund to hire a former secretary of the Democratic

National Committee to coordinate a national advertising campaign in
leading newspapers and magazines extolling the region's cheap power and
efficient

35

SMU,

and reasonably paid native-born

April 15, 1953, p.

labor.

Several Mississippi

1.

36 SR, October 17, 1936, p. 18.
37 Business Week, "Plant Transfers Irk Unions," December

73

1,

1951, p. 36.

cities,

overzealous in their recruitment

efforts,

were charged with misusing

Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds during
highly publicized case

Ellisville,

Mississippi spent $26,00 of

ostensibly to build a vocational center.
to a hosiery

company

money was used

that

Instead

it

finished goods for the

and apparel

WPA funds

turned the

money

fled Pennsylvania during a strike.

company

over

The

week. Mississippi

for $4.00 a

state financial assistance, took the lead in perfecting

strategies in the 1930s that other southern states
textile

In a

purchase knitting machines, and trainees produced

to

communities, with

had

the mid-1930s.

mills to the

would soon use

to entice

South during the 1940s and 1950s. 38

Several states established Balance Agriculture With Industry

programs (BAWI)
agriculture.

BAWI

dependence on

Mississippi issued $5,360,000 in industrial bonds through

initiatives

be seen in the
23,000 jobs

in a concerted effort to break their

by

1950.

fact that

The cumulative

direct benefit to Mississippi can

by 1958 plants constructed there provided almost

and paid out

$60.5 million in wages. This

employees and $100 million

program was responsible

wages by

1959.

to 36,000

The Mississippi

BAWI

for 76 percent of the state's increased

employment and 34 percent
Bosch move was part of

in

jumped

of

its

earnings between 1940 and 1958. The

a concerted Mississippi effort to

develop a vibrant

manufacturing base. 39
Across the south, publicity appeals
availability of

same

state,

low

cost,

non-union

labor.

competed against each other

for

BAWI were

States,

predicated on the

and even

cities in the

to attract manufacturers.

A

38 The states in the consortium were North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, SDN, October 1, 1937, p. 16; James Cobb,
The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development (Urbana, 1993)
p.

7-8.

39 Cobb,

p.

29-30.
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Clanton, Alabama advertisement boasted of "no hostile unions here
and

none

desired."

activity

and

South Carolina claimed there were no unions or union

that "workers give a day's

work

Mississippi city extolled the virtues of

it's

One

for a day's pay."

"wonderful labor, 98 percent

native born, mostly high school graduates,"

who

will "lower average

hourly industrial wage rates 5 cents to 49 cents below other Southern

and from 50 cents

campaign

to

95 cents below Northern

to attract the

states."

During

states

a 1951

Whirlpool Corporation, Mississippi Governor

Fielding Wright wrote to Whirlpool corporate officers that "The particular
area

you have

in

mind has an abundance

of intelligent native labor and

entirely free of those conditions that tend to impair

employer

-

is

employee

relations." 40

Managers
hospitality"

of unionized firms often alluded to this "Southern

when wage

issues

were viewed by companies

were discussed during negotiations. Wages

as their largest fixed cost.

Movement

to the

South could reduce wages. Companies also used the threat of relocation
hold

down

raises

during collective bargaining.

General Electric adopted a southern strategy immediately

World War

II

to

to take

advantage of lower wages and break up

its

after

corporate

concentration in the Northeast. At the end of 1948 factories were closed in

Kokomo, Indiana and

Scranton, Pennsylvania.

location strategies.

The Syracuse,

Corporation closed

a plant

Africa, while

the

work

40 Cobb, p. 97

-

with 1,800

Remington Rand

to Scotland.

New

Others adopted global

York-based Easy Washer

jobs,

and opened

a

new one

also shut a plant in Syracuse

in

and moved

Textron Corporation shifted production out of

98, 100.
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South

Massachusetts to Puerto Rico and closed

textile plants in

New

Hampshire,

relocating in the South. 41
In a 1946 report to

Machine Workers
fighting job

(U.E.)

and plant

its

members, the United

union raised three

relocations.

First,

Electrical, Radio,

and

critical issues related to

every effort needed to be

made

to

organize the South in order to break the low-wage possibilities the

unorganized region offered
discrimination.

to companies,

and help eliminate

racial

Second, as companies shifted plants out of the Northeast

and decentralized production

in smaller shops, unions

had

to

develop

organizing strategies that took such changes into account. Finally, unions

needed

to

develop a community base of support

The U.E. was

in the face of relocation strategies.

to sustain their strength

right to be concerned

about plant relocations out of their stronghold in the Northeast. 42

Plant Relocations 1929

-

1954

In an influential 1962 study, Changes

Manufacturing

in the

United States Since 1929, economist Victor Fuchs

analyzed plant and employment location
several industries. Felt goods

three in plant
the large-scale
shift

Connecticut,

General

and

movement during
movement

had implications

home

Electric,

in the Location of

textile

shifts

to

1954 in

products were two of the top

these years.

of aircraft

from 1929

What was

surprising

and related components

for the Northeast, particularly

to several industries, including

was

plants.

This

Massachusetts and

United Aircraft and

involved in aircraft-related production.

When

41

UE News, December 25, 1948, p. 6 - 7.
42 UE News, September 14, 1946, p. 7. Ch. 6 will examine what strategies unions used
Springfield when faced with plant closing and relocations in the 1950s and 1960s.
76

in

metalworking sectors
special dies, tools,

-

forgings, electrical machinery, foundries,

and attachments

-

are included plant

and

and

job loss

is

considerable. 43

Table

3.2:

Location

by percent

shifts

employment 1929

-

of value-added

and percent

1954.

Industry

Value added

Total employment

goods
Aircraft and parts
Textile goods

45.8

44.4

45
44

43.2
42.1

Engines, turbines

30.6

30.8

Woolen goods

27.2

23.2

Forgings

22.3

17.9

19.5

19.6

15.4

14.3

14.3

12.6

14.2

14.3

11

9.9

Felt

Textile

of total

machinery

machinery, equip.
Foundries
Electrical

Special dies, tools, machine

attachments

Machinery

Fuchs determined which regions of the country were winners and
losers as a

consequence of plant and job movement.

biggest loser in textile

and

jobs.

machinery

New

plants

West South

shifts,

New

England was the

with the South Atlantic gaining the most

In dies, tools

and attachments, machinery, and

England and the Middle Atlantic

Central, Pacific Coast,

States lost out to the

and South Atlantic

In a special April, 1953 issue of

its

electrical

states. 44

newsletter, Local 206 business

agent Jim Manning urged union members to oppose the Mississippi

move, labeling

it

the 'Mississippi Muddle':

fight to maintain a

Hess came

"Now we

Bosch plant in Springfield and

in for sharp criticism for betraying

we mean

workers

43 Victor Fuchs, Changes in the Location of Manufacturing
(New Haven, 1962). Data taken from tables on p. 128 - 137.
44 Fuchs, p. 240.
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are facing a bitter

in the

"in a

just that."

manner

as the

United States Since 1929

Japanese Ambassadors did just before Pearl Harbor."
Ironically, Hess

member

served as a

of the Board of Directors of Future Springfield,
Inc., an

organization working to bring manufacturing to the

city. 45

In a scene repeated countless times across Springfield
over the next

twenty-five years as

its

principal industries were dismantled, machines

were crated up and loaded on trucks and

rail cars for

the trip to

during the Winter of 1954. Gapping holes dotted the factory

machine

tools

had been. Production

lines

were

curtailed,

Columbus

floor

where

and 500 workers

received lay-off notices. First to go was the windshield wiper

line,

followed by automatic seat motors and voltage regulators. The company
notified union officials that the
1955.

move would be completed by

To minimize any hardship

the

company and union resolved

other openings in the Springfield facility
to lose their jobs,

January,

would be

filled

that

by workers

all

slated

provided they could be trained to do the work. While

the union appeared optimistic that few,

permanently out of work,

it is

if

difficult to

any, workers

would end up

understand the source of such

optimism.

A

City's

Manufacturing Base At Risk: Westinghouse Rumors

The

city's

problems were compounded

Westinghouse was also considering
since 1915, the plant
plant.

was

a

move out

it

had no intention

45 LB, April 1953; Hess

rumors circulated
of Springfield.

that

Open

a cornerstone of the city's industry, like the

Although the Westinghouse Board

statements that

as

letter to

Bosch

of Directors issued periodic

of closing the factory, a letter written by

workers, April

78

15, 1953.

plant

manager James Weaver

city officials

in 1955 to the

mayor

of Springfield worried

and workers. Weaver wrote:

we

(Westinghouse) are to get our share of the going
business the products we build here must be competitive in
price with similar products built by other companies in other
If

cities

and

states.

If

we

burdened with higher taxes than

are

our competitors, only because
interpret as a listless
trouble,
setting

Weaver was
on

and

we

are located in

community, we're

in order to

what others

in trouble

-

real

even stay in business must create

off-

economies in other ways.

quite concerned that the city

to industries that

was going

to pass

its

remained in Springfield, and wondered

Westinghouse should have confidence

in the city

Springfield Taxpayers Bulletin said the city

was

when

tax

burden

why

a recently released

'financially sick'. 46

In 1957 and 1958 rumors persisted that the East Springfield plant

would move production

By the Summer of 1958

to Ohio.

newspapers were reporting

that a study

local

commissioned by the

Westinghouse Board of Directors recommended the factory be closed
quickly as possible. Westinghouse

now

reorganization and consolidation of
just two.

A

admitted

its six

it

was contemplating

consumer products plants

corporate press release stated: "There

is

as
a

into

a continuing survey at

our various Westinghouse plants across the country to determine what
facilities are

best fitted or equipped for the various products

we

manufacture." Soon after the press release the Daily News reported that a
decision

had already been made

Columbus, Ohio. The

46

DN, July 30,

article

to ship

work

to factories in Mansfield

and

pointed out that during the recent national

1958, p. 1.
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Westinghouse

workers

strike

at the

Ohio

facilities

crossed picket lines and

kept the plants open. Since the majority of Springfield's
work was
refrigerators

and small appliances, workers and

local officials

cause for concern. More troubling news for the

Valve announced

it

was putting

schedule because no
Finally,

the Local 202
fact

newspaper

17,

came when Chapman

pattern makers on a three day a

new work work

on October,

city

1958 Westinghouse workers learned from

that a decision to shift

1960s as

This sharp drop

employment

fell

week

scheduled.

work out

been made. By March, 1959 the workforce dropped

in mid-1958.

now had

was followed by smaller

of the city

to 1,000

layoffs

below 200 before the plant closed

had

in

from 2,500

through the

entirely in

December, 1970. 47

Bosch Workforce Shrinks Further

No New Work

-

Arrives

Despite repeated assurances by management that work appropriate
to the skill levels in the plant

new work
off

would

did not arrive. Business agent Manning's request to allow laid

workers

to transfer to Mississippi

optimism dissipated and union
plant

take the place of that shipped South,

would

lose

are their so-called

Mississippi."

more than

new

jobs

was

officials

just

flatly rejected.

began

automotive

which

to

jobs.

By

April, 1955

wonder whether

A

the

leader asked "where

will tide over the loss of jobs to

The union urged management

to think

about their

obligation to the community, and in a Bulletin editorial called on the

47 DN, July 29, 1958, p. 1; July 30, 1958, p. 1; July 31, 1958, p. 1; August 12, 1958, p. 1. The
union article was quoted extensively in DN, October 17, 1958, p.l. The Lima, Ohio Local 724
president wished Local 202 well and said "I know that it was leaders like you that made it
possible for the scab-infested Ohio plants to receive a contract as good as the one we did in
1956."

80

Westinghouse

strike

workers

at the

Ohio
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local officials
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to 1,000
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below 200 before the plant closed
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through the
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Bosch Workforce Shrinks Further

No New Work

-

Arrives

Despite repeated assurances by management that work appropriate
to the skill levels in the plant

new work
off

did not arrive.

workers to transfer

would

Business agent Manning's request to allow laid

to Mississippi

optimism dissipated and union
plant

would

lose

are their so-called

Mississippi."

more than

new

take the place of that shipped South,

jobs

was

officials

just

flatly rejected.

began

automotive

which

to

By

April, 1955

wonder whether

jobs.

A

the

leader asked "where

will tide over the loss of jobs to

The union urged management

to think

about their

obligation to the community, and in a Bulletin editorial called

on

the

47 DN, July 29, 1958, p. 1; July 30, 1958, p. 1; July 31, 1958, p. 1; August 12, 1958, p. 1. The
union article was quoted extensively in DN, October 17, 1958, p.l. The Lima, Ohio Local 724
president wished Local 202 well and said

"I

know

that

it

was

leaders like

you

that

possible for the scab-infested Ohio plants to receive a contract as good as the one

1956."
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we

made

it

did in

corporation, as "an employer

community

Appeals

locality."

new management,

As

some

to think of
to

who

has prospered and grown in this

of the debt

management's

after

all,

to

it

owes

late 1957.

had shallow

Early in 1958

its

community

44 years in this

spirit fell

on deaf

ears;

roots in Springfield. 48

the layoffs continued, floor space in

doubled in

to

Columbus more than

management

notified the union that

generator and magneto products would be taken from Springfield to

"complete the consolidation of
plant,

electrical

manufacturing

at the

Columbus

with the Springfield division concentrating on mechanical and

hydraulic products." Claims were no longer

work would
Industrial

substitute for

moved product

Commission appealed

made

lines.

that additional skilled

Alarmed, the Springfield

to corporate president, Charles Perelle to

reconsider.

As you

are undoubtedly aware, the skilled labor and

craftsmen available in
the country.

Any

this area far

surpass any other area in

financial benefit that

might accrue in

another section of the country would be offset by inferior

workmanship. 49

It

took eleven days for corporate officers to respond. C.A. Sharpe,

vice president of the corporation,

met with Springfield Mayor Thomas

O'Connor on February 25th and assured him
pick

up

that

in the plant in the production of diesel

work was expected

pumps

for

to

farm

equipment. The increase, Sharpe claimed, would provide jobs for 70 of

48 LB, February, 1954; SMU, March 7, 1954; LB, April, 1954.
49 SDN, February 12, 1958, p. 1; Industrial Commission letter

SDN, February

15, 1958, p.6
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to

Charles Perelle quoted

in

the

some 250

that plans to

laid off workers.

move

O'Connor

the generator

also learned during the meeting

and magneto

lines to Mississippi

been drawn up by a management consulting team

in early 1954.

had

In other

words, the 70 jobs available in agricultural equipment production
were
entirely fortuitous, not part of a

company plan

to ease job loss. 50

Conclusio n: Springfield Industry Suffers

The Bosch announcement
added

to a lengthy

list

that a plant

New

to

of closings in Massachusetts

elected Massachusetts Senator John

analysis of

was

F.

Kennedy

be built in Mississippi

and prompted

recently

to prepare a detailed

England's economic problems. His findings, borrowed

from the report of President Truman's Council of Economic Advisors,

were released

in a series of late Spring ,1953 speeches

Kennedy warned
electrical

on the Senate

that the "defense contracts in the aircraft

machinery industries and the

inflated

Government

floor.

and
and

payrolls

other activities resulting from mobilization cover up the static position of
the private civilian
after the

economy

of the region."

Korean War boom nearly 40 percent

workers were

jobless...

.

He

pointed out that "Even

of Massachusetts' textile

Instead of declining during the heavy

mobilization year of 1951, unemployment increased 150 percent in Fall
River, 103 percent in Lawrence,

and

in the

Rhode

and

far

more

in

Nashua,

New

Hampshire,

Island textile mills." 51

Senator Kennedy expressed concern that Southern states were

now

successful in encouraging companies with skilled workers to relocate their

50

SDN, February

51 Senator John

F.

26, 1958, p.

1.

Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of

83rd Congress, First Session, Vol. 99,

(May

New

England," Proceedings of the

18, 1953) p. 5054- 5056.
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plants, referring to the

this.

He was

prescient

New

England job

loss

during the 1950s was not going

textiles

and apparel

as

had been

in realizing that

be confined to

Bosch plant as an example of

The Bosch case was

in the 1930s

sited in a Senate floor speech

According

Bosch Co.,

it

permanent

the city of Springfield,

1940s.

he delivered.

to the Springfield Free Press, the
a

and

to

American

fixture in the industrial life in

is

leaving

its

location in that city

for a free plant, free taxes for ten years,

and low-wage

labor in Columbus, Mississippi. 52

Kennedy spoke

against federal tax legislation that allowed the

issuance of rapid tax amortization certificates to corporations that needed
to build

new

plants to

meet defense

He argued

orders.

that the

program

simply provided a subsidy to move jobs out of the Northeast.

He

examples of companies that received

new

in the

South while closing northern

certificate in

and

a

March, 1951

few days

certificates,

factories.

only to build

J.P.

plants

Stevens obtained such a

to construct a plant in Stanley,

later shuttered a Haverhill,

cited

North Carolina

Massachusetts mill, putting

four hundred people out of work. General Electric secured a certificate for

$20 million to build a

discovered that
engines.

It

it

needed

then shut

South Scranton,

jet

Pa.,

engine plant in Louisville, Kentucky and then
a small area in the

down

massive

facility to

White

factories in Trenton, N.J.,

and Bridgeport, Conn., moving 19,000

washing machine and other appliance
Westinghouse received close

jobs to the

new

build

Plains, N.Y.,

refrigerator,

Louisville plant.

to $30 million in certificates, built plants in

52 Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of

New England," (May 20,
83

1953) p. 5233.

Columbus, Ohio and Raleigh, North Carolina and
from Springfield, Mass., and Newark,

Kennedy gained

work

shifted

to

them

N.J. 53

wider audience in a January, 1954 Atlantic

a

Monthly essay, "New England and the South: The Struggle

for Industry."

Readers learned that close

in

to 70 textile mills

were liquidated

Massachusetts since 1946, and that plant relocations were
in machinery, electrical equipment, paper,

understood that plant

shifts

contained in the 1951

BW

In only a small

were subtle

article

number

place through closing

on

taking place

and chemicals. Kennedy

at first

closings.

and echoed the views

He

wrote:

of cases does direct migration take

New

England plants and transferring

their operations to southern plants.

by operating

now

mills in both

New

More

often, firms start

England and the South, then

tend to abandon their northern plants in periods of decline

and

expand

later

their

southern operations

when

prosperity

returns. 54

To stem

the job drain

minimum wage from

its

Kennedy

called for a boost in the federal

present 75 cents an hour.

By comparison, the

average Massachusetts manufacturing wage was $1.64. Kennedy suggested
that a

development strategy based on low wages could not be sustained

indefinitely as other regions of the world, including Latin

Asia, are developed.
"the

same pangs

Such

of aging

a strategy

now

America and

could result in the South suffering

suffered by

New

England," Kennedy

warned. 55

53 Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of New England," (May 20, 1953) p. 5235.
54 Kennedy, "New England and the South," The Atlantic Monthly (January, 1954)

55

Kennedy, "New England and the South,"

84

p. 35.

p. 33.

CHAPTER 4

CORPORATE CONTROL SOLIDIFIED:

1954

-

1960

Introduction

Between 1954 and 1960 management invested heavily

in product

research and development, purchased machine tools, and instituted

inventory and quality control programs in an effort to upgrade the 40-year
old Springfield factory and increase

volume, labor intensive production
relocated to a

new

its

At the same time high

efficiency.

for the

automotive industry was

plant in Mississippi. Simultaneously, a

wedge was

driven between the union and management as every overture the union

made

to play a positive role

Management

on

the shop floor

was

rebuffed.

quite often recognized the importance of skilled

workers. In 1952, for example, the company newsletter carried

photographs of workers in

its

apprenticeship program at the local trade

high school. The company indicated that these high skilled workers were
essential to firm success,

and paid

the 44 blue collar workers to attend.

by decade's end, the only courses being offered were

to

management, and

most had

to

do with how

workers.

A

corporate strategy based on increased control over the shop

floor

was put

skilled

in place,

to gain increased output

and the

workers virtually came

from front

plant's historic reliance

to

an end.

But

line

on the input

of

1

Training Program Looks Good," Craftsman (December, 1952) p. 6-7. In 1957 Progress
reported on a one-day a week training program for supervisors studying calibration, timing,
1

"New

maintenance, and repair of diesel pumps, Progress, "Back
August, 1957, p. 4.
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to

School for

AB

Staffers,"

Charles Perelle Arrives

In

May, 1954 Charles

He had an

Bosch Arma.

worked

at

in Springfield

was named president

Perelle

of

American

extensive manufacturing background, having

Hughes Tool and Vultee

Aircraft.

He

also

had interacted with

labor unions before, having been at Vultee Aircraft during

its bitter

confrontation with the United Auto Workers in the Fall of 1940. 2 Perelle

terminated a number of Springfield executives soon

after

he took over,

including both the production and works managers. In October 1954

Herbert Riddle, vice-president in charge of employee relations, suddenly
resigned. Riddle

had worked

at

Bosch since 1940, and was considered by

everyone in the plant to be fair-minded.

He had been

given credit for the

establishment of what had been excellent labor-management relations

during and

after the war.

To

replace Riddle, Perelle brought in Kenneth

Leaman, who had worked with him

named

the

manager of employee

as

manager

Vultee Aircraft. James Mote was

relations.

machine operators. He had worked

them

at

in the

Mote was widely
Bosch

disliked

for eight years,

by

most of

where he oversaw the

of the standards department,

establishment of production rates and standards rates throughout the
plant.

had

Perelle

would anger

to realize that placing

Mote

in charge of labor relations

the union. 3

Next, Charles Tuttle was put in charge of labor relations for the
entire corporation.

the late 1940s.

2

Labor's
as

3

A

War

Union

and

Tuttle

had been

Bosch union leaders wrote

at

Gar

Wood

letters to several

together in

other

Vultee and presented a major challenge to the government's desire to
stoppages at plants engaged in war-related production. Nelson Lichtenstein,
at Home (New York, 1982) p. 54, 57; Wyndham Mortimer, Organize: My Life

Workers struck

avoid work

Perelle

Man

at

(Boston, 1971) p. 170-171.

SMU, October 25, 26,

1954.
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industrial unions inquiring about Turtle.

Representative for Region

1

Frank Fagan, International

of the United Automobile

responded that Turtle had been in charge of labor

Wood Company
of his work.

-

the part of the

and our differences were kept
felt a

to a

minimum."

"severe change in attitude

willing to settle grievances on the shop floor; foremen

on how

"a technical

on

Company." Foremen and production superintendents were

had decisions reversed by

classes

Gar

1951 and the

But with Tuttle in charge the union

often

relations for the

UAW had definite impressions
According to Fagan the UAW and Gar Wood had enjoyed
from 1945

"the very best of relations

no longer

Workers (UAW)

Tuttle.

As an example
helped precipitate

did,

Tuttle also instituted foremen's

to limit the scope of the contract

document and not

who

a co-operative

agreement and turn

it

into

working agreement." 4

of Tuttle's anti-union approach, Fagan noted that he

a costly six

month

strike at

Gar

Wood

by upholding the

discharge of a worker with 28 years seniority for sitting on a stool while

performing an operation on his

job, a practice

he had engaged in for over

20 years with the knowledge of his supervisor. Tuttle also discharged the
chief

union steward

who came

to the worker's defense.

The grievance procedure and labor agreement were no longer
viewed

as problem-solving tools with Tuttle in charge of labor relations,

Fagan pointed

on

out.

the defensive.

Tuttle's objective

Fagan warned the

was

to

keep the union on-edge and

I.U.E. that Tuttle tried to

collective bargaining to elicit one-on-one deals with

and

that he

The

letter

4

"is

a

dangerous fellow

concluded with

Frank Fagan Letter

206 collection, Series

to
2,

5,

union representatives

with on the telephone."

this character analysis:

International

Box

to talk business

bypass

March 1, 1955 (in Local
Massachusetts, Amherst Labor Archives).

Union of

University of

87

Electrical Workers,

He

an outspoken opponent of the Union shop, check-off,
seniority agreements, and other basic Union demands.
He
is

believes that companies

without

restrictions.

He

technical man.

He

must have freedom
is

.

and highly

a cold, arrogant,

admits having had no experience with

working people other than
Relations man...

to operate

in his present capacity as a Labor

Since Tuttle

left

us in 1951, real collective

bargaining has been restored and maintained. 5

Other changes followed

at Bosch.

plant doubled, while

company

officials

political leaders that

"American Bosch intends

Floor space in the Mississippi

assured Springfield workers and
to utilize its

main plant

Springfield to the fullest possible extent for the manufacture of

products such as diesel fuel injection equipment,

and other defense items which

are

more highly

its

in

other

engine components

jet

specialized, not-so-

competitive products and more suitable for the type of operation here." 6
In 1953

when

newspapers quoted

the Mississippi plans were

announced

a Bosch's vice-president of operations

construction of the Mississippi factory.

now

first

"How

can

we

on

local

the

get panicky

if it is

decided that expansion should be made by manufacturing certain

electrical

products somewhere else and replacing them

additional specialized precision products."

was being moved

to Mississippi

A

at Springfield

year had passed

and 450 workers were losing

-

with

machinery

their jobs

-

prompting the following from the newspaper: "What additional
specialized precision products the
the

5

move

Fagan

to

letter,

to introduce here after

Columbus, Mississippi have not yet been indicated." 7

March

6

SDN, September

7

SMU

X

company plans

9,

1,

1955.

1955.

April 25, 1953, Feb. 25, 1954.
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With Leaman, Mote, and

Tuttle in charge of labor relations, union

leaders were forced to discuss grievances and settle shop floor
problems

with a labor relations team devoid of any plant

now

history.

The company

avoided past practices in the plant whenever possible, and

establish their

own way

set

out to

doing things.

of

Disquiet on the Shop Floor

Throughout 1954 the union publicly and pointedly questioned
whether foremen and supervisors knew what they were doing on the

shop
but

floor.

There had been

now through

little

criticism of

the Bulletin writers kept

ridiculed line supervisors, tagging

Dan 'No Answer Today'
Take Care of

it

management

up constant

them with such

prior to this,

criticism

and

derisive nicknames as

Sullivan, Art 'Hurry Up' Domilla, Ernest

Tomorrow' McLean,

Patrick 'Puddin Head'Judd

'I'll

and

Charles 'Cut Rate' McCobb. This derision stemmed from workers'
frustrations that

shop

floor

problems were not being solved in

a timely

manner. The union protested that the company was seeking increased
profitability

members

by pushing workers harder. Very much on the defensive,

ratified a labor

agreement containing a modest wage increase

during 1954 negotiations,

after agreeing to

Workers were unhappy but wanted
and

his

new management

8 LB, April,

May,

1954;

team,

SMU, September

extend the contract three times.

to avoid a confrontation

at least for the

18, 1954.
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moment. 8

with Perelle

Labor-Ma nagempnt Committee Eliminated

In his

on

all

of

first letter to

you

plant workers Perelle pointed out,

to help in every

overall efficiency so that

we

way you can

decisions

was

committee.

It

relying

our business and

to increase

can maintain our competitive position

without drastic changes." Workers had

mind when he used

am

"I

wonder what

to

the phrase without drastic changes.

Perelle

One

had

in

of his major

the elimination of the plant's labor-management

was unclear

union

to the

just

how

would help

this

increase

overall efficiency. 9

The committee had been

in place for 19 years.

It

met monthly

to

solve problems before reaching the grievance and arbitration stage. The
union's president and business agent were

members along with top

managers. While few records of the Bosch committee

newspaper frequently reported on

its

exist, the

union

meetings, and the United States

War

Production Board prepared a detailed case study on the Springfield

Westinghouse Labor-Management Committee.

was modeled

after this one, a

a perspective

on worker involvement

making during World War

9 Craftsman, Vol. 11, no.

2,

As

the Bosch committee

review of the case study

is

helpful in gaining

in production-related decision-

II. !0

August-September, 1954,

p.l

10

vVar Production Board (WPB), The Labor Management Production Committee of the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Springfield, Massachusetts and the
Radio and Machine Workers of America, CIO, Local 202 (Washington,
July, 1944). The Westinghouse study was one in a series that the Board prepared. In the
introduction it was noted that "the Committee here described is so well set up and

United

Electrical,

permeates the entire factory organization
activities

was deemed

in

advisable."
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such a

way

that a full description of

its

1

Westinghouse

Toint Production

Committpp. The committee was

established in March, 1942 with a top advisory group,
eight activity

committees,

Impetus

six division

for the

committees, and 46 department committees.

committee came from the union in

1940 and was part

late

of a U.E. national effort to establish such committees in
plants.

Initially

Council with

management

many

eventually had.

of the

organized

all its

rejected a proposal to establish a Victory

same

features the joint production committee

In 1942 close to 300

management and union employees

were members of various committees directed by an eight person
executive group co-chaired by the union president and

A

superintendent of production.

Labor-Management

the Industrial Relations Department to handle the

company

office

work

was

set

up

in

of the various

sub-committees. 1

The committee was governed by ten general operating

principles

including:
•

Place emphasis

on

the solution of production

problems by insisting that department subcommittees
solve their
•

Keep

own

problems.

collective bargaining

and grievance issues out

of

committee meetings.
•

Work

•

Give credit to workers in the departments and keep the

in

an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

Advisory Committee

in the

background

as

much

as

possible. 12

The Committee undertook plant-wide

projects in 1942

material conservation and quality improvement.

months
11

12

WPB,
WPB,

significant gains

During the

and 1943 on
first

few

were made. In one department alone, material

p. 7.
p. 2.
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conservation resulted in the salvaging of 25,000 pounds of
aluminum, 57

pounds

of copper,

plating

method put

and 112 pounds

into practice saved $9,000

worth of dies in

months. Department committees met weekly
rejected parts

A

1942.

which had reached almost

plant-wide "Make

it

A chrome

of brass in the first year.

to

reduce rework and

13 percent of total output in early

Good" campaign was launched

in the percentage of scrap being

just three

reduced to 6 percent in the

that resulted

first

two and

one-half months of the effort. 13

Department committees got
project

was

members

started.

directly involved

whenever

a

new war

Designers and engineers met frequently with

of production department teams to determine the best sequence

of steps in machining the parts, the

amounts

of material needed,

and

production time required. With the parts were in production follow-up

meetings were held to insure the quality of the work.

When

the

WPB

analyzed the subject matter of 12 department

committee meetings over

how

a six

month period

in 1944

became apparent

focused shop floor group were on mastering the manufacturing

process in their respective

work

areas:

Out

explicitly production-oriented, including

design, quality, process changes,

A

machine maintenance.

of 239

work flow between departments, and

typical

department meeting went

themselves in a room in such

who

represents

about trying

When

upon.
WPB,

p.

25

-

a

way

we

that?'

try this

Finally

a table or

that

management and who

suggests, 'Could

agenda items, 229 were

such issues as product and tool

The committee members gather around

13

it

it is

like this:

group

difficult to tell

represents labor.

One

method?' Another says 'How

some recommendations

are agreed

the minutes of the meeting are written up, the

28.
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"

name

member

of the

the matter

is

responsible, or of the person to

to be referred,

is

whom

placed in the left-hand margin

beside each topic. 14

Results were impressive at times. In a department producing
large

radio cabinets for the

Navy more than

each week by properly sequencing
largest pieces to be

smaller parts.

produced and

all

four tons of material

work

sheet metal

utilizing

was saved

starting with the

trimmed sheet metal

Past practice had been to discard

trim to salvage. In

all

another department where radio transmitters were assembled

customary

to

wheel needed parts

to the

work

and cloth bags. The assembler would have
find

what he

or she

was looking

for,

area

to sort

some

it

was

loose, in boxes,

through

piles of parts to

often handling each part several

The production committee designed and

times.

for

built a

new

cart

shelves and drawers for smaller parts that could be wheeled to a

bench, loaded with enough parts to build 20

-

with

work

30 transmitters at a time.

Sorting and handling were eliminated and while one cart was in use in
the department, a

worker could be

publicized these results in

WPB

its

off filling

another one. The union

weekly newspaper, The United

members asked workers and managers

to discuss

they saw with continuing the committee at war's end.

wanted

to see the effort continue, although each

Workers expressed concern over the
stimulated

demand

ceased.

15

WPB, p. 12-14.
WPB, p. 16. The

full title

reservations.

Management worried about

on the mast head of

the union

when war-

the percentage of

Workers believed

that

newspaper read "A United Front

of Labor with no Division Because of Race, Color, Creed or Craft.
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problems

Both groups

issue of job elimination

cost savings that should be paid out to workers.

14

had

Front. 15

management would discount
implement them
Implicit, here,

later

was

their

improvement suggestions, only

without compensating workers for

a lack of trust

to

their ideas.

between the two groups. 16

Reactions to the Bosch Committee's Elimination

In early 1955 the union
Perelle as proof that

good labor

union newspaper challenged,
to

do

is start.

We

viewed the committee's elimination by
relations

"If

wonder who

the

will

were

a thing of the past.

company wants

trouble

be hurt the most."

A

all

The

they have

Bulletin editorial

stated:

For nineteen years the American Bosch and the Union have

enjoyed good Labor Relations but

downgrade.

Now

and

means

the

effective

it

now

they seem to be on the

seems we can no longer have an honest
of settling

common

problems through

Labor-Management Committee. Labor-Management

meetings have been held monthly where subjects have been
discussed and issues settled before they became a major

problem. These meetings were beneficial and should be
continued. 17

Iii

order to achieve the shop floor productivity and cost reduction

gains he sought, Perelle actually needed union support and a workforce
willing to share their skills to solve problems.
historically

16

Unilaterally discarding an

proven communications and problem-solving mechanism

These are real concerns and ones that current union-management cooperation
proponents wrestle with regularly. The issue of job security is perhaps the most difficult to
resolve. The Westinghouse Committee functioned well because demand on output was so
great, and jobs in the area were so plentiful, that union members, particularly those with

WPB,

high

p. 21.

skill levels,

did not fear job

17 LB, January, 1955, p.

loss.

1.
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would, in the long run,
Perelle

frustrate other decisions Perelle

was attempting here

short-sighted, but typical of

-

the drive for

made. What

management

what was occurring

control

-

was

in manufacturing facilities

across the country. 18

Labor historian David Montgomery describes the consequences of

worker gains in the

late 1930s

unionizing workers

won on

them and

and 1940s

in this

the job at this time

way: "The power which

was

far

more

significant to

employers than whatever wage gains they won. Shop

to their

stewards and committee

men and women,

backed up (often physically) by

the employees in the departments they represented, translated the

inextinguishable small-group resistance of workers into open defiance and

conscious alternatives to the directives of the management."

Montgomery views
management sought

came

and

early 1950s as a time

to extinguish the 'shop floor dance'

would guarantee

relations that
this control

the late 1940s

at a price,

absolute control

on

and

when

establish

the shop floor.

Getting

however, beyond the wages and benefits paid

to workers.

The 'conscious

Montgomery

referred to were often the clever ideas to improve a product

18

The

issue of corporate

floor after

World War

pioneering

work

is

II

Joel

alternatives to

management

directives'

management's determination to gain greater control on the shop
has been the subject of several recent books and articles. An early,
Seidman, American Labor From Defense to Reconversion (Chicago,

Recent works include: Sanford Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions,
and the Transformation of Work in American Industry 1900-1945 (New York, 1985); Steve
Jefferys, Management and Managed: Fifty Years of Crisis at Crysler (New York, 1986);
Nelson Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining Strategy and Shop-floor Conflict," Industrial
Relations, Vol. 24 (Fall 1985) and "Auto Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory
1953).

American History, Vol. 67 (1980). The 'struggle for control' will
be discussed in ch. 6-8. It is important to note here that while unions believed they were
being made scapegoats when the companies they worked for charged that labor agreements
were weakening U.S. industry, companies were losing out as well by turning workers,
especially skilled workers, away from levels of participation on the shop floor that made
plants productive during World War II.
Life, 1937-1955," Journal of
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or machining processes, or the
setting

up machine

first

hand knowledge and experiences

made

tools that

the plant run smoothly.

Perelle's

abrupt elimination of a long standing labor-management
committee
clear signal that

management had no

assuming a problem-solving

role

and

in so doing

on the shop

guaranteed Perelle

Lines

In four years Perelle

shop

floor poet

Harden

floor.

a

Many

skilled

wisdom and

hollow victory.

'clever

19

in the Plant

had alienated union leaders and workers.

mood

caught the plant

well with a

poem

that

Perelle

is

Psalm

our shepherd.

We

are in

want

He maketh many to lie on park benches
He leadth many beside his still factory
He restoreth our doubt in his administration
(Yea, though we walk through the valley of
unemployment)

We
He

will

always remain hungry.

clobbers our rates with

new methods

Our expenses over-runneth our income.
Surely poverty and hard living shall follow us,

days

Of

the Perelle administration.

And we

shall

19 Montgomery, Workers Control

dwell in a rented house forever.

in

America, p. 164 -165.

20 "Perelle Psalm," LB, February, 1958,

p. 2.
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A

appeared

the Bulletin. 20
Perelle

v\

further interest in the union

workers' withdrew their cumulative production
ideas'

i

all

the

i

The poem's tone represents
cooperation expressed
the

a

sharp break from attitudes toward

For example, in a report on the results of

earlier.

May, 1951 Labor-Management Committee meeting

that high seniority

workers volunteered

same meeting

department.

there

was

new

a discussion of production

this in the future."

will illustrate that

The

if

members were challenged

wryly closed the

real".

more

article:

"This

will gladly serve in

Union members were

view the union as more than an instrument

work

to eliminate

Van Winkle Wake Up!" union

they feel hurt, "fancied or

a dollar's

up men who

to participate regularly in the affairs of the local,

Bosch than the stockholder...

union's

a

they are asked." 21

management. "Our stake admittedly

them

During

problems in

happened and how

it

Bulletin reporter

In June, 1951 in an essay "Rip

when

set

our people have the know-how and

a Supervisor's position

to

shift to

Rather than deal with various assistant foremen to solve the

found the trouble and explained how

urged

second

fuel injection part.

problem the general manager "consulted one of the

not just

was announced

for transfers to the

help solve a production problem with a
the

it

.

Make

is

to fight

as great or greater in

American

suggestions, better the product, give

for a dollar's pay!

Don't kid yourself. There are

militant than ours that recognize that increased assumption

of responsibility leads to increased benefits." 22

Even

in

November, 1954

in the

midst of the redirection of work to

Mississippi, the Bulletin urged workers to

However,
began

21

LB,

to

six

months

make

quality products.

into Perelle's taking control of the

company,

strains

show. In the business agent's and president's November reports

May,

1951, p.4.

22 LB, June, 1951,

p. 2.
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to the

and

membership management was

unilateral changes in the

ups. 23

By 1956

management was
and

an open

in

way workers were

letter to Perelle,

new

castigated for the

in a related article the

criticized for arbitrary rate cutting

paid for machine tool

"How

Blind

Can You Get-

inspection system

company was taken

it

to task for its

suggestion system. According to the union the

new

set

was

installing

new

quality control

system, by taking inspectors off the shop floor, weakened the
ability of

machine operators

and

on

a stress

work and

to detect defects at their

greater output per worker

led department foreman to pass

department to meet production

no consideration
the plan.

A

for

the floor with scrap.

Bulletin cartoon

An accompanying

management team

union plan
analysts,

effective one.

filling a

article

why

This

a part

is all

was

it is

the reasons

Management

quality control

a report

and meet

after

rejected.

made

Rework

or before, but

is

at

taught that Scrap can be repeated after

p. 1.

98

it

does not

at the source

a statement as to

(AFTER THE BULL) [emphasis

has been made. Past experience here

23 LB, November, 1954,

criticism of

hole he had chopped in

of a very limited nature, because

being

its

persisted, with

program, and offered a

correct the reason for the Scrap or

when

of their

sharply attacked Perelle and

under the company plan, would submit

they determined

up bad

'Foremen Solve Scrap Problem'

for the quality control

more

for a

bad work out

layoffs,

to cover

When management

depicted a sweaty and nervous foreman

his

pushed operators

worker input, the union stepped up

page

front

goals.

machine. Rate cuts,

in original]

Am. Bosch has

all

precautions

have been taken unless the source,
machining,

The union was

members

is

time of

protected. 24

angry that workers were no longer equal

also

of the plant's suggestion committee.

structure the union's

at the

In Perelle's

new committee

two representatives could attend only four monthly

meetings a year, where previously they participated in every one. The

union

now urged

which

incidentally

that "suggestions authored

amount

until representatives are
article,

to

by members of Local

about 95 percent of

all

206,

submitted, be delayed

allowed to return to the meetings." In the same

however, since the desire

to constructively solve

powerful one, the union offered ideas

for

problems was

a

improving the suggestion

program.

The average

factory worker has

good ideas but usually

has trouble expressing them in 25 words or

on

the average

not always

the blanks provided.

clear, so

someone trained

in

it is

less,

which

is

Also sketches are

our belief that a short talk with

methods or drawing would

definitely increase the value of a

good suggestion

tremendously. 25

In September, 1955, in the midst of these changes a contract

was

negotiated with Local 206. Talks began just as Springfield expansion plans

were announced and

and generators

for truck

24 LB, April, 1956,
quality control

is

a building

p. 2;

mot

May,

1957, p.l

25 LB, April 1954,

It is

produce

coils,

magnetos

important to note here that the concept that

machine itself, and not in a quality control lab after
was embraced fully in Japan and was eventually recognized

effective at the

revolutionary

to

and farm equipment. The Springfield workforce

the parts are off the shop floor,
in the U.S. as a

was acquired

management

p. 3; April, 1956, p. 2.
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principle.

had jumped

from 2,600 since the

to 3,500

profits for the first half of 1955

Mississippi

was

matched 1954

in full production.

They

plentiful in Springfield, at least for the
to

make

start of the year,

also

sales

and

The union knew

levels.

knew

moment,

and

that

there

with work

was an opportunity

contract gains. 26

This time, unlike 1954, there was no contract extension
and the
negotiating committee received a strike authorization vote from
the

membership well before

the contract's expiration date.

informed management that

September

1

there

would

A

history of the local.

agreement with

a

if

The committee

the current agreement expired

in fact be a strike, the first

on

one in the 19-year

two-day walkout ensued and resulted in a two-year

wage and

benefit package hailed as the best in Western

Massachusetts. Each side could claim victory. The walk-out took place

over a week-end so only overtime work was disrupted.

company, the new two-year agreement broke

Important for the

a nineteen-year history of

one-year contracts. Establishing control over labor costs was essential to

long-term corporate planning; negotiations once a year
difficult.

Just

one week

after the contract

was signed

union leaders by announcing

a Mississippi

manufacturing floor space

meet soaring demand

products.

The announcement was

know he was

26 SM(i, August
plant

up

to

to

its

still

Perelle surprised

expansion designed to double

Perelle's

way

for

automotive

of letting union leaders

The wild swings in employment run through the history of the
The agricultural, automotive and defense industries had sharp ups

3, 1955.

closing.

SMU, September

this

in charge. 27

and downs and the Springfield plant was
27

made

2, 6,9,

a seat-mate

1955.

100

on the

roller coaster.

Plant Modernization Prog ram-

Meeting t he Competition Hear! -On

Between 1955 and 1960 with
longer contract that

a loyal

made wage planning

mixed

Employment

tools.

signals about their future.

introduce

Added

new manufacturing methods,

that alienated workers

and

new

remained

levels

in place,

and

possible, Perelle set out to

reorganize the factory floor, and invest in

machine

management team

productivity-enhancing
erratic,

to this,

giving workers

by attempting

to

while asserting control in a

made

a difficult task

laid off

because of a

the union, Perelle

way

an

impossible one.

By January, 1956 500 recent

hires

were

reduction in orders for tractor fuel injection pumps. Annual sales were

down

but 1955 profits rose

military orders
1956, but

workers
million

and had

none of

this

slightly.

would be spent

ARMA

Division

was gaining

a $195 million defense sales backlog at the start of

work found

finally received

The

its

way

some good news:

to Springfield.

Perelle

modernize the main

to

Then

announced

in

May

that $1.5

plant. 28

Research and Development

The plant continued
development. In the

to

spend money on product research and

late 1940s

and early 1950s Springfield increased

research and development expenditures as a portion of total sales to

approximately 7 percent. Efforts began right

new
28

fuel

SMU,

pump

April

3,

that required fewer parts,

1956; LB,

May,

1956.

newsletter, Progress, in 1956. Progress,

after

and had

World War
a simpler

The corporation began publication
May, 1956, p. 2.
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II

to

produce

assembly

of

its

own monthly

process.
it

was

The new PSA pump weighed 13 pounds compared

APE which weighed

replacing, the

to the

model

26 pounds.

In 1951 the Craftsman ran a series of articles
discussing various

departments

in the plant.

"Designing our Products" described

how

a

new

product was developed in sequential processes, from draftsmen
and
engineers, to the laboratory for
finally to sales.

Analysis'

At the

was done

tests, to

manufacturing engineers, and

sales stage a 'Manufacturing for Price

and Delivery

to determine the total costs connected with

production, including any investments needed to purchase

new

machines, fixtures, and

and tooling

will

tools.

"If

be so high as to necessitate

the cost of manufacturing

a selling price that is out of the question,

an attempt must be made to redesign the new product toward attaining

Once

lower

cost."

to the

Production Section of the Engineering Division where

costs

were acceptable, the new product was

time discussions were to be held on

needed quantities

in the factory.

how

Several

to

a

to be released
for the first

produce the product

in the

new products and improved

designs on existing ones originated in Springfield using what could be
fairly

be called

a trial

and error approach

was time-consuming, and
especially

when new

it

added

to

product design. The approach

significantly to the cost of products,

designs were not accepted by customers. 29

Cost Improvement Program

In addition to research
cost

and development

improvement program was

encouraged

to

started.

submit ideas that "lower

efforts, a

All plant
costs,

employees were

improve working conditions

29 Craftsman, April, 1948, p.4-5; Craftsman, February-March, 1951,
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manufacturing

p. 8-11.

or in
first

some way improve

month

the quality of

American Bosch products." In

of the plan 50 suggestions were proposed.
Stan Bubien, a

planner in the

office,

was paid $140

for his suggestion to switch the

manufacture of a particular part from an expensive casting

to

commercially produced bar stock. Progress reported Bubien was
going
use the

the

money

for a vacation, breakfast at the

Yankee Peddler

to

and

(a local

expensive restaurant) and a bicycle for his son. The suggestions
program

continued to enlist the energies of workers in spite of the union urging

workers

to

withhold ideas

until full representation

was regained on

the

committee. Close to $1.5 million in cost savings were generated by the
plan between

May

1955 and the end of 1956 as monthly awards for quality

and manufacturing improvements were made. 30

Shop Reorganization Plans

Perelle believed that for the plant to be

departments in the factory needed

to

work

more

efficient all

together.

Industrial

Engineering manager Willard Kelly was placed in charge of a program to
insure that Manufacturing, Engineering, and Sales personnel were in

constant communication with each other.

When

Manufacturing sees

fit

drawings and specifications
often
is

means

that Sales

is

necessary to discover

to ask Engineering to alter

in order to realize

economies

it

required to contact our customers.

how

the change will affect the

way

It

in

30 progress, reported that $712,900 in savings were generated in just 17 weeks. Payments to
workers remained small overall, averaging less than $50.00 (June, 1956, p.l). The

on eight proposals, two that eliminated machine
operators, one that reduced set up times, and the others that had a direct effect on
machining times. The total payout for the eight was $350.

November, 1957

Progress reported

103

which our customers use our product. He

(the

frequently requests changes which

a

demand

customer)

new approach

to

tooling and manufacturing methods and lead to
a switch in
plant layout. 31

Kelly established procedures to design

new

layouts for every

production department. Department 210, which became one of the

first to

be redesigned, started producing new pumps in early November, 1956.
article in Progress

An

described the "smooth flow of parts and assemblies,

greater efficiency because of conveyors

and power

tools,

and

better

working conditions" resulting from the changes. The new layout
guaranteed "skilled craftsmanship without drudgery." 32

Quality Improvement Programs

Management now

stressed the importance of building quality

products. The firm's Quality Manager was profiled in the November, 1956
issue of Progress discussing the concept that "quality cannot be inspected
into a product.... Quality

must

start

with the design and then be

maintained through tooling, purchasing, fabrication, assembly, testing and
shipping."

This approach

earlier quality

recognition.

was

consistent with the union's critique of

programs, but once again union ideas received no

Insuring good

work became

a constant

theme throughout

1957 as management stressed the links between quality and shop floor

31 Progress, September, 1956, p.

1

32 Progress, November, 1956, p. 4. A photograph of the department shows all the machine
tools in Dept. 210 linked through a series of conveyors to facilitate the movement of work
from one work station to another. Machine tools are also arranged in a sequence that
follows the actual operations to be performed to insure that parts are not handled numerous
times in the department.
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organization,

and preached good housekeeping.

A housekeeping

plan was

launched in March, and the shipping department
was completely
reorganized to insure that orders got out to customers
on time. These
coordination and planning efforts appeared to be having
a positive impact
in the plant.

It

was

reported, for example, that in October, 1956 of 3,129

automotive generators built and shipped

all

were on time. 33

Machine Tool Prog ram

From 1957-1960 $10
Automated

was spent on machine

million

turret lathes replaced lines of

machines and small

lathes, while

pre-World

War

tools.
II

automated, multi-spindle

vintage screw
drill

replaced production lines of single spindle drilling machines.

could

now run

into a fixture

several

and

machine

tools at a time

machining

cycles, permitted

simultaneously.

and /or hydraulic
to

an operator

The new machine
controls,

measure the time

to

making

produce

tools
it

to

their

Multi-tool

automated

run two or more machines

had mechanical,

fairly

worker

by simply loading stock

starting the machine's drilling cycle.

chucking machines were introduced, and with

A

presses

easy for

a finished part.

electrical

management engineers

This helped greatly with

scheduling. Production bottlenecks often resulted in parts not being
available in the assembly area to produce finished products.

believed the

more they could

control

Management

work flow from machine

tools the

33 p r0 ress, November, 1956; January, March, 1957. Clean up programs were instituted in
g
several departments and unused machine tools were removed to reduce cluttered work areas
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better they

would be

able to attack this problem

and complete products on

time. 34

Automatic milling machines were purchased
with dual cutting heads and

unloading of

parts.

air

clamp

fixtures to

for

Department 200

speed up the loading and

Several automatic lathes were acquired and equipped

with powerful drive motors and tungsten carbide

tools.

These lathes

could cut stock to finish dimensions, eliminating several secondary

machining operations, and

Burgmaster multi-spindle automatic

jobs.

drill

presses were also purchased and located throughout the plant. These

machines were capable of performing
part once

it

was placed

in a fixture.

head centered each new

a

An

number

of drilling operations

electrically controlled

tool in sequence, the tool

on

a

indexing

was brought down

into

the work, automatically raised, the turret holding the tools indexed and a

new

tool

performed

its

"No

four to eight tools.

required operation.
attention

load, press the start button,

handicap which

AB

needed," Progress reported, "except to

and unload. This permits

operate a second machine...
a

is

Burgmasters could hold from

.

It's

the operator to

obvious that outdated machine tools are

cannot afford." In May, 1959 several Kingsbury

horizontal drilling and tapping machines were installed.
to-back," according to Progress, "the

counter-sinking, and tapping
the drilling time

on

up

two

"Working back-

units are capable of drilling,

to 26 holes simultaneously.

Internal to

the first machine, the holes are being threaded

by

tapping in the second machine. Versatile quick-changing fixtures and
tools provide a

own

means

of rapid changeover for various parts."

marketing information

stated:

machines and several operators

34 Progress, March

3,

April

8,

May

to

Kingsbury's

"You need several general-purpose

keep up with one Kingsbury and one

22, 1959.
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To conclude

operator."

this

round

of

machine

tool purchases automatic

chucking machines appeared in Department 300
several lathes.

With air-operated chucks

to take the place of

enhance loading and

to

unloading, and automatic cycling "the machine tools are operated
back-to-

back by one operator." 35

machine

U.S.

tool builders intensified their

marketing

efforts

during the mid-1950s in the face of increased international competition.
Tool builders promoted the

need

for skilled workers.

ability of their

machine

tools to diminish the

The November, 1954 American Machinist,

for

example, contained advertisements for machines whose names alone
indicated the builder's marketing strategy,

Acme

Gridley Chuck-Matic.

operations,'
retool,'.

had 'automatic

e.g.

Machines 'eliminated two grinding

control of cycle time,'

The Chuck-Matic "does not require

operates as

many machines

Bullard Mult-Au-Matic,

were

'easy to set

skilled labor

-

one

up and

man

as the cycle times of jobs permit."

The December, 1954 American Machinist

promoted machines

designed to cut the number of operators and set-up personnel a company
needed.

The Monarch Mona-Matic advertisement had

"Many grinding operations
cut;"

the following line:

eliminated, set-up times reduced, tool costs

the Lo-Swing Automatic Lathe: "Drills and reams simultaneously

with turning and facing operations;" Gisholt Automatic Lathes: "Lower
costs, less

dependence on operator

skill";

Cincinnati Grinders:

"Operator

Responsibility Reduced." 36

35 Progress, March, 1959,

p.l.

Management said that the new machine tools now allowed
Model T to a Lincoln'. Progress, May, 1959, p. 1; June, 1959, p.l

workers to move up from 'the
September, 1959, p.l. For a typical Kingsbury ad see American Machinist, June, 1950, p. 26.
For an excellent history of U.S. machine tool builder Burgmaster see Max Holland's When
the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America (Boston, 1989).
36 American Machinist November, 1954, p. 8, 9, 32, 39; December, 1954, p. 33, 52-53.
,
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The November American Machinist contained an
"Getting the Most

new machine

Out

tools.

It

Your Machining"

of

read in part:

editorial

that argued for the use of these

"Many managements have

resorted to

the intelligent action of putting before their workers
the economic facts of
life

as they affect the

company's business." Automating machining

operations and forcing operators to run more than one machine
tool were

two of these

facts. 37

Unionists reacted angrily to the machine acquisitions.

ups and downs already presented an unstable job

made
set

up

matters worse.
rear of

Bulletin.

"Battery of

Department

new

Employment

These machines

picture.

Operator-Eliminator machines being

160," read a 'Hits

and

Bits'

comment

in the

Another read:

There will be so

much new machinery by

July of next year that

there will undoubtedly be fewer people working here.

Automation means

-

Meet

Union Members. Without

the market competition
a

doubt

this definition

by fewer
should be in

Webster's dictionary. 38

Springfield Output Projected to

At the end of 1956
Chicopee elected

Perelle hosted a plant tour for Springfield

officials to discuss

that the plant used 1,112

everything from tool

New

modernization plans.

England suppliers

He

p. 15.

p. 2.

108

and

explained

for purchases of

steel to cutting oils, to rags, to tooling

37 American Machinist, November, 1954,
38 LB, October, 1959,

Grow

and

fixtures,

and

that 34 are

from Springfield. Close

suppliers in 1956.
to

announce

1957.

While on the

tour,

employment would

that

Backing up

this

to $1 million

management took

to local

the opportunity

increase to 2,700 from 2,400 during

optimism was the

income were the highest

was paid out

fact that

in the history of the

1956 sales and net

merged

corporation.

Sales

climbed to $122.23 from $73.8 million in 1955 while earnings
went
million from $3.38 million.

improvements

"Incidentally

when we
effective

lose

Perelle attributed these gains to

in operating efficiency. 39

In April, 1957 Perelle
in Springfield

to $4.63

announced

that he intended to double output

and Columbus, Mississippi by

we now have

a larger

started to build the

answer

to those

employment because

volume

Columbus

who were

1961.

He

said in part:

in Springfield than

we

did

plant in 1954. That seems to be an

worried then that Springfield might

of the Mississippi plant."

His optimism was

predicated on two things: research and development gains

made

designing a fuel injection system for passenger cars; and ongoing

in
efforts to

turn the experimental machine shop and tool design departments into a

machine design and building unit

for the entire corporation. 40

In July, Detroit car makers Ford, Lincoln and Packard indicated that

systems developed in Springfield would be available options in
higher priced
of

its

to the

1956 models. Mercedes Benz was

cars with systems built in Springfield.

fuel injection

peak.

Fall,

work could

Carried

now

equipping some

Bosch managers believed that

carry the Springfield plant to a

away with enthusiasm

Perelle

new

4,
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April

industrial

and others turned

problems car makers confronted persuading customers

39 Progress, December, 1956, p. 1.
40 Progress, December, 1956; SMU, March

their

9, 1957,

a blind eye

to invest in

fuel injection.

Difficulties in obtaining

work from

the recent past should have tempered the

initial

Detroit auto makers in

enthusiasm in

Springfield. 41

Chevrolet had installed fuel injection systems in several
of

its

models, but well publicized mechanical failures soured car
buyers on the
option.

Seeing

this,

Ford reduced

its

program

to introduce fuel injection.

Mississippi expansion hopes were attached to another technology
break-

through developed over a four year period, push button transmissions.

was

anticipated that 500-600 units a day

September, 1957 for installation in

blow

to Perelle's

growth

its

would be shipped

new

to

It

Ford by

Edsel models. But, in a serious

projections, neither automotive

development

resulted in production contracts and the research expenditures and time

spent in prototype production were never recovered. 42

The second more modest gain was an
plant's highly skilled tool

machine

effort to turn the Springfield

room and experimental machine shop

tool building unit for the corporation's

A

then to the wider manufacturing world.

Columbus, Mississippi plant

built for the

slots in small parts

assembled in

room was building an average

electric

own

into a

internal needs

and

machine was designed and

to automatically locate

and cut

motors. By early 1959 the tool

of one machine a month.

External

customers never availed themselves of the highly skilled group, however.

While the work kept many of the
engineers busy

company

in

its

it

plant's highly skilled machinists

never generated volume sufficient enough

anticipated and this

42

SMU,

would cause sharp production

was ending sooner than

declines an

worker reductions (February,

2).

July

9,

to assist the

plans to double Springfield production by 1961 43

41 In 1948 workers were notified that a large Ford contract
1948, p.

and

September

24, 1956; April 9,

May

21,

43 progress, January, 1957; January, December, 1959.
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August

28, 1957.

Ventures Outside Spring field

Meanwhile

new automotive

the

parts

company, keeping
and machine

its

options open in the event that

tool production activities failed to

generate orders, entered several joint production ventures.

Bosch licensed Thompson Product,

Inc. of

In July, 1956

Cleveland, Ohio to

manufacture fuel injection systems developed by Springfield engineers.

The Cleveland firm had complete manufacturing
competed head-to-head with

the Bosch.

Perelle

privileges,

had put

not the Springfield workforce, in a win-win situation.

Thompson won

a bid

Bosch collected royalties on the

and

the corporation,

Whenever
Perelle

sale.

effectively established a competitor in the field that could be held

Local 206 during contract negotiations as a more

efficient,

up

to

lower cost

producer of the same products. 44
Sales
failure of

were lower than anticipated by the middle of 1957

as the

automotive fuel injection and push button transmissions hurt

Springfield growth. In addition, defense

work

at the

ARMA Long Island

plant decreased. Springfield faced deep layoffs as fuel injection products
faltered.

In

August the union extended

agreement could be worked out and
contract-no work' philosophy gave

and

after

two extensions

a

in the harsher

was reached

1956; April 9, 1957.

Ill

the

wage

wage

'no

economic climate

for a total

wage reopener scheduled

Union leaders were not happy with

SMU, September 24,

expired contract so that a

walkout avoided. The 1955

way

a settlement

worth 11.8 cents an hour with

44

a

its

package

for

settlement, but

August, 1958.

saw

little

alternative in the face of continued

slumping

conditions improved by the time 1958

sales.

They could only hope

wage reopener

Perelle continued to pursue a merger

talks

commenced

«

and acquisition strategy by

purchasing Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-based Tele-Dynamics
in 1960. The

company was

a leader in the field of research

and development of airborne

transmitting and ground receiving equipment.

developing electronic systems

Tele-Dynamics was

flight.

In 1960

ABA

to

to

Tele-Dynamics was

monitor the performance of missiles

be operated as a separate division of

in

ABA 4 6

established a joint venture with DeHavilland

Holdings, Ltd. of England to acquire SG. Brown, Ltd., also of England.

DeHavilland was part of the Hawker Sidney Group,
industrial organization that

owned

major British

a

several companies in aircraft, missiles,

transportation and diesel engines. S.G. Brown, deeply rooted in the
British defense industry,

was

and gyroscopic equipment.

made with RCA

A

a

major producer of precision navigation

production licensing agreement was also

Victor Argentina to manufacture Bosch wiper motors

and assemblies with production anticipated

to

begin in January, 1961. 47

The Union Responds

The
period.

Bulletin

In the

hammered away

August 1957

castigated as nothing

own

at

management throughout

issue the cost

more than

improvement program was

a ploy to get

workers

speed-up and job elimination. The shop

to participate in their

floor reorganization

also seen as a cleverly disguised effort to eliminate jobs,

45

SMU, August 31, 1957;
46 SMU, Februarys I960.
47 SMU, June 11, I960; Progress, August,

1960.
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this

was

and was dubbed

the "consolidate effort
titled

-

eliminate personnel" campaign.

A

lead editorial

"Reap the Harvest" blasted Perelle and his
management team.

We

all

open

have

a certain

amount

of pride, hidden or out in the

as to our accomplishments, our work, etc.

to Operation
fault of the

Speedup, gone

workers

who

is

can

the pride

still

a

had. Through no

produce quality unparalleled,

the system installed allows for too

reworked parts and

we

Today, thanks

much

leeway, too

many

bungling of operations out of sequence...

.

In the union's view the plan resulted in excessive scrap,
rework,

and

The

field rejects.

Bulletin ran a front

with a railroad car streaming toward
truck sped

away from

test,

carrying a cargo of rejects, while a

the loading dock filled

Workers worried about
them, the "acid

it

page cartoon depicting the Bosch

this

up with junked

parts.

because they well understood the key for

the Public's reaction, acceptance or rejection, through

familiarity of our products"

is

what keeps

the plant going. 48

In October they expressed concern that high inventories coupled

with moves to automate production, could lead
loss.

to

more permanent

Automation was causing upheaval, and labor was relegated
"The manufacturer and investor

a spectator at best.

is

We

can see his problem,

union urged the establishment of

work flow

in the plant,

To back up
union proposed

a

and ways

a joint

to

is

for quality

and

he blind to ours?" The

committee

improve

to being

forced into

automation to survive through competition and the race
price for his goods.

job

to

study automation,

quality. 49

the call for the establishment of this committee, the

program

to reduce scrap.

48 LB, August, 1957.
49 LB, October, 1957.
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The

local

argued that

it

made

no sense

company

for the

to boost

output per worker

if

the increase

resulted in scrap that canceled any realized
productivity gains. They called
for

more

floor inspectors to assist

workers

at their

machines, as well as

time study adjustments to put more inspection time
in the rates on

The

Bulletin

the workers,

hearts

placed responsibility on machine operators as well.

must

we know

try to

if it

this

means

a

far

from

be more

ideal,

alert,

take a

reprimand from your foreman and do

Workers wanted the opportunity
floor.

"We,

flow of bad work even though in our

the largest share of the blame rests elsewhere.

though conditions are
even

stem

jobs.

to

make

The plant had large numbers of high

a

Even

more time

little

good
on

a difference

seniority workers.

job." 5 0

the shop

The

drill

press department, for example, averaged twenty-five years in the plant.

Workers knew

tolerances they handled,
to right the

had been lauded many times

their jobs,

and wanted

employment

picture.

employees reveals the high

to share that

A brief review

for the close

knowledge

an

effort

of the careers of three

and the depth of

level of service

in

skill in the

Bosch plant. 51

James O'Neill was
his first job

was

in that city's Farr Alpacca textile mills.

hired at Bosch as a

during World

War

drill

II,

in

years service,

was born

jr.

also

press operator,

and

group leader

Bailey,

retiring in 1959 after 40 years.

worked

for the past 23 years

Born in Holyoke,

He

eventually got

in the radio department

worked

as set

up man and

one of the grinding departments. Hans Krueger, with 35
in

Germany and

had 35 years

service.

started at

Born

in

Bosch in 1923. Albert

Birmingham, England, Bailey

50 LB, October, 1957.
51 Progress, January 11, 1957.

union members attended the classes out
of a bargaining unit of approximately 1,500 with close to two hundred turned away because
of a lack of space. This meant that almost 20 percent of union members expressed an interest
in the training

program

One hundred and

{Progress,

December
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forty

26, 1958).

attended trade school and took engineering
courses

at night.

He

spent

over 25 years as a toolmaker in the Development
Department. There was

no substitute

for the familiarity

such workers had with the products and

various manufacturing processes required to

make them

right the first

time. 52

Eschewing
union believed
firm

was

its

a confrontational style since its

members'

skills

and knowledge were

Workers were attempting

to succeed.

founding in 1937, the

But just as with their 1954-1955

management committee,
affront Perelle set

up

if

the

to bolster plant efficiencies

in the belief that anything less ran counter to their

being.

essential

own economic

well-

call for the restoration of the labor-

the union's call

was ignored and

a technical advisory

in a direct

committee consisting only of

engineers and scientists to study corporate reorganization and research

programs.

Defense

By mid-January 1958
declined.

Work

Hope Again

layoffs reached 700 as orders for tractor

In February Perelle

and generators was going

Offers

to

announced

be

moved

that the production of

pumps

magnetos

to Mississippi as quickly as possible.

Vice-President of Manufacturing Sidney Miller said that the

move was

in

keeping with the corporation's view that Springfield was a precision

manufacturing center.

A

glimmer of hope came when the Springfield

plant received a small order to build test equipment for a government B-

52 "Five

Men Reach

Total Service of 180 Years," Progress, January, 1959, p.l.
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52

bomber program.

more

that 50 percent

By

the

However,

first

half earnings for the year

summer

of 1958 Springfield

military engineering group

to originate

new

off

from 1957.
managers determined

defense work held the best hopes for the plant. In

member

were

was

November

established.

"It is

that

a 60-

our intention

products, to accept specifications, do the research and

development and proceed through construction. This

is

something that

will take time to do," Vice-President Miller told local
newspapers.

The

engineering program focused on design simplification,
miniaturization

and simplified

service.

efficient fuel injection

assembly

easier,

One

pump

and the

result

less

move

into

costs,

man

So

Little

Gain

improve quality and increase the

new markets

changes on the factory floor beginning in
this effort as the

more

expensive than competing models. 53

Much Change.

To hold down production
firm's ability to

the introduction of a new,

with 100 fewer machined parts, making

pump

Conclusion: So

was

Perelle ordered significant
late 1957.

He was soon

hailed for

responsible for taking a "nondescript merger of two

older firms and whipping them into one of the country's leading defense
contractors." Success

was

possible because Perelle

had

carefully blended

defense and commercial work. The commercial work was produced in
Springfield and accounted for about a third of
of

its

AB-ARMA's

sales

and

half

profit after taxes.

53

SMU, January 13,14, February 12, 26, 1958; Progress, June
1958; Progress, November 21, 1958; SMU, January 30, 1959.
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27, 1958;

SDN, November

10,

Fortune contended that Perelle's concern for
Bosch
total strategy

because Bosch

is

normally a solid money-maker and a

balance wheel for more speculative military ventures."
The
that in 1957 Bosch earned $2.4 million

percent;

about

ARMA

truck, farming

that the

a

Based on

percent.

Bosch plant was

new

sales of $35.5 million, or

about 7

total sales of $98.8 million, or

and automotive markets

Some production
and

article stated

For 1958 sales at Bosch declined due to a recession in

overall sales climbed to $83 million.

ARMA just 2.3

on

earned $2.6 million on

2.6 percent.

logical in his

"is

to $28 million while

ARMA

Bosch earned 5 percent on

its sales,

of these figures Fortune concluded

all

Perelle's "highly convenient ace in the hole." 54

lines

quality control

were redesigned,

and simplified

relocated,

program was established

in each production

department. Figures were reported on a monthly basis showing the cost of
scrap and rework as a percentage of direct labor costs. Visual displays

documented scrap

parts

and indicated why they were

defective. 55

In addition, a state-of-the-art material and inventory

system was
transactions.

installed.

Now

a

The system eliminated hundreds

component could be scheduled

system with required stock allocated

for

of

paperwork

in the

production in as

management

computer

little

as three

minutes. Once the production order reached the floor a computer card
traveled with the

completed

a

work and each time

a

machining operation was

worker entered the information

located in each department.

system sensitive enough and

and distributing

facility,"

"We
fast

felt it

computer terminal

necessary to have a data processing

enough

said Perelle.

at a

to react to

"A bottleneck

our modern factory
in the processing of

54 "Charles Perelle's Spacemanship," Fortune, Vol. 59 (January, 1959)
55 Progress, April 4, 1958.
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p. 113, 115, 122.

our paperwork could not be tolerated" Orders
were

now

production schedules. This helped eliminate
excessive

machine down

The jobs

time.

directly tied to

set

ups and

of those workers responsible for

moving,

recording and keeping track of work were eliminated. 5 ^

Yet the old patterns of fluctuating sales and profits
continued. Sales

went up from 1955
million and

fell

-

1957,

dropped

jumped

for three years,

through the mid 1960s

in 1961 to $133.6

to $70.6 million in 1964.

Profits

followed a similar trajectory, reaching a high of $5.1 million in
1957,
falling thereafter to a

had

low of

$1.5 million in 1964.

major customers: Alco Products,

five

Products, Ford Motor

Company, and Mack

Allis

Over

ABA

Chalmers, Caterpillar

Truck. These five accounted

for 60 percent of all the products the corporation sold,

these products were manufactured in Springfield.
industries influenced by the ups

period

this

and downs

and 83 percent

All five

were

in the national

of

in

economy

during the 1950s: agriculture, defense, transportation, and construction. 57

As
example

a result

employment never

in April, 1958

management announced

employment

stability in Springfield".

made

a 100

add

to

worker third

keep up with orders

employment

levels

would go

56 Progress, May 24, 1960.
57 Sales and profit figures are found
of

to 2,300

was on

employment dropped below

all

shift

BoschArma 75 percent

a

program

For

to "attain

By December, 1958, plans were
and go

to full

for fuel injection systems.

in 1960 the entire plant

For

stabilized in Springfield.

It

Saturday production

was predicted

that

from 1,800 by April, 1959, but early

a four-day

week and by March,

1961

1,500.

in issues of Progress

covering the years under review.

of 1957 sales were in the highly volatile defense sector

according to a financial forecast prepare on the corporation by Paine, Webber (SMU,

September

to

20, 1958) p. 4.
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In 1960 the Springfield Bosch plant was part
of a world-wide

The corporation attempted

corporation.

efficient as possible,

electronics

work

work

its

the Springfield facility as

but was unwilling to put any of the

Nor was

in the plant.

in the city that could be

acquisitions provided
to

make

to

ABA

it

new

military

willing to keep any large

done cheaper

in Mississippi.

with manufacturing

The

volume

British

Europe,

facilities in

home

chief competitors in the field of diesel fuel injection, Robert
Bosch

Corporation in Germany and Lucas, LTD., in England. The Springfield

was

plant's future

tied to holding onto the diesel

equipment business while attempting
as

new

products were developed in

able to figure out

how

to schedule

its

and

fuel injection

to capture additional

research

facility.

market share

Perelle

was never

production to eliminate wild

production swings. As a consequence, the corporation could never take
full

advantage of the investments

with no work were

it

made. For

that

home

too frequently a decisive cost advantage over

course labor costs." The

letter

were only

of increased world-wide

earned by an

AB

demand

is

us....

what they were

a greater

letter

five years

sales of fuel

ago in

"This

spite

"For every dollar

a foreign competitor

went on,

and

A major cost factor is of

for diesel products.

employee an employee of

our average hourly rate
is

mid-1959 management

informed employees that plant

a third of

average of only 25 cents." The

Germany

in

"American Bosch's foreign competitors enjoy

injection parts

machines

just pieces of metal. 58

In a letter sent to every worker's

warned

after all, fast

means

that

$2.66 the comparable hourly rate in

is

paid an

where

West

66 cents, in Japan 27 cents and only 80 cents in the United

58 vVorker levels were taken from membership dues
Amherst Labor Archives.
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lists

found

in

Local 206 Records,

UMass

Kingdom." The
talks

letter

were scheduled

arrived at workers'
to begin.

homes

Earlier in the

just before 1959 contract

decade high volume runs of

parts mainly for the domestic automobile industry
were shipped to

Mississippi because

it

was no longer

cost effective to

Workers were now being warned

Springfield.

manufacture the more highly specialized

to

that

it

produce them in

was not

cost effective

fuel injection nozzles, holder

bodies and pumps. 59
In early 1960 Perelle

would make sense

to

had

purchase

a

management team consider whether

all

it

needed components from German,

Japanese and English suppliers and simply assemble the

pumps

in

Springfield with a drastically reduced workforce. Perelle believed that
the
fuel injection

market was

at stake

By June, 1960 Springfield had

when he ordered

lost 70

percent of

its

the feasibility study.

fuel injection

work

to

German

competitors, including Robert Bosch, and the plant went on a

four day

week

to avoid

massive

layoffs.

At the end of the year

Perelle

decided to maintain production in Springfield, but animosities caused by

management's one-sided approach

to solving

the plant's future into question. 60

59 Letter reprinted
60

SMU, June 3,

in

SMU, June

9,

1959.

1960.
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shop floor problems called

CHAPTER 5
LOCAL 206:

1936- 1945

Introduction

In 1934 almost

Moore Drop

all

large metalworking firms in the region, including

Forge, Indian Motorcycle, Smith and

Bosch were non-union.

When

Chapman Valve Company
Federation of Labor

removed from
the workers

efforts

were made

Wesson and American
in 1933 to organize the

the Central Labor Union, an

affiliate,

cautioned workers "that the

their thoughts at the present time...

and employers

American

in this territory

.

The

was adequate

word

strike

be

intelligence of
to

cope with

labor difficulties." 1

These sentiments were fueled, in
area

wages were higher than many

part,

by the

fact that Springfield-

parts of the state. This

was do

measure

to the concentration of

builders,

and metalworking manufacturing establishments

in large

machine shops, foundries, machine

tool

in the region.

Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries wage surveys showed
that Springfield average

wages were generally

in the top five in the state

throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. For example, between 1925 and 1927
Springfield's average

weekly pay

for

manufacturing workers was $25.42

while Holyoke's and Lowell's were $21.79 and $19.13, respectively.
Worcester, another metalworking center, was the highest at $26.38.

1

The statement was made

to

Chapman Valve workers by Kenneth

Bosch

Taylor, president of the

Springfield Typographical Union. Taylor also urged workers to form two separate unions,

one for skilled pattern and moldmakers and the other
hands (SDN, August 23, 1933).
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for

machine operators and foundry

and other

skilled

metalworkers in the area

initially

believed they could do

well without a union. 2

However, several Springfield metalworking firms were
organized
by

UE between

1936 and 1941 as organizers used this base to launch

organizing efforts up and

down

the Connecticut River Valley from

Bridgeport, Connecticut to Springfield, Vermont. By 1939

workers in manufacturing plants responsible

for the

UE

represented

output of 80 percent

of U.S. electrical goods, from the smallest appliances like
toasters

and fans

to the largest electrical generators built in the world. 3

For the
there

was no

first

twenty-two years of the American Bosch plant's history

A

labor organization.

worker's

life

on the

job

complete discretion of management. Foremen determined

and who did
Historian

not,

who

Maynard

received well paying jobs and

I

Sometimes
Then,

I

again."

couldn't
I

left to

the

who worked

did not.

Seider cites a Sprague Electric worker from a North

Adams, Massachusetts

work and

who

was

plant

punch

who commented,

in until the

wouldn't even work

would no more than

at all

get back

"I

had

to

walk two miles

work came down my

to

line.

and they'd send me back home.

home and

they

would send

for

me

This kind of treatment fostered organization. 4

In 1933, as union organizing activity heightened plant

superintendent Donald Murray established a company union in an

2 Massachusetts

3

UE

effort

Department of Labor and Industries (MDLI), Annual Report for 1938,

p. 49.

For example, in 1939 the union represented
workers at the following: Emerson Electric, General Electric, Westinghouse, DelcoFrigidaire, Edison Storage Battery, Phelps Dodge, Allis Chalmers, Singer Sewing Machine

News, (l/EMJanuary

7,

1939, p. 4

and Pratt and Whitney. Gross sales
were almost one billion dollars.
4

Maynard

1937

-

Seider, "The

CIO

in

-

5.

of the top 26 corporations

UE had

at least

one

local in

Rural Massachusetts: Sprague Electric and North Adams,

1944," Historical Journal of Massachusetts, 22 (Winter, 1944) p. 55.
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to give
plant.

workers

a voice

while blunting independent organization of
the

Bosch management refused

to accede to initial

worker requests

from the company union. The welfare capitalism
subscribed
corporations like Ford Motor

Company was

that allowed

High

seniority workers bristled

foremen

to pick

who would

by

never contemplated and the

company union gained no improvements whatsoever
conditions.

to

in

working

under an employment system

work. Production cycles in the

plant were not well regulated, and as a consequence large
numbers of

workers never knew from one day
Aside from a core of highly

job.

set

up

5:00

specialists,

to the next

skilled tool

men and women

lined

whether they would have

and die makers and machine

up outside

AM each day in hopes of securing a pay check.

and vacation pay did not

exist.

Campbell, president of United

the plant as early as

Regular

raises,

a

when

UE

Electrical

Workers Local 202

in the huge,

summer and

national organizer found during the

of 1936

to unionize. 5

Organizers were

fired,

management conducted

supporters were laid off days before

a 'recognition survey',

attempted to hold elections for

officers of the

and the company

company-sponsored union

after close to 70 percent of the plant's 1,200

cards.

fall

officers,

they conducted secret meetings in private homes to convince Bosch

workers

even

holiday

These were the conditions Matthew

near-by East Springfield Westinghouse plant, three other Local 202

and

a

workers had signed union

With each new challenge and company provocation union

and Campbell's organizing team responded

in

leaders

moderation as they

5 For a discussion of Ford see Stephen Meyer's The Five Dollar Day. Labor Management
and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, 1908 - 1921 (New York, 1981); Daniel Raff,

"Ford Welfare Capitalism in

its

Economic Context,"

York, 1991).
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in Jacoby, Masters to

Managers (New

sought wide support on the shop floor before
confronting Bosch

management. But the rapid pace

of

union organizing resulting from the

National Recovery Act and the Wagner Act swept
over the Bosch

company union and

led to the establishment of United Electrical,
Radio

and Machine Workers (UE) Bosch Local 206

in 1936.

Matthew Ca mpbell and Union Organizing
in

Western Massachusetts

When Matthew Campbell
union

at the

Bosch he had few

began

efforts to organize

toolmaker, Campbell worked for fifteen years

became

active in

A

allies in the city.

union organizing

efforts

at

highly skilled

Westinghouse before he

and labor

eventually led successful organizing drives at

an industrial

politics.

He

many Western

Massachusetts companies including Milton Bradley, Van

Norman

Machine, Package Machinery, and Worthington Pump.

Campbell was born
for 25 years.

Legion Post

A

World War

21, the largest post in

three children,

directory

disabled

in Scotland in July, 1890

Campbell owned

lists his

neighbors as

1

family

home during

the 1920s,

American

Western Massachusetts. Married with

his

own home. The

a tester for the

a part of the city's skilled

in Springfield

veteran, he belonged to

electrician for the city, a post office worker,

He was

and lived

working
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telephone company, an

and

a clerk at

class, that

and confident

1934 Springfield city

that

Westinghouse.

could afford a single

metalworking plants

would continue
die

to

provide employment for the machinists and tool
and

makers residing

in

and around

Campbell played

Springfield.*3

a leading role in the 1933

Westinghouse work

stoppages that led to the creation of Local 202 and was
elected president of
the local in 1934, a position he
1941.

was

In 1935 he

Electrical

would maintain

until his

sudden death

in

elected regional vice-president of the United

Workers and eventually

led the local out of the

American

Federation of Labor-affiliated Springfield Central Labor Union
and into
the Congress of Industrial Organizations

At the time of

president.

campaign

his death he

where he became

had

just led a successful organizing

at Colt Firearms in Hartford, Connecticut.

union drives

for

Westinghouse

Colt had resisted

over 100 years, but agreed to recognize the U.E.

Campbell engineered

up and low pay

a state vice-

rates.

a

two-day walkout of 5,000 workers

Campbell was

also

as chair of the national

after

to protest speed-

engaged in negotiations with

Westinghouse Conference Board. 7

The United Labor Party

In addition to union organizing, Campbell

was instrumental

in

developing a labor electoral strategy in Springfield, and in 1935 became the

United Labor Party's (ULP)
rallying point for

first

candidate for mayor. The party served as a

many newly formed

industrial unions.

party spokesman, "The organization of this labor party

b Springfield City Directory, 1934.

is

According

to a

a logical step

Copies of directories are found in the Pioneer Valley
Historical Museum, Springfield, Ma. Directories were useful in determining the
occupations of union organizers and early in-plant activists.
7

SDN, June

2,

1941, p.

8.

UEN, May

19, 1941, p. 1;
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June

7,

1941, p.l.

accompanying the development of labor unions
whose voting strength

now

so great

At the
to seek

it

demands

ULP

first

is

true representation."

meeting an organizing committee was established

support from club,

civic organization,

Committee members worked
including Westinghouse,

and other unions.

for large manufacturers in the city,

Chapman

Valve, Spaulding, and Bosch.

Party

organization created an opportunity for workers to discuss
conditions in
their plants,
skills

and

it

way

afforded Campbell a

and meet workers from

outset the city's A. F. L.

-

a

number

to

showcase his organizing

of plants across the city.

affiliated Central

From

the

Labor Union, led by John Gatlee,

publicly opposed the United Labor Party's efforts and endorsed the

Democratic Party's candidate

for

mayor. 8

At the end of September the ULP platform was adopted. Campbell
declared that the party was born out of the dissatisfaction and frustration

workers had with the two parties and

their failure to "assist

securing just wages and decent living conditions." The
public ownership of

all city utilities,

avoid worker duplication, cash
for the

would reduce

the

the reorganization of

relief or

unemployed, and support

work week and

ULP

work

for state

called for the

all city offices to

at prevailing

and national

workers in

union wages

legislation that

secure old age pensions. Finally, the

party sought to shift the city tax burden

through more equitable taxation of the

away from small-home owners

city's large industries.

In

its first

public meeting to announce the platform party leaders directed their

appeal to a broad coalition of "small-home owners, office employees,
professional

men and women and

the

workers." The platform pledged the

8 Springfield Union, Sept.

unemployed

ULP

"shall

as well as factory

always give preference to

5, p. 1; Sept. 10, p. 6; Sept. 11, p.6, 1935.
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local
to

products in

its

purchases, provided prices and labor conditions
are up

our local standards." 9

Campbell and

his party allies sensed the

industrial workers in the city.

broad-based coalition

Their platform

weak

political position of

was designed

to insure that workers' concerns

during the 1935 election. Indicative of

to create a

would be heard

this strategy is the fact that

Campbell's nomination papers contained the names of both

Westinghouse supervisors and foremen. Occupations of

ULP

candidates

also reveal the type of coalition being cobbled together as well
as the

important role that skilled workers played in Springfield. Included were
plater

and assembler from Chapman Valve,

a

a

toolmaker from Fiberloid

Corporation, a machinist from Spaulding, and a machinist, mechanic, tool
grinder, final inspector,

Westinghouse.
solid support

pattern maker, and a production supervisor from

Throughout the 1935 campaign Campbell maintained

among workers

returned to the

local's

Westinghouse plant and was

in the

presidency unopposed at a September 30

membership meeting while every other
While making
owners, and

office in the local

was

home owners,

the

ULP

also declared
to

it

wanted nothing

aldermanic candidate, withdrew from the

was made. Campbell

to

ULP

at the

Company and

meeting where

publicly declared that he

led the discussion to keep Party

was not

members

this

a

off the

ULP

9 SU, Sept. 24, 1935, p. 6.
10 SU, Sept. 24, 1935, p. 6. The Sept. 13 Springfield Union reported the signatures and

addresses of residents
directory

it

was

candidates and

who

signed Campbell's nomination papers. Using the 1934 city

possible to determine place of

many who

employment and occupation

signed nomination papers.
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do

endorse any Party members or

supporters. Karl Gustafson, a machinist at the Fisk Rubber

Communist and

contested. 10

their appeal to office workers, small business

with the Communist Party by voting not

decision

his

for

ULP

ticket.

At the same meeting

was agreed

it

that the

ULP would

any candidates nominated by the Republican or
Democratic
In spite of this decision, the

CLU

refused to endorse

public statement Gatlee indicated that the

swerved

into

members,
not

any

political action

affiliated

members

of

and

way

a

CLU would

mixed group

non-affiliated unions,

of

parties, either.

candidates. In a

not "be swayed or

members and non-

and by some individuals

any union." 11

Undeterred, the
that the rank

by

ULP

not support

and

file,

ULP
now

appealed to Springfield workers. "We believe
that they

have the opportunity

will vote the

they strike, shoulder to shoulder, united in a tremendous vote for

themselves

at last."

The president of the Painters Union,

a

CLU

affiliate,

supported Campbell and the ULP, arguing that the current thinking that
labor should 'defeat our enemies by electing our friends' needed to be

updated

to 'defeat

our enemies

elect

-

our own.' The

ULP

deaf ears however, and two weeks before the election the

appeal

CLU

fell

on

endorsed

the Democratic candidate for mayor. 12

In one final blast Gatelee labeled Campbell "self-anointed, self-

appointed, and self-seeking."

He warned

that Campbell's efforts

"lead the people of Springfield to judge the strength of labor
results

you

are about to achieve".

their president,

Sunday afternoon November 3rd meeting
newspaper accounts there were

of the

marched on

member

several near-fights

11 SU, October

1,

p.4;

present. 13

October

7,

1935, p.

3.

12 SU, October
8, p. 4; October 24, 1935, p. 1.
13 SU, November 1, p. 14; SU, November 4, 1935,
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p. 1

the

CLU. According

when

to

Gatelee and

David Goggin, president of the plumbers union, threatened
Local 202

by the sorry

Local 202 members, outraged at

on

Gatelee's highly personal attack

would

to fight

any

On

Election night Gatelee's prediction that
Campbell's showing

would embarrass

labor

and show

it

in a

Republicans swept every office in the

came

in a distant third in the

weak

city

mayoral

light

proved accurate as

by wide margins. Campbell

race, receiving just 2,152 votes

while the Republican winner garnered 22,762, and his
Democratic
challenger 17,565.

But the loss did not distract Campbell from his

organizing campaign, nor did

played a pivotal

it

turn

roll in the successful

him from

UE

as a

needed voice

Two

years later he

mayoral campaign of Democrat

William Putnam, one of Springfield's leading

embraced the

politics.

for labor

industrialists.

Putnam had

when Campbell mounted an

organizing campaign at Putnam's Package Machinery Corporation in the
spring and

summer

According

of 1936. 14

to historian

Ronald

James Carey, Harry Block and others

Filippelli,

who

Campbell was

eventually turned against the

union's national leadership in the late 1940s, for

being pro-communist.
1936

UE

close to

among

Filippelli partly bases this claim

other things,

on

a vote at the

founding convention that Campbell cast with Block and Carey

against a resolution in support of a labor party in the United States. The

convention passed the pro-labor party resolution 35-10. Since Campbell

had unsuccessfully run

for

mayor

of Springfield just a year earlier,

motivations are probably more complex than

this

one vote can

determine. 15

14 SU, November 6, 1935, p. 1.
15 Ronald Filippelli, "UE: The Formative Years, 1933
(1976) p. 366.
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-

1937," Labor History, Vol. 17

The Bosch Gets Org an izprl

By 1936 Westinghouse Local 202 was an

integral part of a

burgeoning plant by plant movement directed by

Westinghouse and General

Electric corporations.

UE

to organize the

Each company

discouraged union organization through the selective use of
paternalistic
labor relations

and periodic purges of union

However, by 1936
initiatives at

Lynn and

GE

activists

electrical transformer plants in

Schenectady,

UE

York,

New

York.

claimed to represent approximately 15,000 of the

300,000 workers in the electrical, radio and
country.

New

Massachusetts, and at Westinghouse radio and

appliance plants in Springfield, Massachusetts and Buffalo,
In early 1936

their plants.

unions had been formed through grassroots

local

Pittsfield,

from

home

appliance industry in the

By 1939 the union would represent workers

in plants producing

80 percent of U.S. electrical goods, from giant industrial generators to the
smallest

home

appliances, in

Battery, Essex Wire, Pratt

Emerson

Electric, Delco-Frigidaire,

Edison

and Whitney Machine Tool and Singer Sewing

Machine plants concentrated mostly

in

New

York, Pennsylvania, Ohio

and Massachusetts.
Historian Ronald Schatz determined that the electrical industry

concentrated most of

its

manufacturing

facilities in U.S. cities

of

between

30,000 and 175,000 people, avoiding large metropolitan areas. In 1930

twelve communities stood out as centers of the industry including:
Schenectady,

New

York,

Erie,

Pennsylvania, and Lynn and

Pittsfield,

Massachusetts, where General Electric located plants; Wilmerding, Turtle

Creek and East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut which had large General
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for

Westinghouse; Bridgeport,

Electric,

Westinghouse and Singer

Sewing Machine

with typewriter makers and machine

and the Springfield-Holyoke, Massachusetts area with

builders;

General

plants, along

Electric,

tool builders,

tool

the

Westinghouse, and Bosch plants, and several machine

and precision metalworking companies. The industry was

also characterized

by the rapid growth

of production workers, climbing to

343,000 in 1929 from 92,000 in 1909. The

number would drop

to 164,000 in

1933 but rebound to 306,000 in 1937, an 86 percent gain. This
growth soon

caused a skilled labor shortage in Springfield, something union
organizers

used to

their advantage. 16

movement

Bosch workers were joining a national

to organize labor into industrial unions

and were about

to

challenge Rolls Royce's 1919 observation that Springfield was "the city
freest

from labor troubles

in the United States". 17

In April, 1936 Campbell
that efforts

was

to

would begin

was informed by UE President James Carey

in earnest to organize the

During organizing meetings and

Bosch workers learned
increases each
called for

their

in articles in the

month between May and

pay adjustments based on company

profits:

Electrical

so this anniversary issue

is

(Illinois,

in a Rolls

being constructed

the

to

company

-

1950,

Manufacturing Industry

This special Local 206 25th anniversary issue

history of the early years of the local. Local 206 records for the

contained

Workers were

month

of the paper contains a richly detailed history of the Local and

Workers

union paper

p. 328.

7 Local 206 Bulletin (LB) September, 1963.

Electrical

Press, at

Work, Struggles, Aspirations 1930

Figures in Backman, The Economics of the

York, 1962)

step

first

October, 1936. Local 202's contract

16 Ronald Schatz, American Electrical Workers:
(diss., 1977).

A

Westinghouse counterparts received pay

receive a one percent increase for every $60,000 a

1

plant.

be regular distribution of UE's newspaper, the People's

plant gates.

(New

Bosch

invaluable for the information

1983) p. 62-64.

UEN, January

Royce plant location study

relied

provides. Schatz, The

1939, p.

4.

that resulted in a car

in Springfield in the early 1920s,
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7,

it

on heavily for a
period 1936 -1948 were lost
is

appears

The quote
assembly

in Stone, p. 550.

is

facility

made over

a base figure of $600,000.

With the economy beginning

to

improve, workers saw wage gains of between nine and
thirteen percent
each month between

May and

October, 1936. 18

These pay gains opened the eyes of area workers, most of

whom

had

received no raises for several years. Average annual earnings
for

manufacturing workers across the

state

dropped sharply between 1929 and

plummeting 45 percent between September 1929 and September

1933,

Though

skilled

1930.

metalworkers tended to have higher wages, they too saw

income drop during

this period.

compensation in Massachusetts

By 1939 average manufacturing

still

failed to

exceed 1929 levels (Table

5.1

Massachusetts Earnings).

Table

5.1:

A

Massachusetts average annual earnings 1927

1927

$1,221

1929

$1,246

1931

$1,091

1932

$953

1933

$889

1934

$963

1935

$1,006

1936

$1,068

1937

$1,121

1938

$1052

1939

$1,124

-

1939.

study commissioned by the state legislature demonstrated that

even with Springfield's comparatively high average earnings, income
1927

fell

below what was needed

to

maintain a family of four. The

18 SR, Oct. 14, 1936, p.12. Carey to Campbell, April 24, 1936,
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UE

District 2 Archives.

in

-

or $1,568: Male average annual earnings were
$1,410.
slightly higher earnings,

Even with

their

Bosch workers were feeling the pinch as they

contemplated signing union cards. 19

Winning Acceptanrp

Eventually 52 percent of Bosch workers signed membership cards

and the union went public October
elections for officers

was

its first

confrontation.

management terminated
office

seniority,

-

On

UE

Leo Goulet,

a

The union charter

national office in

York

office wall the local

two

of

whom

were running

toolroom group leader with fourteen

and Viola Theriaque, an assembler. Goulet was

for a 'lack of work'.

New

was

Thursday, October 15

three workers,

allegedly allowing workers to

go

Friday, October 16.

But before the charter could be hung on the

embroiled in

union

1936 with the announcement that

be issued that day as well from the

to

City.

would be held

12,

smoke on

for

years'

fired for

the job, while Theriaque

was

let

In spite, or possibly because of the terminations,

Goulet was elected vice-president and Theriaque, recording secretary. The
day-old union

now had two

officers out

on the

Campbell demanded reinstatement
to file labor

street.

of the

workers and threatened

board charges. The following Tuesday the

reported that the union was
protest the termination

still

local

seeking a meeting with

papers

management

to

and demanded resolution before Friday, October

19

MDLI, Annual Reports for 1938, p. 40 and 1939, p. 43; Special Commission on Stability of
Employment, Final Report (Boston, 1933) p. 61, 105, 125. By sector, the highest average
wages in 1929 were: Printing and Publishing, $1,850; Foundry and machine shop products,
$1,552; Machine tools and metalworking machinery, $1,510; and Electrical machinery,
$1,422. The lowest were: Cotton mills, $927; Paper mills, $1,014; Knit goods, $1,015; and
Woolen mills, $1,145. The Commission was chaired by Stanley King, president of Amherst
College.

133

23rd.

The deadline came and went with union leaders expressing

confidence that the issue would be "resolved amicably;'
in the words of

newly elected Local 206 president, Robert

Shields. Julius

Emspak,

UE

Secretary-Treasurer, supported Campbell's approach to resolving
the

terminations and gaining union recognition.

In an early

November

he noted: "Since you have

a majority of

you

whatever in getting the Labor Board

will

have no

difficulty

letter

workers enrolled in the union,
to act in

this matter."20

Company

effort to intimidate the local

were not unique. Robert

Zieger recounts a similar episode in a Madison, Wisconsin battery factory

during the Spring of 1936

However, unlike Local

when two union

206, the

members

officers

were dismissed.

of Federal

Union 19587

authorized a work stoppage against the company unless their leaders were
reinstated.

Two and

a half

weeks

after the strike vote Local 19587' s leaders

returned.
Peter Friedlander discusses the intimidation

employed

to

keep the United Auto Workers out of the Detroit Parts

Company. In one such
plant

know

incident, after a secret organizing meeting, the

manager walked out onto

worker

management

who had

the shop floor

and pointed out each

attended the house meeting, to

let

union supporters

they were being closely watched. The creative lengths workers

would go

to protect themselves against retaliation for

union

activity is

revealed in an article by historian Maynard Seder. In rural North Adams,

20 SR, October 12, 1936,
to

SR, October 17, 1936, p. 1. SDN, October 24, 1936,
10, 1936, UE District 2 Archives.

p. 7;

Campbell, November

134

p. 4.

Emspak

Massachusetts, "the workers fashioned their petition
(for a pay increase)
into a circle, leaving

no

single

name

at the top. "21

Plant workers were cognizant of the organizing
going

them.

Strikes

upswing
on

and

sit-ins,

in the state

a strike of 4,000

on around

mostly for union recognition, were on the

and across

workers

the country.

The

local press

was

reporting

at several textile mills in Fall River,

Massachusetts. There was also auspicious economic news. Local

metalworking establishments were working double

employment had jumped

to just

shifts

and

over 20,000 in September from 16,000 in

January, 1936. Skilled workers, tool and die makers, mold makers,

around machinists, were now
position than they

Machine
in large

had been two years

tool

measure

work

at

earlier. 22

to innovations in the structure

New

cutting tool designs "make

accurate

more advantageous bargaining

manufacturers had dramatically expanded

equipment being produced.

new

in a far

much

it

less energy.

due

and design of the
and

possible to produce machines doing

higher speeds on a greater variety of materials."
lighter yet sturdier materials

Van Norman's

In Springfield

bearing grinding machines were in heavy

enough

to

milling and ball

demand by

and Whitney Machine Tool could not produce
vertical grinders fast

sales,

materials, especially steel alloys,

These machine tools were stronger, made of

and used

all-

its

car makers,

and

lathes, shapers

and

Pratt

keep up with domestic and foreign

demand. 23

21 Robert Zieger, Madison's Battery Workers

(

Ithaca, 1977) p. 25

-

28; Peter Friedlander,

The Emergence of a UAW Local (Pittsburgh, 1975) p. 12. Maynard Seider, "The CIO in
Rural Massachusetts: Sprague Electric and North Adams, 1937 - 1944," Historical Journal
of Massachusetts, 22 (Winter, 1944) p. 54.
22 SR, October 6, 1936,
p. 1;

23 SR, October

11, p. 18;

October

14,

1936, p. 5.

135

With the surge

in industrial production

came

a skilled labor

shortage, leading Springfield employers to
establish training programs
to get

workers

off welfare rolls

and

presidents at Westinghouse and

into their plants.

Company

Van Norman were instrumental

in

getting the collaborative program established with
the Springfield

vocational high school. Training consisted of classroom
instruction in

shop mathematics, blue print reading and hands-on operation
of
presses, engine lathes, grinders,

and milling machines. According

of the sponsoring firms "Skilled mechanics

machines have
of

many

this year

been

at a

who

understand

one

to

their

premium. Specialization over

a period

years has led to a large group of just machine operators. They

could pull a lever but that was about
that

drill

an estimated three hundred

it."

Owners were alarmed by

the fact

skilled machinists traveled to greater-

Hartford, Connecticut each day to work. Sixty out of sixty-five graduates of
the first

program found permanent employment with an additional

slated to begin training in October.

The program achieved

forty

a national

reputation and later became a model program, with requests for

information from as far

away

as Japan. 24

Area newspapers continued

to report favorable

Pay increases and year-end bonuses went

to area textile

economic news.

and rubber

workers. Package Machinery boosted wages five percent and provided

workers with two weeks' paid vacation

was reported

that manufacturing job gains in Springfield

than those of thirteen other industrial
Tilt

as a result of a profitable year.

cities in the state.

Under Heavy Unfilled Orders" cheered

24 SR, October 11,

October

p. 18;

October

14, p. 5.

were greater
"Plants

Run

a Springfield Republican

See "Skilled Mechanics at a Premium," SR,

25, 1936, p. 2e.
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It

Full

headline. Factories could not get orders out fast
failed to

modernize over the past

six years.

Hartford strained to machine and assemble
escalating
unfilled.

demand. Orders

for

enough because they had

Pratt

and Whitney

Aircraft in

engines to meet

aircraft

Bosch radios and automotive parts went

Foundries were running

at full capacity. 25

Bosch workers were in an enviable position

make demands on

to

management: The economy was rebounding and the labor market
skilled

workers tightened

'go-slow'

further.

for

Campbell now questioned whether

approach was the proper one in

a late

November

letter to

his

UE

President Carey. Carey responded as follows:

procedure outlined in your

...the

satisfactory.

The success of

this

letter is

very

procedure to a great

extent depends on the patience of the workers involved,

and care must be taken
everything possible

is

that they

management

lot of

that

not being done to result in a

satisfactory adjustment.

the

do not assume

It

has been

my

experience that

of companies like Bosch often waste a

time without reaching any suitable agreement

unless pushed by the organization. In a previous letter

I

advised you that those on the ground floor in a case of
this sort are better able to

than

I

would be

Carey urged Campbell

on

determine the proper course

at this distance.

to persist

with

efforts to get the

Labor Board to rule

recognition. 26

25 SR,

November 16, p. I; November 17, p. 4; November 18, p. 11; November 21, p. 1;
November 29, p. 17; November 22, p. 18a, 1936. At the end of 1936 the Springfield
Republican reported that the output of local manufacturers was strong. Gilbert and Barker,
Greenfield Tap and Die and Van Norman were running at full capacity and there was
increased activity in Holyoke's Fall Alpaca woolen mills. See SR, December 27, 1936, p.
14a.

26 Carey

to

Campbell,

November

Carey could not be found but

it

24, 1936,

UE

appears, from Carey's tone, that
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The Campbell letter to
Campbell may have been

District 2 Archives.

UE
they

deemed appropriate

a go-slow

two

national staff encouraged local organizers to
adopt the strategies
for their specific circumstances.

In the Bosch case

approach was endorsed even in the face of the terminations
of

leaders.

A memo

from organizer Hugh Harley

UE was

amplifies this further. In 1943

to

James Matles

locked in a difficult campaign to

organize 3,000 workers at the Sprague Electric North Adams,

Massachusetts plant. The two

tactics utilized

educational campaign on the benefits of the

company union

to

win

Management
to

its

still

to

UE and

town-wide

campaign inside the

a

leaders over to the UE. 27

first contract,

and instead announced

a poll in

determine whether there was worker support for the

Shields and Campbell

union.

a

refused to meet with representatives of Local 206

begin negotiations for a

mid-December

were

considered the poll

illegal.

warned management

that the

Murray responded by laying

off

union

200 workers

three days before the poll. Local 206 protested that every dismissed worker

was

a

union supporter. Campbell

now

stated that a "walk-out

was

unavoidable as long as management's anti-union attitude continues."

added

that he

was not

agitating for a strike

the labor board could rule

representative
protest

and

was

call for

on the

legality of the

at four

company

poll.

A

it

until

union

sent to the Boston office of the labor board to launch a

an

NLRB

supervised representation election. In the

same press interview Campbell revealed

underway

and cautioned against

He

more area

plants,

that organizing drives

Moore Drop

were now

Forge, Sickles, Gilbert and

Barker and Indian Motorcycle.

having some misgivings over not having adopted a more militant strategy to gain
recognition. Carey appears to be subtly pushing Campbell with his "unless pushed" phrase
but he clearly left strategy and tactics in Campbell's hands.
27 Harley

to

Matles, July 13, 1943 in

UE

Archives, District 2
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files,

U. of Pittsburgh.

On December
for

December 16

12

it

was reported

to discuss a

company and union

finally

company

met

that the

proposal.

union scheduled

On December

to discuss outstanding issues

them. At a meeting organized by the chairman of the

management agreed

Board,

to recognize Local 206

New

a

meeting

17 the

between

England Labor

and indicated

that

it

ready to negotiate a contract with whomever the union
designated as

was

its

representatives. 28

By the end

of 1936

and

in the first

workers heard on the radio or read

and organizing
the Ford River

two months

in the local press about sit-down strikes

victories across the country.

Rouge plant

in Detroit

Libby Owens-Ford Glass. Strikes

shutdowns of assembly

at

facilities.

of 1937 Springfield

Thousands were on

and Pittsburgh

Plate Glass

strike at

and

key auto parts plants were causing

"Labor Front Seething" read one local

headline discussing wholesale walkouts affecting the entire country,

"Bayonets Rule Anderson, Indiana" read another.
across

New

England shoe workers struck

Closer to Springfield,

for recognition of the C.I.O.-

backed United Shoe and Leather Workers. Large walkouts took place

in

Brockton and Haverhill. Finally on February 24th twenty-seven plants
settled,

and granted

Timing was

28 SR,

a 15 percent

critical to this

wage

increase to 12,700 jubilant workers.

success according to chief union negotiator

December 12, 1936, p.5; DN, December 10, 1936, p. 2. In the
midst of this turmoil the union opened a storefront office on Main Street, just a short walk
form the plant. Monthly dues were now being collected for the first time, $1 for men and 50
cents for women. DN, December 14, 1936, p. 9. M. Campbell to fames Carey, December 17,
1936, District 2 Archives. In the same letter the untiring Campbell informed Carey that
"there are quite a few plants here who would like to be organized." Campbell added that
"if you could get a steel worker organizer or auto worker organizer I could help him quite a

December

10, 1936, p.

1

lot."
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William Mahan: "Shoe companies which haven't
already signed, on the
basis of annual Easter

demand,

will

have

to capitulate before Friday. "29

Bosch contract negotiations were inconclusive through
the

months

and Local 206 and management clashed

in 1937

for a third time in

mid-February 1937, when the company proceeded with a plan
officer elections for the

confront

company

management more

management

to

union.

forcefully

proceed with

this

two

first

to

conduct

Previous union unwillingness to

may have emboldened

provocative activity. The company's

continued recognition of both unions while refusing to negotiate a
contract with Local 206 represented a serious challenge to the union's

contention that

it

alone spoke for workers.

The union response remained measured, though more aggressive
than

its

response to the October terminations and December mass

layoffs.

Quietly and confidently Shields and others organized what they hoped

would be an

effective in-plant protest to convince

negotiate a contract.

workers shut

On Monday

off their

machines in

determination to hold elections.

work

at

February 15

silent protest against

one o'clock and resumed again

them whether any more labor
machines were

restarted, metal

and magnetos and

management's

"We simply knocked

at 2 o'clock.

know our

to

prearranged time

at a

Shields stated

demonstration was orderly. They

management

attitude

off

Everything about the

and

it

now

rests

with

trouble develops." After exactly 59 minutes

was ground,

fuel injection

drilled,

equipment began

to

turned and stamped

make

its

way

through the plant again. Almost immediately the company recognized

29 For examples of coverage see SR, "Lewis Seeks

Showdown

Auto Industry," December
19, 1936, p.l; "Big Glass Strike Likely to Extend Beyond Holidays," and "Steel Workers
Form New CIO Council," December 21, 1936, p. 1; "12,700 Shoe Employees Jubilant at
Victory," February 25, 1937.
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in

Local 206 and bargaining began for a
that the majority of the
Electrical

to

employees

first contract.

at the plant are

"There

no question

is

members

of the

workers union/' Shields asserted. "Any more labor trouble

is

up

them. "30

Skilled

Workers and Union Organization

Matthew Campbell's union

career

is

similar to that of other skilled

workers analyzed in several recent studies of industrial union formation
as well as a fictional account written

Field in 1946.

20 year old

by machinist and

World War

Set during

who moves from

II

UE member

Piper Tompkins tells the story of a

rural Connecticut to take a job in

Hartford metalworking company. With no shop experience

Tompkins slowly
befriended by

UE

learns the trade

niggers,

from other workers, and

union president, Scotty Stevenson,

run-ins with a shop foreman

and Reds." Piper

is

who

labels the

UE

after

an East

at all,
is

Piper

eventually

having several

as "an outfit of Jews,

upset with his supervisor because he sees

workers providing the foreman with food and other small
that they are placed

Ben

on well-paying

jobs

gifts to

insure

and are given overtime when

it is

available.

Born
able to
job.

in Scotland,

move about

the

Stevenson

is

a skilled

whole factory with

Field describes Stevenson's

work

imagine Campbell's work area as

machine repair mechanic

relative ease as

area in detail.

It is

he performs his

not difficult to

similar.

30 SR, February 17, 1937, p.l; February 18, 1936, p. 1. Campbell was quick to point out that
events in the plant should not be interpreted as a sit-down strike. DN, February 16, 1937,
2.
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p.

Not only was
it

was

Scott's corner a

also a sort of library.

union headquarters, but

Over

his tool cabinet

and

boxes Scotty had built shelves for books and
magazines. Here were the American Machinist,

manuals on pumps, hydraulics, and air compressors,
and magazines the like of Iron Age. 31

Campbell was
officers

assisted in organizing Bosch

by Westinghouse

local

included Business Agent Wallace Kennedy, a tool grinder, and

vice president

Leonard

Wade and

O'Connell, both machinists.

Two

negotiating committee member, John

of Bosch's top officers

Leo Goulet,

diemaker, and Robert Shields, a tool designer, were also highly

a

skilled.

A

check of the occupations of ten Bosch union offers determined that seven
held skilled jobs while a similar check for Westinghouse found several
tool

makers,

final inspectors,

and

set

up men had been

early union

officers. 32

Historian Ronald Schatz found a similar pattern

when he examined

the occupations of key organizers and early officers in several

Many

of these individuals

were

UE

British or Scottish immigrants.

found information on 28 early leaders of

local

Schatz

unions in Erie and East

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Lynn, Massachusetts, and Schenectady,

York.
14

Of

the 28, 23

were of

were Northern European immigrants or

31 Ben Field, Piper Tompkins

(New

York, 1946) p. 87

-

New

their children;

The majority were

Scottish, Irish or English descent.

plants.

skilled. 33

88.

32 Occupations found using Springfield City Directories, 1925 - 1935.
33 Schatz, American Electrical Workers: Work, Struggles, Aspirations 1930 - 1950 (diss.,
Pennsylvania, 1977) p. 90 - 100. Schatz states that these men resembled the 'labor
aristocrats' of 19th century England, p. 110. See also Schatz, "Union Pioneers: The Founders
of Local Unions at GE and Westinghouse, 1933 - 1937," Journal of American History, Vol. 66

(December, 1979)

p.

586

-

602.
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Steve Babson determined that skilled workers
played an equally

dynamic
"tool

role in the formation of the

United Auto Workers.

and die makers were the cutting edge

Production workers provided the

states that

of auto unionism in Detroit.

mass

critical

He

that

pushed the

UAW

forward, but as they stormed the walls of open-shop
Detroit, they

through breaches opened by the

found that many
immigrants or

tool

and die makers...

in leading positions

were

."

moved

Babson also

either Anglo-Gaelic

their children. 34

Further evidence of the role skilled workers played in organizing

campaigns

contained in recent studies of the 1939 General Motors tool

is

and diemakers
"secured the

Historian John Barnard asserts that this strike

strike.

UAW's

GM, and

position in

Auto plants required two types

therefore in the auto industry."

of highly skilled workers, those

who

prepared the tools and dies required to manufacture automobile parts and
those

who

set

up and maintained

a assembly-line

paced production

at the Detroit Fischer

Body plant

the thousands of pieces of equipment in
plant.

When

these workers struck,

in early July, escalating to 12 plants

first

and

GM conceded that preparations to bring out
1940 cars were at a standstill. GM attempted to get dies produced at area
job shops but machinists refused to touch the work, forcing GM to
7,600 workers

by July

24,

its

negotiate a settlement with the strikers

Campbell and other
workers an alternative

skilled

who were

worker

-

union

led

by Walter Reuther
offered

activists,

to the petty tyranny of individual foremen.

Machine operator Art McCollough decried working conditions he

34 Steve Babson, Building the Union: Skilled Workers and Anglo-Gaelic Immigrants in
the Rise of the UAW ( New Brunswick, 1991) esp. chs. 4 and 5.
35 John Barnard, "Rebirth of the United Automobile Workers: The General Motors Tool

and Diemakers"

Strike of 1939," Labor History, 27 (Spring, 1986) pp. 165
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-

187.

35

tolerated daily.

know,

'The company had the goddamned thing so unequal
you

that a foreman's favorite

money than somebody
William

Winn

else,

would be making

and

guy might be doing

this other

related "People bring farm baskets and get

overtime, privileges.

And you

you do?" The theme

of unfairness

couldn't
is

do nothing abut

men were

work

in the factory.

level

headed and systematic

workers

to urge others to

It

in their

was not out

produce quality

leading the fight against the

.

jobs,

What could

it.

to exacting requirements,

The planning and deliberation

over to their union organizing.

good

more...

repeatedly invoked. 36

Capable of turning out precision work
these

more

a hell of a lot

company

approach

of their

to their

work

carried

of character for these

parts, while at the

same time

union recognition. In Piper

for

Tompkins, for example, Stevenson fought a supervisor to no avail when
the supervisor decided to knowingly ship bad parts to the Navy.
the parts

When

were rejected and returned, the union used the evidence

the supervisor fired.

Springfield's skilled workers appear to

well to organizing campaigns centered on

and respect
There

for skilled

have related

treatment, compensation,

workmanship. 37

some evidence

is

fair

to get

due

that,

performed, skilled workers in the

to the

nature of the work

electrical industry

maintained

much

of

their craft identity well into the 20th century while their counterparts in

industries like steel

and automobiles saw

other things, the introduction of

36 Quotes found

skill

issue

in

is

technologies.

American Electrical Workers, (1977)
Pennsylvania Westinghouse plants.

in Schatz,

machine operators
37 The

new

this dissipate

important to consider

in

through,

among

Particularly in plants

p. 68.

Both workers were

analyzing national events that would

overtake UE in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many Bosch and Westinghouse workers who
led the opposition to anti-communist attacks on the UE were skilled machinists and tool
and die makers, while the first officers in I.U.E. Local 206 were all stock handlers, packers,
and machine operators. This will be discussed in chapter 6.
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like the Bosch,

with

multiple products and exacting machining

its

requirements, tool and die makers, set up personnel,
and maintenance

and repair crews were

in

demand. These workers moved

all

over the

plant in the course of their day, and were able to stay in
contact with large

numbers

of workers

when running

for

union

Their bargaining and

office.

leadership positions were weakened, instead, by corporate
developments
outside the plant. Historian Philip Leahey found, for example, in
near-by
Pittsfield,

Ma., that General Electric's "coordination of a huge network of

integrated production
craft

facilities significantly

workers had customarily exerted over

reduced the control which
their labor,

even as they

retained the skills which have been depicted as the cornerstone of their

power

in the workplace

immersion into

and of

How

their status in life."

the Bosch plant's

a multi-plant, multi-national corporation in the 1950s

affected skilled workers will be

examined

in chapter

6. 38

Organizing in the Rest of Greater Springfield

Campbell and Local 206 union leaders did not

management with

sit

downs

or lengthy walkouts despite the fact that an

expanding regional economy and increased demand
reduced the

risks associated

review of the

local

forcefully confront

with such job

economy

actions.

for skilled

workers

In a 1937 year-end

area workers learned that Westinghouse sales

increased 40 percent, Indian Motorcycles output was up 36 percent and

Chapman

Valves sales jumped 25 percent. These companies had

workers.

Van Norman was exporting

all

added

grinding machines to Russia,

38 Philip Leahey, "Skilled Labor and the Rise of the Modern Corporation: The Case of
the Electrical Industry," Labor History,

27 (Winter, 1985
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-

1986) p. 53.

England and Japan.

On

February 27, 1937 the Republican reported that

"industrial output in Springfield

was

at

record levels." 39

With such leverage one would expect

a surge in organizing activity

across the city, but this did not materialize. Strikes
declined in

Massachusetts while they gained more prominence in the

rest of the

country. In 1931, 14 percent of striking workers in the U.S.
were in

Massachusetts; this dropped to 3 percent in 1937 and 2 percent in
1938.
Strike days idle also

dropped markedly

falling to 3.9 percent in 1935

Moreover,

1931.

in 1936.

and

percent in 1937 from 16 percent in

2.1

strikes in the country

There was

little

as a percentage of the U.S. total,

evidence of

climbed to 4,740 in 1937 from 2,172

this

upsurge in Springfield

metalworking firms. 40

A
man

review of 1938 strikes shows that Springfield had the

days

Lynn and

lost

by

strikes in the state

Fall River).

affected five

would suggest

most willing

exceeded by Boston,

New

Seven industries had three or more

13;

garment workers,

11;

that workers least secure in

and

and increased wages, not workers

Bedford,

textile

teamsters, 20;

workers,

employment were

to exert the pressure of walkouts to gain

highest

strikes that

hundred or more workers. The top four were:

boot and shoe workers,
This

(

fifth

10.

the

union recognition

in the industries that

were growing

rapidly between late 1936 and 1938.

^ y SR, February 27, 1937, p. 5. An Associated Industries of Massachusetts survey released
early March showed that 84 new manufacturers, employing 5,308 workers opened in

in

Western Massachusetts between March 1936 - March 1937. A large number of these new
companies represented industrial migrations from other states AIM determined. See SR,
March 8, 1937, p. 7. Year-end review in SR, January 3, 1937, p. H8. Westinghouse
employment jumped from 4,437 to 5,692; Chapman Valve went from 1,000 to 1,400. Overall,
metalworking firms employed 5,000 more workers in January, 1937 compared to a year
earlier.

40 U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor
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Statistics

(Washington, D.C., 1974)

p. 367.

In March, 1937 while 2,000 Woonsocket,

workers and 3,000 Nashua,

New

shoe workers walked picket

Rhode

Island woolen mill

Hampshire and Lowell, Massachusetts

lines, 7,000 Pittsfield,

GE

Massachusetts

metalworkers received wage adjustments and improved vacation

payments without resorting

to protest.

Machinery and Westinghouse,
According

to plant

worker turnover
policy of paying

found
them."

to

GE

at

to profitability.

in

an

rates "equal to or higher than

industries for comparable work...

appeared

UE aimed

pay increases

to

be

rates, the

flexible

company

wage
.

will

minimize

effort to

particularly of highly skilled machinists

be lower than going

Package

Electric, like

manager Louis Underwood,

wage

community

other

with

-

tied

General

If

-

GE had

a

rates paid in the

wage

rates are

promptly

and cooperative by entering

rectify

into talks

organizing plants across the country, prompting twenty-

five year old national

UE

president James Carey to remark

"I

believe that a

very happy relationship will be established between the union and the

management

of GE."

Philip Murray,

Chairman

of the Steel

Workers

Organizing Committee (SWOC) expressed similar sentiments
Steel, extolling the virtues of

According

to

Murray, "The

SWOC's 1937 agreement with

strike

and lockout

for U.S.

the steel giant.

are discarded in favor of an

orderly process of settling difficulties at the conference table." 41
It

was not

undertaken

until late 1939 that a concerted

to organize

Package Machinery and

Pump

in

effort

Western Massachusetts metalworking

UE

was

firms.

Local 220 reached an agreement, giving the

local exclusive bargaining rights in the plant.

Worthington

and successful

UE

Local 259 and

Holyoke reached an agreement

41 Frederick Harbison, "The General Motors

in

March, 1940.

United Auto Workers Agreement of 1950",
Journal of Political Economy, 58 (1950) pp.404 - 405; R. J. Thomas, Labor Information
Bulletin (November, 1940); Philip Murray, Labor Information Bulletin, (June, 1939).
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Greenfield Tap and Die Local 274
1941, 569 to 261 over the

won

a recognition election in September,

management-sponsored Greenfield Small Tool

The International Association

Association.

previous attempts to organize the plant.

was captured

in October, 1941

UE

endorsed the

its

management

had made four

Another anti-union stronghold

1,000 workers at Smith

as their exclusive bargaining agent.

characterized plant

Henry Ford's

when

of Machinists

and Wesson

Newspapers

as having a reputation "exceeding even

for being bitterly anti-labor."

gates reading 'No Catholics hired here.'

union as pro-communist

failed to deter

union, and by the end of

November

Smith and Wesson had signs

Company

efforts to

at

smear the

workers from voting for the

a contract

was

signed. 42

Bosch Workers Gain Through Negotiations

Over
in

a five

measured

established

month period between October

steps,

eschewing the walk-out or sit-down Local 206

itself as

management

fired

1936 and February 1937

the legitimate voice of workers, in the plant.

union leaders, work went on

in the plant while

Campbell and others negotiated. When scores of workers were
the eve of a recognition poll to be conducted by the

leaders remained low-key.

They continued

publicly stated that they, and not the

workers.

Its

one militant

convinced management

When

to sign

laid off

on

company, Local 206

up new members, and

company union, represented

action, "the fifty-nine

to discontinue the

minute stand-up"

company union and

negotiate

42

UEN, November 18,1939, p. 1; March 23, 1940, p. 8; September 27, 1941, p. 1; October 4,
1941, p. 1. UEN, May 16, 1942. The election was close, with 817 voting for U.E. and 658 for
with the American Federation of Labor (UEN, June 6, 1942). It appears that
for the U.E. organizing gains were the most dramatic after the war began.

affiliation
least
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at

a collective

bargaining agreement.

For management the fifty-nine

minutes of silence followed by the din when
turned on again,

may have posed

to

management

workers and could
radios

management did

were

tools

than the walk-out of

in the plant.

The unity

unfilled,

the logical thing as

and
it

necessary.

skilled

With orders

workers hard

a

of action

that union leaders did in fact speak for

command them when

and magnetos going

machine

a greater threat

handful of workers in one department

demonstrated

all

all

for

to find,

disbanded the company union and

recognized Local 206 as the sole bargaining agent for plant workers

The union won an
rate,

and Labor Day

initial 2.2

fittingly

ten cent base rate increase

percent raise on each worker's base

became

the

first

paid holiday in 1937. In 1938 a

was obtained, along with time and

a half for

hours worked in excess of eight during the day, 40 for the week, and

Sunday work. No gains were made

in holidays

and workers

still

receive paid vacations.

Nor was

remained an important

issue; in fact job security for long-term

there seniority protection.

any

all

did not

Seniority

employees

had been one of the key organizing issues during the union's formative

became one

period. Local 206

of just

two UE

locals in the country to attend

the 1938 national convention with a signed labor agreement.

By 1940 grievance and arbitration procedures were
seniority rights

were spelled

out, six paid holidays

and

in place,

a vacation schedule

were established. Local 206 bargainers gained language stipulating
layoffs

and

were

recalls

book became part

to follow plant-wide seniority.

of the contract in 1941. 43 Steady

as well, with eight

and 10 cent per hour

wage

A job

classification

gains were

increases in 1938

and

that

1939.

made
In five

years base rates were raised from a range of 20 cents to 50 cents an hour to a

43 LB, September, 1963.
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new range

of 60 cents to $1.21.

By comparison, only

and sit-downs throughout the early months
Ford

settle

on

a 10 cent increase, the first for

The Local 206 agreement

fit

into an

after

work stoppages

of 1941 did the

UAW

and

Ford workers in three years

emerging pattern

44

in

metalworking. In a study of collective bargaining carried
out in 1941

economist Sumner Slichter determined that while 290 of 400
contracts
negotiated between 1933 and 1939 contained some seniority
provisions,
fully 87 percent of metal trades

agreements contained such language.

With the Springfield Westinghouse
their

make

agreement,
a

it is

local

pushing

for this protection in

likely that this influenced Local 206 negotiators to

concerted effort to win such protections for their members as

well .45

Bosch plant-wide seniority language was
a large,

sprawling

several

hundred

facility,

with close

to 50

significant because in such

production departments and

job classifications, administering the system

became

a

bureaucratic nightmare. Seniority clauses in other contracts were usually
limited to specific departments,

making

it

easier for

management

to layoff

workers. Plant wide seniority like Bosch workers had, gave high seniority

workers from one department the right
another department.

A

to

"bump" workers

off a job in

chain reaction of "bumps" across the plant often

resulted, causing serious production disruptions.

Certain occupations

44 Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: The CIO and World War II, p. 46 - 47. U.S.
Steel, General Motors, General Electric and other corporations similarly increased wages as
well.

45 Sumner Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management (Washington, D.C., 1941) p.
105-107. For discussions of the issue of seniority as an aspect of union formation see
Local, 1936-1939
Freidlander, The Emergence of a
p. 72-74; Howell Harris, The
Right to Manage (Wisconsin, 1982) p. 64-65; Schatz, The Electrical Workers ch. 5, p. 105-

UAW

,

,

136.
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may

"requiring ability, as

Committee of Local
plant" could be

place calling

be agreed upon

206, as necessary to the efficient operation of
the

exempted from

on

by Management and the

jointly

company and union

the

32-hour work week

layoffs

if

A

seniority rules.

clause

was

also put in

to explore the option of going to a

would drop

the workforce

plant-wide language and the "bumping" procedures

it

below

The

2,000.

sanctioned would

be a sticking point in union-management relations for the

rest of the

union's history. 46

The Bosch contract was more elaborate than many others

in the late

1930s and early 1940s. David Brody characterizes most agreements
as "thin
affairs, largely

vacations,
after the

added

codifying existing conditions and limited to wages, hours,

and weakly drawn grievance and

seniority provisions."

war was such language strengthened,
By comparison,

to contracts.

as

in the 1940

new

Only

provisions were

Bosch agreement

all

personnel moves were to be based on plant-wide seniority. Seniority was

accumulated from date of

hire,

providing there were no breaks in service

for voluntary quits, discharge, or failure to report to work. 47

Early agreements contained strong maintenance of membership

language requiring that employees

employment with

the

standing during the

Company

life

"will

be required as a condition of

to maintain their

of this Agreement." This

membership

in

was something

good

the

UAW only gained with General Motors in 1950. A check off system was
also established, with dues automatically deducted

monthly from each

46 Local 206 Contract, 1942, p. 30. In later years management aggressively sought to limit
this language through negotiations and in arbitration cases, arguing that a layoff of 25
workers would result in at least 100 moves across the factory as each laid off worker
exercised his or her rights to
this

caused could result

bump

into other jobs using their seniority.

in a layoff taking several

47 David Brody, Workers

in Industrial

America

Contract, 1942, p. 30.
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weeks

(New

The domino

to complete.

York, 1980) p. 178.

Local 206

affect

worker's pay and turned over to Local 206's
treasurer. The maintenance
of

membership and dues deduction

tasks that confronted the local.
to

pay

clauses simplified the administrative

By 1941

the contract required the

for the negotiating committee's lost time

when

the

company

company

requested meetings. Grievance committee members were
to be paid

during weekly meetingsas well. In 1941 the
represent

all office

local

gained the right to

workers in the plant excluding engineers and

supervisors.

On

the eve of

legitimacy.

World War

With the exception

the bargaining table.

II,

then, Local 206

had achieved

of the 59 minute sit-down this

was done

Maintenance of membership language, company

dues check-off, well-defined grievance and arbitration language and
seniority

measures elaborating the ways management could move

workers in and out of the plant provided workers with parameters in
dealing with management. The contract greatly reduced the arbitrary
authority of foremen that sparked worker organizing in the plant in
1936. 4 8

Conclusion: The Union Faces an Uncertain Future

Examining trade union

World War

II,

activity

during and immediately after

Nelson Lichtenstein contends

that a "system of interclass

accommodation" developed immediately following the war. Union

power was

essentially political

power, and

it

was put

to effective use

on

the shop floor during the 1930s and early 1940s. In auto plants workers

operating grinding machines, milling machines, lathes and performing

48 Local 206 Contract, 1942,

p.

26 33.
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at

intricate assemblies

and content
assembly

on

moving

by management when they challenged management

the factory floor. Quickie

escalated

the auto industry

GM

maintain a level of control over the pace

Labor agreements provided workers with protection from

lines.

slowdowns

to

of their work, unlike workers regulated by
the flow of

unilateral reprisals

authority

were able

among

was taking

workers. By 1944 one of every two workers in
part in

some

vice-president reported that most

refusal of workers to

Such overt

work stoppages and departmental

sort of

work stoppage.

GM strikes were

In 1944 a

"caused by the

meet production standards." 49

activities

never assumed prominence in Springfield.

Local 202 at Westinghouse had lengthy strikes as part of national labor

However

negotiations.
significant

the war.

Van Norman, Chapman

Bosch,

metalworking plants were quiet during and immediately

The

fight over rates

and production standards took on

urgency in the mid-1950s. Springfield metalworkers

maintained more control over
autoworkers,

As

Valve, and other

their

work than

greater

actually

have

Lichtenstein's

at least until then.

the previous chapters show, the

consolidated

may

after

its

management team

that

authority in the Bosch plant under the direction of

Charles Perelle sought to gain a measure of control on the factory floor

two

levels, ideologically

with the union and

reconfiguring the factory floor.
fired

A

World War

in Lichtenstein, "Conflict

production by

popular labor relations manager was

and the hated head of time study took

49 Quoted

at the point of

at

Over Workers'

this position.

The long-time

Control: The Automobile Industry in

Michael Frisch and Daniel Walkowitz, eds., Working Class America
(Urbana, 1983) p. 295. The workforce Lichtenstein describes as being the most actively
involved in shop floor job actions is quite similar to the one found in the Bosch plant.
During the 1940s and early 1950s close to 50 percent of the workforce set up and operated
II,"

in

manual machines and could significantly control output by controlling their own
Information from Local 206 seniority and occupations lists, UMass Archives.
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pace.

production manager was released along with several
production
supervisors.

tolerance

shop

Because of their high

skill levels,

and the

work performed, Bosch workers had not

floor challenged, but they

during World

War

II

had

a vibrant

management.

albeit unsuccessfully, to

going, in vigorous opposition to
it.

their roll

on the

management's

keep

By the

this council

unilateral decision to

50

Labor historian David Brody contends that significant shop
battles

close

union-management council

in place to discuss production-related issues with

eliminate

had

and

soon would. For example, before and

the union

mid-1950s the union fought,

yet

intricate

were continually being fought

for in-plant control.

floor

as part of a never-ending jockeying

During the war managers were concerned

that

unions were encroaching on their right to run the shop. Labor

agreements reflected local leadership's commitment
security for their membership.

A

contracts reflected labor relaxing

to preserving job

give-and-take ensued, and resultant

its

concern for shop floor and job control

language in exchange for seniority protection and cost of living and wage
increases tied to productivity boosts. Income security prevailed over job
security.

5U During and immediately following the war the CIO's Philip Murray and the

UAW's

Walter Reuther attempted to define a role for labor in corporate decision-making, based
part on the shop floor militancy Lichtenstein describes. Murray's Industry Council Plan
sought a voice for labor in corporate production, investment, and employment decisions.

in

By the mid 1950s the Local 206 labor
agreement contains the following language: "The Company reserves and retains complete
authority to manage its business and to make all decisions relative thereto, including, but
not limited to, the right to schedule the work and working forces, discipline or discharge
employees for just cause, promulgate reasonable shop rules, and other inherent management
Lichtenstein, "Conflict

Over Workers

Control," p. 301.

rights not herein specified."
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At the

local level

workers

still

tried to exercise

some

control over

work. Brody's assertions are supported by Gary Gerstle's
study of

their

textile

union

activity in

language he states that

Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Analyzing contract
"In mill after mill, unionists

sought to replace the

managerial unilaterialism that had characterized shop floor governance

with management-labor mutualism....

Discharges, qualifications for

promotion, piece rates and bonuses, work loads and working conditions
all

demanded

the mutual agreement of employers

and employees.... To

Independent Textile Union members in 1941, industrial democracy had

come

to

mean

relating to

life

equal voices for management and labor on every issue

on

the shop floor."

early 1940s did not last long.
into

most contracts and the

However

Management

spirit of

Interpretations put forward

the 'control' gains of the

rights clauses

mutuality was in

were inserted

retreat. 51

by Lichtenstein and Brody describe

pattern of union activity emerging after World

War

II

in

a

which firm-

centered collective bargaining and the policing of contract language are the
focal points.

In this model, income-security

became more important

union leaders than employment-security. However,

would place more

it

appears that Brody

stock in the persistent shop floor 'dances'

soldiering of completed

work so

as to

make

to

-

the

sure piece-rates were tilted in

the worker's favor, the stretching out of machine tool set ups to play

havoc with production schedules and insure overtime

for one's

department, the zealous guarding of contract language that protected

51

Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 188 - 195; Gary Gerstle, Working-Class
Americanism: The Politics of labor in a Textile City, 1914 - 1960 (New Yoek, 1989) p. 212,
314-316. A typical clause read: "The Union recognizes that the Management of the plant
and direction of the personnel, subject to the provisions of this agreement, shall be vested
exclusively in the employer."

Compare

this to the

206 agreement.
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management

rights clause in the Local

seniority rights for

rank and

new

jobs

interest in the

file

and against

is

-

as being

symptomatic of

maintenance of a semblance of job

close review of Local 206 grievances

and 1960s

layoffs

and

A

control.

arbitration cases during the 1950s

presented in chapter 7 to determine

if

this

was indeed

the case

in the Bosch.

After the war, Bosch workers were confronted with three disruptive
issues:
to

employment

levels fluctuated wildly causing

be laid off and recalled repeatedly from 1945

-

hundreds of workers

1960; the

UE was

openly

challenged for leadership in the plant by the upstart International Union
of Electrical Workers;

and Bosch became part of

factories spread out across the country

the strike

weapon, the

local

responded

assertive than ever before at the

a larger corporation with

and Europe. Rather than eschew
to these

changes by becoming more

end of the 1950s and through the

1960s.

These issues, along with the union's response to management's drive

shop

floor control in Springfield,

in the next

and overseas expansion

for

will be discussed

two chapters. 52

52 This appears to be a fairly high level of strike activity for the years in question and is
similar to what Geiger found in his study of Madison's battery workers. See his concluding
chapter in Madison's Battery Workers, 1934 - 1952.
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CHAPTER

6

THE UNION AND CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION

UNION

SPLITS

AND RUNAWAY

I:

JOBS

Introduction

In the years immediately following

World War

Connecticut

II

River Valley metalworkers were enmeshed in a high stakes fight
for

However,

survival.

common

take a

there

scant evidence that their unions attempted to

is

stand to preserve their livelihoods.

ownership took charge of

factories that

had been

New

locally

corporate

owned

for

generations as Springfield's metalworking industry was integrated into
the rapidly changing national

Bosch workers witnessed the

machines and work

to

and international economic landscape.

shift of

what they believed

newer US and foreign

plants.

to be their

They

also grappled

with the impact the purchase of new machine tools had on
seniority protection.

As we have

seen, during this period

skills

and

management

repeatedly compared Bosch hourly wages to costs in Europe, South

America, and the rapidly industrializing and mostly non-union southern

United

States. Several joint

overseas,

and

production ventures were established

a production plant

was

built in Mississippi to

perform work

usually done in Springfield.

At Bosch, union leaders attempted
the prestige earned during the

monthly

Bulletin

They were

would lead

to

new

themselves to maintain

war production boom.

members were

told that

to assert

Through the

told of the impact of corporate decisions.

technologies and shop reorganization plans

workers running several machine

157

tools simultaneously.

Articles

warned

classification

rates

were

that this

and

set.

would play havoc with long-standing

seniority language as well as alter the

Militant rhetoric

expanding in Mississippi, and
establish a

community-based

jobs out of Springfield.

weak though

it

was

way

also directed against

for a brief period calls

job

piece

work

management

were made

for

to

coalition to fight the shift of manufacturing

However, by

the late 1950s, the union campaign,

was, had collapsed. Erratic employment swings continued.

Union membership remained

making

unstable,

consistent, unified response to the

company

it

difficult to establish a

(Figure

6. 1-

Local 206

membership).

3000 n

2750

-

Local 206 Membership September 1946

Figure

6.1:

Local 206 membership 1946
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-

1968

-

January 1968

Compounding

these problems, the legacy of the acrimonious
in-

plant battle that resulted in the IUE wresting
control of Local 206 from the

UE made

in-plant unity

all

but impossible. Several founding officers and

long-time union stewards of
participation in the union.

UE

Local 206 withdrew from active

Just as

authority over the Bosch shifted to

power

struggle,

and thus missed

plant and articulate their

own

ownership and decision-making

New

York, workers were engaged in a

the opportunity to address the sale of the

vision of the factory's post

World War

-

II

future.
Finally, the union's leadership often took contradictory
positions

toward management during the 1950s, leaving the rank and
as to the position they should take

April, 1959 Charles Perelle

file

confused

toward supervision. For example,

was praised

for

putting

"AB

in a position to

compete, cementing most jobs here in Springfield." Seven months

he was accused of viewing workers

a consistent

problems facing workers, union leaders reacted
all

the while

good. Through

it all,

later

in the plant as basic units of

production instead of people. Lacking

occurred;

in

to

approach

each

new

membership dropped, and work

no comprehensive

strategy

left

was ever

to the

crisis as

it

the city for

articulated to

deal with these issues. 1

'

LB, April, 1959, p.

1.

In the

same

article Perelle

team. The article concludes on an optimistic note.

worth

-

1956, p.
strike at

is

praised for bringing in his

"We

(the workers)

have proven our

considerations always follow recognition." LB, November, 1959,

one Bulletin writer likened supervisors
the opportune moment," LB, May, 1956, p. 3.

3.

In 1956
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to

management

"new-born

p. 1;

LB, May,

reptiles

ready to

United

Electrical

Workers Under Attack: 1948

-

1952

Introduction

In February, 1951 the second issue of the IUE-CIO
Bulletin carried an
editorial titled "Coincidents

reiterated events leading

the International

Union

up

-

Communists

-

And Comments."

to the June, 1950 representation vote

of Electrical Workers

and succeeded the United

It

Electrical

Workers

won

when

a clear cut majority

as bargaining agent for

workers in the plant. Once again charges of Communist party

membership were leveled

at several

The

on these national

editorial writer called

single instance in

Communist
what

which the

UE

line

UE

national officers
officers to

and organizers.

"name us one

has departed from the line of the

party and Soviet Russia over the past ten years." Absent from

the article called

"its last full

scale attack

on

the

UE" was any

discussion of trade union policies or disagreements the Bosch-IUE local

had with

the performance of the

local's thirtieth

rewritten.

No

UE

from 1936

anniversary celebration

mention was made

its

-

1950 in the plant. By the

history

at all of the

UE

had been completely
as organizer of

the large metalworking firms in Western Massachusetts.

members who

led the fight to

as the pioneers of the

At

its

remove UE from

the Bosch

most

of

Instead, those

were canonized

Bosch union. 2

1949 convention the Congress of Industrial Organizations

expelled the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. In 1950
several

more unions were

expelled.

2 LB, February, 1951, p. 3.
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The

UE

expulsion was anticlimactic

since

it

had already resigned from

meeting.

It is

CIO

prior to the 1949 national

not the intent here to analyze what transpired

national level.

metalworking

the

The focus
locals,

is

on

Springfield,

and how the

UE - IUE

home

at the

UE

to several

conflict affected Local 206's

presence in the plant.

Chapman

Van Norman, Westinghouse, and Bosch were

Valve,

organized from the mid- to

roughly 10 years, as did

late 1930s

many

and remained part

of the

UE

for

other plants in the Connecticut River Valley

between Bridgeport, Connecticut and northern Vermont. In

just eight

weeks during November and December 1949 Springfield UE members
backed

and

their Executive

for the

CIO

the Bosch plant

-

Board recommendations and voted

backed International Union of

was

Electrical

to leave the

UE

Workers; only in

there organized opposition to this move. 3

The National Scene

From

its

founding in 1936

UE was

a

divided union. According to

historian Ronald Filippelli three distinct groups joined together to form
the

UE

between 1936 and

1937.

One group was headed by James

his role as leader of the Philadelphia-based Radio

National Labor Council.

A

in locals affiliated with the

^

Carey, in

and Allied Trades

second was led by James Matles,

who

brought

Machine Tool and Foundry Workers along

Workers and studies of anticommunism in the labor movement that contain detailed discussions and analysis of the UE
- IUE split including:
Michael Bonislawski, The Ant-Communist Movement and Industrial
Unionism: IUE vs. UE (Master of Arts Thesis, 1992); Ronald Filippelli, The United
The Struggle for Control
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 1933 - 1949:
(diss., 1970); Martin Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold War Era (Albany, 1988); Stephen
Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin: The Making and Unmaking of Militant Unionism, 1900 There are several histories of the United

Electrical

1950 ( New Brunswick, 1992); Steve Rosswurm, ed., The ClO's Left-Led Unions (New
Brunswick, 1992); Ronald Schatz, The Electrical Workers (Urbana, 1983).
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with 14 International Association of Machinist
lodges. The third group,
consisted of workers from several General Electric
plants in Lynn, Massachusetts
identified with Julius

and Schenectady,

facilities,

New

York,

including

was

Emspak.

Divisions manifested themselves at the union's Buffalo,

founding convention in March, 1936.

motion

to

closely

support a third national

Delegates voted 36

political party.

-

New

York

10 against a

Carey led the

opposition along with Springfield Westinghouse local president
Matthew

Campbell. The
concept.

GE

locals, loyal to

Emspak, supported the

At the same meeting Carey was

third party

elected president

and Emspak,

Secretary-Treasurer of the UE.

Matles and the machinist locals did not join the

UE

until 1937.

When

they did, Matles became director of organizing and the balance of

power

in the

union shifted from Carey. Even while president, Carey was

kept out of the successful 1937

-

national contract.

from power

Carey's

fall

1938 negotiations for a General Electric
in the

UE

culminated in his

defeat for the presidency by Al Fitzgerald of the Lynn, Massachusetts
1941.

However, Carey had been

1938.

From

many

of the radio plants he

this

Carey and his

elected Secretary-Treasurer of the

GE

CIO

in

in

highly visible national position he maintained support in

allies

had brought

were able

into the

to turn several

UE

UE, and by early 1948
locals against the national

leadership. 4

There were other indications of what was to come
II.

During the 1940

UE

convention,

Emspak and Matles

after

World War

joined together

against Carey in opposing conscription. At the March, 1941 national

Executive Board meeting Carey again opposed Emspak and Matles.

4

Filippelli,

The United

Electrical,

Radio and Machine Workers, p. 53
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Championing
Philadelphia

the cause of local autonomy, Carey

Harry Block, attempted

ally,

to gain

and

his long-time

passage of a resolution

allowing locals to bar members from holding office
based on their

The

affiliation.

Not long

effort failed. 5
after this Executive

Board defeat Carey

the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU).

by several

New

had chapters

York

priests, labor organizers,

in at least

two

with the dangers

it

Catholic workers.

UE

It

Communists

was

Members

for

unionists

who

this.

strongholds.

in the labor

ACTU

ACTU

and
concerned

movement posed

itself

to

ACTU focused

Catholic. 6

and external pressure on the UE's top leadership began
fall

of 1946

when

Block organized

Democratic Action (UEMDA). According
resisted

what he termed Communist

relegated to second-class

change

Established in 1937

social reformers,

also putatively anti-fascist.

summer and

earnest in the

UE

with

because, according to historian Ronald Schatz, half UE's

members were
Internal

felt

and

allied himself

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

cities,

Bridgeport, Connecticut, that were

mainly on

political

membership

in their locals.

in

UE

to Block, local

dictation,

were

UEMDA intended to

Several Congressional subcommittees also began to

investigate the

UE

at this time. 7

5

Block was a founder of the Philadelphia Philco radio local in 1933, attended the UE's
founding convention, and was president of the Philadelphia district of UE. Block and

Carey were joined by Matthew Campbell

Campbell's vote here
is consistent with the position he took to bar Communist party members and supporters from
running for office on the United Labor Party ticket during Springfield city elections.

6

in this unsuccessful effort.

Schatz, The Electrical Workers, p. 181.

7 Filippelli, esp. p. 68 - 88, 201. From 1936 - 1940 Carey could usually count on Campbell for
support in his attacks on the political affiliation of UE officers, efforts by UE to develop a
labor party, and statements against early entry into the war. Campbell's death

in

June,

1941 deprived Carey of a consistent Executive Board vote. Al Fitzgerald, from GE. Local

Lynn took Campbell's seat on the Board and soon defeated Carey for the UE
presidency. By 1948 three key issues divided CIO unions: the Henry Wallace presidential
campaign, membership in what was argued was the Communist-dominated World
201 in
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But in spite of the attacks and investigations
receive financial

and moral support

for

its

UE

organizing

continued to

The

efforts.

National Citizens Emergency Relief Committee
conducted extensive
fundraising efforts to support striking General Electric
and Westinghouse

workers.

Members

of the committee included Eleanor Roosevelt,
former

New

York City mayor

actor

Melvyn Douglas, musical conductor Leonard

Fiorello LaGuardia, Florida Senator

Claude Pepper,

and band

Bernstein,

leader Artie Shaw. Locally, the Springfield City Council voted 21

support local Westinghouse workers, out of work in a national

Labor unions and
for the strikers.

civic

-

3 to

strike.

groups collected over $2,000 during a fund

raiser

Students from area colleges, including Smith, Mt.

Holyoke, and American International, served as ushers
Massachusetts the

UE

played an active role on the labor

staffers leading the fight in the legislature for

at the event.

front,

In

with union

passage of a law

guaranteeing unemployment payments for strikers out of work over four

weeks. 8

While Carey and Block plotted against the union's national
leadership,

UE

remained successful organizing new

locals

and defeating

take-over attempts from other unions, including the United Auto

Workers (UAW), the United

Steel

Workers (USW), and the International

Association of Machinists (IAM). In Dayton, Ohio by a 275

IAM

machinists decided to leave the
contract,

and

affiliated

-

23 vote

because of dissatisfaction with their

with UE; and in Henderson, Kentucky the

UE

federation of trade Unions, and support for the Marshall Plan. See F.S. O'Brien, "The

'Communist Dominated' Unions
1968) esp. p. 185
Electrical

8

-

186.

Block's role in

Workers, p. 180

UEN, February

-

United States Since 1950," Labor History, 9 (Spring,
establishing the UEMDA is discussed in Schatz, The

in the

181.

18, 1946, p. 7;

February

26, 1946, p.8;
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March

16, 1946, p. 6.

defeated an A.F.L. Federal Union 121
face of A.F.L. charges that the

-

32

UE was

at a

GE

appliance plant in the

un-American and communist. 9

Early in 1947 the Saturday Evening Post ran a
series of articles by

conservative columnists Joseph and Stuart Alsop.

Communists Loose?"

the

CIO Shake

In "Will the

Post readers learned that UE's leaders were

directed from the Kremlin. According to the Alsop
brothers, Carey

Emspak and Matles because both were

fooled by

The death

organizers.

Matthew Campbell

of

Carey's position in the

UE and

it

and gladness. They

rank and

file

he has

crawl to

to

The

it

attacking the

UE

a

is

death

bed...

was not favorable

union meetings as "not

and sleazy

affairs of

halls...

.

The

persons to sweat with horror."
1947

CIO convention

CIO

presidents) energetically

As

to

Carey or the CIO,

young man

CIO

causes

many

either.

While

respectable

for Carey, they described

"sitting beside

Murray (United

smoking

Steel

him

at the

Workers and

a cigar too large for him,"

and

as a

boiling with nervous energy, chieftain of the

anti-communists, and the best kind of fighting Irishman." 11

9 LIEN,

May

25, 1946, p. 7;

October 5, 1946,

p. 4;

February

8,

1947, p. 3.

*0 Joseph and Stuart Alsop, "Will the CIO Shake the Communists Loose?" Saturday
Evening Post, February 22 and March 1, 1947. The authors were certainly wrong about the
cause of Campbell's death which was from a sudden heart attack, not an automobile
accident.
11

Alsop, "Will the

CIO Shake

the

Communists Loose?" Saturday Evening

1947, p. 27.

165

if

." 10

broader anti-union message was being conveyed. The

authors wrote: "The very thought of the

"small, dark

an auto accident weakened

But a communist will come to a union meeting

from

Post article

UE

are usually held in grim

stay away.

highly effective

then shifted to outright Communist

party control. The article described
joy

in

was

Post,

March

1,

UE_M aintains Sup port.

Attacks like the one in the
Post escalated,

UE

but

continued to achieve significant
organizing success. In February,
1947 UE took control from the
International Brotherhood of
Electrical

'

Workers (IBEW)

of a large General Instruments
plant in

workers invited the

UE

in

and expressed

News, "The use of an attack on the

by the employer, and appeals
overcome one

nearby

UE

fact

plants."

-

UE

with their existing

to racial

and

to the

and

religious prejudices

wages and conditions were

UE's opponents argued that

far

if

had

below those

UE won

that this

in

the plant

was indeed

a black

World War

II

veteran told

UE News

was 923

defeated the

-

356. 1 2 In near-by Holyoke, in

IBEW

Holyoke General

campaign of

290

-

15

and gained the

Electric plant in spite of

"red baiting

and

November 1946

right to represent

what

the

UE

workers

at a

Lowell, Massachusetts,

GE

company charged

and

union leaders were "dishonest, unpatriotic, and ungodly".

UE

still

won

took out a
12
13
14

full

that the union

was

a front for "the evil

power"

the election, defeating the International Ladies

Garment Worker Union 202
organizing drive at an

at the

the local papers referred to

plant the

However,

final

racial slanders."* 3

During an organizing campaign

that

the

that all

200 African-American workers in the plant voted
for the UE: The

as a

failed

actively sought support in
African-American neighborhoods.

Henderson Simons,

tally

UE

written by James Carey, assistance

would be desegregated. Organizers responded
case,

Jersey after

During the General Instruments
campaign, according

contract.

to

dissatisfaction

New

RCA

-

94.14

^ me face of similar attacks during an

plant in Pulaski, Virginia local merchants

page newspaper advertisement

UEN, March 1, 1947, p. 1.
UEN, November 9, 1946, p.
UEN, August 2, 1947, p. 7.

4.
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in

support of the UE. In the

ad merchants urged workers
achievement,
to "support

its

its

members

based on the union's record
of

members problems, and

in their effort to

UE won

739

-

win

at

-

being challenged by another union

3.15

numbers of rank and

legitimate union

and

that

file

new shops
-

its ability

the things that they are

summary, between 1946 and September,

in 571 representation elections

that large

UE

dedication to solving

entitled to as Americans."

In

to vote

1947,

UE was

or in shops

and won 86

percent.

involved

where they were
It is

workers believed that the

apparent

UE was

a

offered a powerful voice in their
efforts to

it

gain better pay and working conditions.^

The Rise of the Internat ional Union Q f
in Spring field-

1947

-

Electric!

WnrU.c

195n

In October, 1947 the Springfield Union
published an

from Anthony Cimino, former president
to

Ralph Forsstrom, president of Bosch

charges

made

UE

Cimino, a 15-year assembler
local chapter of

UE Members

in the fight to return

UE

to

at

members

and elsewhere,
of the

Local 202,

that

Communist

Westinghouse, urged

for

UE

letter

Local 206. The letter reiterated

in the Saturday Evening Post

national and district officers were

Westinghouse

of

open

many UE

party.

UE members

to join a

Democratic Action and become involved

sound American trade union

principles. 17

Forsstrom, a skilled toolmaker, had been elected president in 1945.

He was

15

singled out for this attack because of his public defense of the

UEN, August 9,

1947, p.l.

16 Election
figures are in

employed

in plants

these workers.
17 SMU, October

UEN, September

27, 1947, p.8.

covered by these elections.

29, 1947.
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UE won

A total of 112, 745 workers were
the right to represent 73 percent of

union against red-baiting from

UEMDA members.

In a 1946 letter to
Jim

Matles, Forsstrom requested
information on the role Harry
Block and
others were playing in
attacking UE. He informed
Matles that:

intend to take the floor at our
membership meeting next
month in support of the National officers
and in opposition to
Red-baiting, but I know I will get
a lot of opposition from
some
of the other officers of our local,
so that any information
I

me

can send
the truth

you

will be greatly appreciated as
long as

and can be

substantiated.

I

being both truthful and sincere and

have

I

it is

strictly

a reputation for

intend living up to this

reputation. 18

On

same day Forsstrom wrote UE president Albert

the

Fitzgerald to

express regret that he had voted against
the re-election of Matles and

Emspak
little,"

at the national convention.

"My

conscience

he wrote, "even though we were instructed

is

bothering

me

to vote as a unit

a

and

the majority of our delegates were in
favor of voting for Block's running

mates." This indicates the Local 206 Executive
Board

delegates
issue.

It

on how

to vote at conventions

-

also demonstrates that Forsstrom

controlled or a

Communist Party member

-

which instructed

was divided on

was
as

neither

the

communist

Communist-

Cimino and others

contended. In the note Forsstrom's democratic proclivities
appear as he
let

Fitzgerald

know "my

18 Ralph Forsstrom

conscience does not bother

me

a bit for voting

James Matles, September 22, 1946 (UE Archives District-Local
ff 247x). The 1946 Milwaukee convention marked the
first time an open electoral
challenge to UE national leadership took place. By eight-to-one majorities each
attempt
failed. Local 206 was now identified by its votes at this convention
as in the Carey-Block
camp (Schatz, The Electrical Workers, p. 184).
to

Series,
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against you because of the
unfair

meetings

manner

in

which you conducted the

at the Convention... ."19

Fighting inside the

UE

continued through the rest of
1947. In

Bridgeport, Connecticut the local
leadership had testified before
the House

Un-American

Affairs

the Bridgeport

including

all

GE

Committee

that

plant everyone

members

of

who

UEMDA.

UE was

that

continued to support Forsstrom.

members

rejected a

committee by

company

a four to

it

was voted out

testified

The

UE New

Council passed a resolution condemning
the

movement, and demanding

Communist-dominated. At

England

UEMDA

dissolve.20

May

at a

District 2

as a dual-union

Local 206

For example,

of office,

members
meeting union

contract offer endorsed by the
negotiating

one margin and voted

committee and business agent. Forsstrom was

to dismiss the entire

easily elected to the

new

negotiating committee. 21

The September 1947 Conv ention and

the

Ciminn

September the event that precipitated Cimino's open
the

UE

national convention in

New

But in

Letter

letter occurred:

York City Forsstrom, unlike

At

in 1946,

defied the local's directive and voted for the national
officer slate of
candidates, including Matles, Emspak, and Fitzgerald.

Two

other Local

206 delegates, James Manning and William Slattery, cast their votes
as
instructed in opposition to the national

UE

American

of Jesuit-run

in

New

football player

York

City, continued to

19 Ralph Forsstrom
Series,

20

ff

and graduate

to

Albert Fitzgerald,

oppose

UE

September

officers.

Manning, an

Fordham University

national leaders

22, 1946

Ail-

and

policies

(UE Archives District-Local

247x).

UEN, December

21 Al Smith

to

UE District Council Minutes, October 1947 (UE Archives, ff 6).
Matles, May 20, 1947 (UE Archives, District-Local Series, ff 253).

20, 1947;

James
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after the convention.

While there

no evidence linking Manning

is

to the

Association of Catholic Trade
Unionists, possibly he was
exposed to the.
outlook on trade union issues and
attitudes toward UE while
enrolled at

Fordham, since
In

its

New

York was

a

stronghold of

ACTU

activity.

convention coverage the Daily News
informed readers that no

Springfield locals voted for Fitzgerald,
Matles, and Emspak.
letter

followed, and by early 1948

spokespersons for

a

Manning and

Bosch

telling

of your unions throw

with

The

workers that

to hell

it

UEMDA chapter,
if

UE Comes

Apart

an issue

in

any

out and throw the advocates out along

in Springfield-

November

he was re-elected president of the

with his earlier election
appears the rank and
effective unionists.

11

is

it."22

71 percent of the vote against

This

They were

206.

which regularly

"Communism

Ralph Forsstrom became the focus of
this,

were

growing opposition group inside Local

supported by the Greater Springfield
leafleted the

Slattery

Cimino's

was

the case in

UEMDA

to the

file

-

December 1949

UEMDA

local in

attention.

November,

In spite of

1948, garnering

candidate William Slattery. As

revamped negotiating committee,

preferred officers

The national

who

projected themselves as

political struggle

most of the country

as well.

it

was

still

secondary. 23

In December, 1948 alone

SDN, September

9, 1947. The throw them out statement was first made by Philip
Murray, president of the Steelworkers. The News reported that "A number of delegates
from the Springfield area have expressed their growing distrust of the left-wing elements

in the

UE

union." Leaflet quote in

SDN,

article titled "Bosch Workers Urged to Battle
Reds in UE," September 18, 1948. UEMDA had representatives from UE unions at Monsanto,
Package Machinery, Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Bosch, and Westinghouse.

23

UEN, November

27, 1948, p. 10.
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UE

defeated three attempts by the

worker refrigerator plant

At the

start of

1949

locals,

its

including a 3,000

in Evansville, Indiana.24

UE

national leaders attempted to
shift the focus

from the union by mounting an

unemployment and

UAW to raid

falling

all-out

campaign against high

worker incomes. The national
Executive

Board passed a resolution castigating
big business and Congress
that five million

Americans were

jobless.

termed half-hearted labor leaders
against unemployment.

They

who were

However, these

also

went

for the fact

after those they

running away from the fight

efforts failed

and

at the

September, 1949 national convention
James Carey emerged with three
times

more delegate

loyal to

votes than in 1948. Carey

him represented

now

claimed that locals

150,000 out of approximately 475,000

UE

members.
At the beginning
convention which

of

November,

officially expelled

prior to the start of the national

them, the

UE

CIO

resigned from the CIO.

The Westinghouse, Chapman Valve, Van Norman,
Monsanto, and Bosch
locals issued a joint press release stating
that they intended to

the CIO.

how

remain

"We're staying in the CIO," read the release, "we don't

this is to

the choice

is

be done, but we'll find a way. Between the

clear

- it's

CIO every

time."

know

UE and

the

in

yet

CIO

On November 2nd Herman

Greenberg, president of the Western Massachusetts CIO Council,

announced
a

new

UE.

that a ten-person national board

to set

up

labor organization to represent any workers desirous of leaving the

Anthony Cimino was named

board. The board's
International

24

had been appointed

first

Union

UEN, December

action

was

of Electrical

18, 1948, p. 5;

Springfield-area representative to the

to grant a

CIO

charter to the

Workers and name James Carey

December
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25, 1948, p. 3;

January

22, 1949, p.

1

president of the

new

On November

union.

Carey sent telegrams

4

manufacturing plants urging management
not
dealing with the

UE

and advising them

that

to

to 1,500

have any further

fUE now represented

their

employees. 25

Also on November
officers

regularly scheduled elections for
Local 206

were held. In the main contest Forsstrom
faced Ralph

a race for business agent.

had

4,

Chicketti, a union steward

thirty years' seniority in the plant.

By

a 690

-

Chicketti in

and stock handler,

670 vote Chicketti

narrowly defeated Forsstrom, while Frank
Broderick, another anti-UE
leader,

was

elected president.

UE

read "Bosch

On November

5th the Daily

Defeats Forsstrom: Leftists Lose Last

Hope

News headline
of Major

Influence Here." 26

In rapid succession area plants exited

Van Norman

led the

Chapman Valve

way on November

three days later, and

4,

UE

and

affiliated

with the IUE.

followed by Westinghouse and

Monsanto on November

Sunday, November 20 mass membership meeting

Pittsfield

GE

8.

At

a

workers

voted overwhelmingly to join the IUE. There, before the
vote workers

sermon by Father Marshall

listened to a

Church advising them

Moscow and

that they

St.

a choice

Mary's

Roman

Catholic

between "Washington and

ultimately Christ and Stalin." 27

The Bosch remained
to recognize

had

of

split three

UE, held dues collected

more weeks. Management refused

in escrow,

and refused

to negotiate a

25

SDN, November 1, 1949, p. 1, p. 4; November 2, 1949, p. 12; Novembers, 1949,
Cimino had attended the CIO convention that expelled UE as a delegate from a
Pennsylvania local of the United Theatrical Employees Union. SDN, November
8.

Chicketti had 30 years seniority in the plant.

26

SDN, November

workers
27

5, 1949, p. 1.

In a related story

for defeating Forsstrom.

SDN, November

21, 1949, p. 32.
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Herman Greenberg

p.

1.

4,

1949, p.

praised Bosch

new

On November

contract.

and comprised

and agreed

to

entirely of

send

a

9 the stewards council, chaired
by Forsstrom

union stewards, affirmed

support for the

its

UE

telegram to Carey demanding that
"he keep his nose

out of our business and stop interfering
with our current contract
negotiations." But the Executive Board,

handful of stewards, passed

composed

own motion

its

of top officers

and

just a

calling for a swift resolution
to

the conflict.
Finally, at the

ordering

November

all local officers to

IUE membership

cards.

A

19

membership meeting

a

motion carried

withdraw immediately from the

UE and

sign

second motion passed directing Broderick
and

Chicketti to attend an organizing meeting of
the

Philadelphia at the end of November, with

all

IUE

to

be held in

expenses paid by Local 206.

Confident that they had shop floor support, Broderick,
Chicketti, and

Manning

called a special executive board meeting for

suspended Forsstrom, second

shift Vice-president

November

Theodore Gagnon,

Trustee Donald Bergeron and three negotiating
committee
office for failing to
disaffiliate

25 other

from

comply with

UE and

sign

the wishes of the

IUE membership

members had signed an open

November

19th

the

first five

members from

membership

cards.

These

to

six,

refusing to join the

membership meeting. By November

had signed IUE membership

Through

letter

25 and

30, 1,200

along with

IUE

at the

workers

cards. 28

months

of 1950 attention focused

on the

National Labor Relations Board election to be held June 2 to decide the
issue of representation in the plant.

international representative, helped

28 Executive Board minutes,

November

19,

November

Anthony Cimino, now an IUE

IUE supporters throughout

the

General membership meeting minutes,
1949; Special Executive Board meeting minutes, November 25, 1949 (Local 206
14, 1949;

files).
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campaign, He was assisted by Herman
Greenberg
rally the night before the
election.

affiliation

Workers voted 964

With the United Electrical Workers.

in the local

papers remarked "The

in Springfield.

in this

to stay

lit

It

is

-

supporter quoted

Communists

fitting that

with the C IO and

a giant

724 to end their

An [UE

fight to clean the

our union started here
area has seen

who planned

out of

every major plant

reject decisively

com munisin." 24

Who

Counts:

Skill

The

Su pported the

UE made

one attempt

Ut-

and thp

II

||.?

to reestablish itself in the

Bosch

plant.

In

1952 Forsstrom led a brief but intense campaign to
represent workers in
the skilled trades, including the maintenance
department, experimental

machine shop, and

all

tool

and die and gage makers.

I

lowever, under the

supervision of the Boston office of the NI.KB, workers voted 127

remain

in the

A
1947

close analysis of individuals associated with the

win back those departments.
occupations, 10
against the UE.

remain

in

Of

plant:

the

^

SMI

at

Looking

UE were

On

It

is

made

first at

3]

UH and

from Bosch,

I

L

J

I

:

workers and

who

who

|

Highteen held skilled positions

among

the ten

[UE supporters, there was

I

I

.

1
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to

in the

were toolmakers and lour were all-around

the other side,

unfi 3, 1950/ p.

their

voted

he IUI! International loaned the Springfield local close lo
$10/000 to finance the campaign (Local 206 files, c lorrespondence Series 1).
30 SDN, Augusl :><), 22, 1958,
I,

from

declared lor or

Bosch, the occupations of 21

determined.

I

the right decision in trying to

possible to identify 4

Westinghouse and

these, five

machinists.

to

[UE.30

1950 indicates that Forsstrom

-

78

-

one

set

up man, two machine

chasers and store

room

operators, an assembler,

IUE and

six stock

clerks.

At Westinghouse 14 workers signed
the

and

a public statement

for a brief period tried to
reorganize a

Occupations were determined

seven from

for

this

UE

opposing

local in the plant.

group.

Five of the

seven were skilled tradesmen and
machinists and two were assemblers.
key leader of the stay-in group was
maintenance mechanic Murdo

Campbell, brother of deceased

most

influential

IUE leaders

UE

stalwart

in the plant

A

Matthew Campbell. The two

were assemblers

31

Historian Ronald Schatz found a similar
pattern in an examination
of the occupations of

Westinghouse
tool

UE

supporters in East Pittsburgh

Local 601. Just as with early Bosch
organizing, the main

room had been

loyal to

UE and IUE

a center of early

union organizing.

Many remained

UE, while the nucleus of IUE support came from
younger,

unskilled and semiskilled workers.

can be noted, the

UE

Schatz writes:

'Although exceptions

generally captured majorities in those sections
of the

bargaining unit in which

a

skilled, well paid, or both.

which the proportion of

high proportion of the workers were either

The IUE won those

skilled or well-paid

sections of the unit in

work was

lower."32

In April, 1950, prior to the failed certification elections
at

Westinghouse and Bosch, UE News printed
Westinghouse workers.
Westinghouse" the

a series of

Titled "Old-timers Fight for

article

interviews with

UE

at Springfield

provides further evidence of UE's support.

toolmaker commented that the strongest pro-UE department

*

For Westinghouse see SDN,

affidavits to

conform

and petitioned the
32 Schatz, The

November

18,

1949, p.

1

.

for

what ended up being an

Electrical Workers, esp.

chapter

175

8,

in the plant

The fourteen signed non-communist

to Taft-Hartley guidelines, established

NLRB

A

themselves as

UE

local 202

ill-fated certification election.

quote on

p.

203.

was

the tool room. Oscar
Nilsson, a machinist

orgaruzers in the plant added
baiting.

I

"I

certainly don't

think that's a political

move

and one
fall

for

UE

of the first

mis communist-

of guys to get votes

and get

jobs

for themselves." 33

In sum, the Bosch

following: 23 of 28
12

UE

and Westinghouse numbers reveal
the

supporters held skilled positions
while only one of

IUE supporters held

a similar job.

UE

supporters included: machinists

James Cornell, Theodore Gagnon and Ray
Gosslin; toolmakers Ed
Durgin, Ralph Forsstrom, Louis Urban,
and Emil Claus; and machine

mechanics Gustav Langheld, Murdo Campbell,
and James O'Neill.
also possible to identify the occupations
of 12 Local 206 officers

positions in the union between 1940 and
1944.

were diemaker Leo Goulet,

who

was

held

Here again the findings

reveal that a majority of individuals held
skilled positions.
of ten

It

tool grinder Wallace

In the group

Kennedy, two

around machinists Leonard Hayward and John
O'Connell, and

all-

tool

designer Robert Shields.

After the split union leadership came from a different
source.

Three

men dominated

Local 206 for the next ten years: James Parker, a

stock clerk served as president from 1952

work

expediter,

-

1958; Jim

was business agent from 1952

-

Manning, now

1958;

another work expediter, served as president from 1950

UEN,

April

a

and Ralph Chicketti
-

1951 and

was on

1950, p. 4. It is unclear if there was an ethnic aspect to who wanted to
stay affiliated with the UE. In a recent conversations with a long-time UE staff person,
2,

David Cohen, he indicated that the shops that remained UE, especially in Greenfield,'
Massachusetts and Springfield, Vermont were comprised mainly of workers with old New
England Yankee backgrounds who rejected outsiders from various anti-UE organizations
telling

them who

to support.
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various negotiating committees.

makers were elected

The Impact

It

Or^ niypH

appears that skilled workers

on improving wages. Since
incentive basis tool

skilled machinists or tool

to top office in the local

Sp lit on

of the

No

T

a

through the 1960s .34

h™

now

focused their attention mainly

the majority of workers

room and

and die

were paid on an

other trades people often

made

less

money

per hour because they were paid a straight
hourly salary. This group

became
least

active during contract negotiations

one

skilled trades

belief that their

Bosch,

high level of

somewhere

to negotiating committees.

They paid

floor fights piece

little

to replace

That no

tool

office after 1950 is

at a

at

workers had with management over such

new

incentive systems,

workers with new machines. The
fell silent

and
social

during the 1950s and

and die makers, machinists, and mechanics held high

noteworthy, indeed. Angered, embittered, embarrassed,

barred from running for office for their loyalty to UE,

movement

not

attention to the negotiating battles

base of the local during the 1930s and 1940s,
1960s.

if

group became disengaged from

issues as rate changes, the introduction of

management's desire

to elect at

Content in the

assured them employment,

skill

else in the valley, the

the affairs of the local.

and daily shop

member

and usually managed

time

needed. Most were

when
like

their

many

energy and organizing

what labor

Names were

journalist

quit the union

skills

were much

Len De Caux termed the

in-

gathered mainly from meeting minutes and newspaper articles.
Occupations were determined primarily using city directories and union newspapers.
Employment records for the period could not be found. IUE officers were determined from
election files in Local 206 archives, UMass-Amherst.
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between progressives in the labor
movement, who now wondered how
much good they had done .35

The

UE had

aggressively organized the rapidly
growing electrical

industry starting in the late
1930s and established national
agreements

with two of the largest corporations
in the country, General
Westinghouse. In the early 1940s close

to 80 percent of the

Electric

and

workers in the

industry belonged to UE. However,
as a consequence of intensive
raiding

by CIO unions

like the

membership dropped

World War

II.

UAW and the internecine battle with IUE, UE

to 71,000 in 1957

Most importantly,

from almost 500,000

at the

end of

as Schatz points out:

Freed from the constraint of

powerful nationwide union,
top General Electric and Westinghouse
executives set about
redesigning jobs, manufacturing facilities, and
the
a

internal

structure of

management itself. The net effect of these
changes, which began immediately after World
War II and
extended into the mid 1960s, was to radically change
the
world of the workers and

in the process

undermine the

conditions which had given birth to nationwide
unionism in
the

first place. 36

Nationally, the

IUE grew

quickly, winning several

representation elections between 1950 and 1954.
industry, particular the

While

UE

more

But the electrical

consumer goods segment, grew more

rapidly, with

beyond the scope of this research it would be interesting to determine if any
workers left the large plants in the early 1950s to start smaller firms of their

it is

skilled

own. There is evidence that in parts of Europe, and particularly northern Italy, numbers of
plants were established by workers expelled from large firms for their Communist
political
views during this same period. In Labor Radical Len De Caux reports on visits with
several labor organizers

and

officers affected by the attacks on alleged communists in the
movement. Besides eliminating communists, De Caux contends, the move also
eliminated "most earlier labor idealism." See Len De Caux, Labor Radical (Boston, 1970)

labor

504 - 506.
36 Schatz, The

Electrical Workers, p.

232

-

233.
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p.

most new plants

built outs.de the Northeast,
IUE's base of support.

GE's

Unionization rate dropped to 80 percent
in 1960 from 95 percent
in 1950.

By the early 1960s
as they

With

GE

workers were

had been through

GE became

m

a

dozen unions instead of

just

one

the late 1930s and 1940s.
Coordinated bargaining

very difficult 37

Some

highly skilled work remained
in

the Northeast, like the production
of GE's massive electrical
transformers
in Pittsficld,

and

airplane engines in Lynn, Massachusetts.

its

consumer products plants were
the early L9608

newer

around the globe
production

factories

to take

shift affect

built in the

were placed

South and Southwest and by
in

Europe and elsewhere

advantage of lower wages.

IUE membership

in

However,

New

represented workers in 59 factories in southern

How

did

England?

New

this

In 1955

IUE

Hampshire, northern

Connecticut, and Massachusetts: By 1985, 65
percent of these plants were

closed.™

Loc al 206 and the Mississip pi

P\ ?n \

Introduction

In the essay

historian David

"American Workers and the

Montgomery

New

Deal Formula" labor

describes four sources of employer control

over labor: Ideological control of the education system; the coercive
authority of the government;

^

w

Srh.ii/,

The

1AM

-

of the

means

of

n y L963, in terms ol membership numbers UE
workers. Other unions with sizable presence in c,E wen- mi:

Electrical Workers, p, 226.

only represented 10,000
68,000;

company ownership

9,000;

GE

UAW

,i

•

5,500

™

The list ol plants was found in IUE 206 files, UM.iss, Amherst Libor Archives. Closings
were determined usin^ city directories .it three year Intervals from 1970 1985,
is
it

possible
this

does

th.it

,i

little

may have changed ownership and/or name and
minimize the fad that so many plants Hosed.

handful
to

179

still

he open

Out

production; and the firm's drive for
profits and control of markets.
The
later

two were

effectively utilized

when Bosch management announced

plans to build a manufacturing plant
in Mississippi in 1953, and
repeatedly

used thereafter as
Holland,

Italy,

joint

production ventures were established in
England,

and South America. This unchallenged
ownership made

it

possible for the corporation to determine
where production could be
carried out in the

most cost

effective

way:

could be done cheaper elsewhere, so be

To support

his contention

economist Sumner Slichter

who

it.

If

production in Springfield

39

Montgomery

cites the

work

of labor

in 1940 observed that "in the
absence of

great outbursts of union enthusiasm the
pressure of business competition
will

always make the unionized sector of any industry
tend

Montgomery

refers to the case of northern textile
workers,

significant gains in

World War

A

south.

I

wages and working conditions

only to see their factories close

to shrink."

who made

in the aftermath of

down and

industry

similar fate awaited Springfield metalworkers in
the

move

mid

1950s.40

Mississippi

Moving

In constructing the Mississippi plant

"ABA

is

essentially following

the trend of other manufacturers in the highly competitive automotive

component business who have found

the operation of branch plants to be

advantageous," company president Donald Hess told workers. The
Springfield plant

had recently

lost

high volume production work for Ford

39 Essay in David Montgomery,
Workers Control in America (New York, 1979)
40 Sumner Slichter quoted in David
Montgomery,
Workers Control,
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p. 157.

ch. 7.

Southern competitors and Hess had
no intention of losing again.
Following the recent split in Local
206, Hess had little reason to
fear the
to

"great outburst of union enthusiasm"
Slichter wrote about

would be

forthcoming. 41

There was a public response
the union's
to

A

monthly paper.

to the Mississippi

announcement

Bulletin editorial cautioned

in

members not

be fooled by the reasons Hess gave for
the Mississippi start-up.

According

work

loss of

costs to

union business agent Jim Manning

to

to competitors

it

had

little to

with Southern plants or the need

meet increased competition. "They

from paid holidays; three week vacations;

do with
reduce

to

are attempting to get

away

cost of living increases;

pensions; paid insurance; seniority." Union
president Parker added that

he doubted the company's strategy would work:
"So

moving

to Mississippi, they will get

making

a sad mistake."

new

if

they think, by

away from Organized

Labor, they are

Parker added, "When they open the gates of their

plant in Columbus, they will find themselves surrounded
by IUE-CIO

Organizers."

owed

Parker also informed members that the

Long Island workers over

its

new

money

to

plant in Mississippi

Corporation

a million dollars in retroactive

dating back to July, 1952 and asked:

building a

ARMA

"Now
-

the

when

same Corporation

pay

is

they do not have enough

pay the employees they have now.

I

wonder what

will

happen

next?" 42

A

Bulletin writer

asked

proceeded to answer his
for

41

win

workers

to

Hess

quoted

letter

42 LB, April, 1953,

own

"Is

SMU,

in Springfield?"

question, warning that

the fight: "The

in

Bosch doomed

working

April 15, 1953.

p. 1.
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class

it

would be

may succeed

in

and

difficult

postponing
turn,

breakdown; they cannot avert

its final

whatever remedy they resort

contradictions that

gnaw

to,

they cannot overcome the

ceaselessly at the workers'

concluded, "The moving to Mississippi
plan

schemes

to

whichever way they

it

is

fatal

He

vitals...."

one of the desperate

which the stockholders have turned

to increase their

dividends. "43
In fact, the
1954,

IUE did organize

the Mississippi factory by the late

fall

but this did not stop the expansion of
the plant later in the year and

the reallocation of even

more

Springfield

work

to the facility.

provided organizers with information on wages,
language that were used in

workers

work on

in the

new

plant,

a series of

Local 206

and

benefits,

newspaper advertisements aimed

and president Jim Parker went

the organizing drive for several weeks.

to

open

In an

Columbus

Columbus,

Mississippi."

and benefit package

in the forming of a union at the

The

letter

that derived

believes, in

from

good honest,

"We

a strong union.

to

are in

plant in

highlighted the workers' strong

that the contract secured better labor relations because

company

AB

at

letter

distributed to Mississippi Bosch workers, the union
observed

no small way interested

seniority

wage

Local 206 went on

"we

believe,

and the

fair negotiations." 44

^

LB, April, 1953, p. 2.
44 "Dear Friends Letter",
October
Series

19,

1954

in

Local 206 Labor Archives, Correspondence

surprising that this tone would be used toward management when the
union had been accusing them of behavior comparable to what happened at Pearl Harbor
for building a plant in Mississippi. Such thinking shows how labor lacked a strategicFile,

2.

It is

approach to the rapid pace of events swirling around them and how labor felt it needed
appear very reasonable to succeed. In fact relations were anything but excellent. For
example, in a June, 1954 letter to IUE field organizer Emmett Curley, President Parker

to

apologized for not corresponding sooner and explained "We have been going through some
big layoffs...
We now have over 600 people laid off since the middle of April" (Local 206
Archives, Correspondence file).
.
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The Carey
distributed a

As

Plan.

news

part of their organizing campaign

article to Mississippi

workers taken from

IUE
a

speech

made

by President James Carey. "The Southern Story" outlined
the
international's position

on Southern

industrial development.

twisted logic, Carey stated in part: "But there

between an expansion
industrial areas,

from one area

which we

favor,

new

Such

was

it

when

to use

it,

even

orders slacked

if it

meant

new

local in Springfield could

made

for existing

at least stable,

was

built a

work from an

made

but by

company

older plant

This position encapsulates the overall weakness

off.

effectively with the changes

this case,

on

non-

existing production

a corporation only

factory

shifting

of labor's national efforts to understand

Carey in

to take place in

is

had excess work orders

also predicated

implication growing markets. Once a

was going

which

and simply changing

when

plants

a decision

a considerable difference

Carey assumed that

to another."

decisions to build
facilities.

of production; part of

is

Using

underway

do very

this

little

and develop

in the global

strategies to deal

economy. One small

alone, while at the national level

confused statement about production

expansion the center-piece of his union's

effort to fight

runaway shops

in

the electrical industry.

Carey argued as well that corporations stood

on such things

as pensions

and vacation

with high seniority workers.

benefits

if

to

make huge

they closed factories

"We have demonstrated,

for

example, that

by wiping out

a plant of 1,000 people with ten years of service

up an

new

entirely

would be

savings

and

starting

plant where people have no service, General Electric

able to save a million dollars..." Finally, he cited several
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instances of electrical, radio, and
machine industry
the

New

England and Middle Atlantic

states to

runaway shops from

support his arguments .45

Carey also outlined the IUE's five-part
program
factory closings. First, federal tax
abatement
to

make

it

financially beneficial to

combating

and other programs designed

move should be

Taft-Hartley provisions allowing firms to
pay
start-ups.

for

eliminated, including

sub-minimum wages during

Second, workers laid off as a result of a closing
should be given

hiring preference at

new

Third,

facilities.

should be retained by workers

when

all

seniority

and service

they relocate to the

new

credits

plant.

Fourth, severance equal to one week's pay for each
year worked should be

paid to

all

laid off

employees by the company.

Finally,

unemployment

compensation should be increased and benefit periods lengthened
through the establishment of an Employment Security Fund. 46

Labor Falters on Runaways

Carey's program

Workers

in

early 1950s

is

indicative of arguments

Industrial America. Discussing

Brody

employment

states:

"When

it

For the

UAW,

by the mid

in

behavior during the

took up the problem of unstable

in the auto industry, the

deal with the causes, or to protect

UAW

David Brody made

its

UAW had two choices:
members from

1950s, supplemental

Either to

the consequences."

employment

benefits

and

result-based approach prevailed; Carey's five points similarly focus
45 Special Bulletin: The Southern Story, in
Local 206 Labor Archives. In the examples
plants were abandoned in Trenton and Belleville, New Jersey; White Plains, New York;
Bridgeport, Connecticut; Pittsfield, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and

production started

Kentucky; Tyler and Paris, Texas; Rome, Georgia;
Ashville, North Carolina; and Reform, Alabama. The Special Bulletin was also
distributed in Springfield by the Western Massachusetts CIO Council.
46 Special Bulletin.
in Louisville,
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a

primarily on income security .47 There
was no

call for

stepped up

Southern organizing or a discussion of capital
mobility and
prevention. Absent, as well,

competition.

was any

all

possible

of the rise of global

In the early 1960s this limited perspective
resulted in the

union joining with management in
campaign' even as the corporation

expanded

recognition at

its

company-financed 'Buy-America

a

laid off

hundreds of workers and

production base in Europe and South America. Carey's

its

program conceded any

interest at all in developing a

comprehensive

strategy to deal with the structural changes in the
electrical industry. By

looking inward, the program also failed to galvanize the
community in an
effort to

stem job erosion. 48

Brody also

cites a

1960 study in which economist

contended that the choice unions made

income security

is

a policy,

Slichter

be more concerned with

indicative of the general conservatism of the

movement. Such

labor

to

Sumner

Slichter argued,

American

avoided "the necessity of

bargaining over such essential management decisions as production
schedules, capital improvement plans, and plant location and

management

...

its

freedom

labor's position right after

observations

made

in 1945

to

make

World War

David Brody, Workers

in Industrial

II.

had not been

Consider, for example,

UAW leader Walter Reuther
strike. The UAW viewed the strike as:

by an aide

regarding the 1945 General Motors
4^

these decisions". 49 This

left

to

America, p. 194.

48 UE, by comparison, tried to develop
strategies that would address the needs of laid off
workers as well as look at the industry. It called repeatedly for a strategy to organize the
South and end discrimination. UE recognized as early as 1946 that corporations were
beginning to decentralize production and attempted to devise responses to this as shops

became

and decreased in size. They also sought to develop community-labor
coalitions wherever possible to fight plant closings For two examples of this see UEN,
September 14, 1946, p. 7 and District Council No. 2, Unemployment in Massachusetts (Fall,
1949);

scattered

UE

National Office Records, District

49 Slichter, quoted
a discussion of

UE

2, ff

103, University of Pittsburgh.

Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 194 - 195. See chapter 3 for
strategies immediately after World War II as an example of this.
in

185

...

the

first act

of a

new and

significant era in

American

unionism, an era in which labor might
break away from the
bonds of business unionism, to wage an
economic
struggle

planned

and

to

advance the welfare of the community as

to lay the

foundations for

whole,

a

new economic mechanisms

designed to win security without sacrificing liberty .50

In a 1951 Bulletin article at least

some workers

in Local 206

still

believed labor needed more.

In Europe unions have been guaranteed the
right of co-

determination, which implies union participation in
corporate financing, pricing, supply, and all other
functions
of

management. This theory has been covered

Walter Reuther's writings and
to bring

you

a report

on

we hope

in

in

some

some

of

future issues

tremendous advance in union

this

responsibility. 51

In 1953

and early 1954

the Bulletin carried several

about the Mississippi plant. Union

move would
decrease the

lead to higher

demand

issued for union

get into the battle, for

Army

unemployment

for labor

members

better organize

officials

and the

in the Springfield-area

price paid for

win

this one."

it.

A call

one time

to get involved: "This

really

articles

predicted the Mississippi

though the North won the

and

more

Civil

all

was
of

and

also

you must

War, the Union

Politicians

were

criticized:

"Because of the juicy advantages offered by the South for exploitation of

non-union workers by manufacturers, with

some

senators and congressmen from

50 Quoted

in

Brody, Workers

51 LB, February, 1951,
p.

in Industrial

New

little
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no opposition by

England, we're heading for a

America, p. 176.

2.

or

rough

time."

A

growing concern was now becoming

Gone Concern."52

A front-page

the Mississippi plant

Two

a

"Going

-

Going

-

cartoon in the April, 1954 issue depicted

submerged

in

managers, covered with the

mud

mud

with ducks floating around

it.

themselves, were talking and one

said "Well the Labor's Cheaper anyway."

An

editorial

accompanying

the

cartoon warned that the corporation had 47
additional acres on which to
build in Mississippi and questioned

Bosch

feel

reassured that his work

The April

made

to

is

at the

American

not moving, but will stay?" 53

issue also reported a disappointing trip Local 206
officers

Washington, D.C. The Massachusetts Congressional delegation

ignored Parker

's

eliminate provisions in the Taft-Hartley law that

call to

allowed manufacturers bringing
the federal

They

"How can anyone

government

new

industry to a community to petition

for a six-month waiver

on minimum wages laws.

also refused to consider sanctions against the corporation,
including

the curtailment of lucrative defense contracts. 54

The issue

of defense contracts,

through the 1960s,
fight

work

illustrates

how

which arose several more times

the absence of a coherent strategy to

relocations could hurt labor.

to use the contracts as a
later the Springfield

way

to penalize

Westinghouse

For example, while Parker sought

Bosch for moving, just four years

local sought,

and obtained

a pledge

from Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy and Springfield Congressman

Edward Boland
plant to keep

that they

would pursue

employment up

large defense contracts for the

in the city. 55

5 ^ LB, April, 1953. Usage of the phrase "This one time" implies that the union rank
and
file had not been actively engaged in the affairs of the local. There is a sense of urgency
here that workers need to, at the very least, come to the defense of their livelihoods.
53 LB, April, 1954, p. 1.

54 LB, April, 1954, October, November, 1954.
55 SDN, February 28, 1959, p. 1. Kennedy and Boland did not deliver on their promise as
the plant fell to 200 workers in 1970 from 4,000 in 1958 (Joan Reilly, History of
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Finally, Local 206 officers called for
the establishment of a non-

partisan

movement

skilled jobs.
will suffer

to fight

runaway shops and safeguard

'The storekeeper, grocer, milkman and

from

this

move by

no evidence

the challenge to union
effort or that

other businesses

industry out of the area unless something

done and done soon," an union
absolutely

all

Springfield's

editorial

warned. However, there

members ever amounted

workers were willing

case,

to

more than

a rhetorical

to fight to preserve jobs.

may have

that the rank-and-file chose to ignore the situation

At Westinghouse, while rumors circulated that thousands

entirely.

jobs

and

is

that this call, the criticism of political
officials, and

In fact, events at Westinghouse indicate the
opposite

been the

were

to

be

is

lost,

Local 202

members defeated William Lieberman

of
in his

1958 presidential reelection bid. Lieberman had been outspoken in
challenging Westinghouse to declare

pushed

for the Massachusetts

its

AFL-CIO

Westinghouse products. From

local

Springfield plans

to call for a boycott of

newspaper accounts

Lieberman was defeated because many workers believed
the issue

was

alienating the

and successfully

company. After

it

appears

his stridency

his defeat the boycott

on

was not

implemented. 56

Westinghouse Electric Company in Springfield 1915 - 1970: The Demise of a Giant
(unpublished paper, 1986) Pioneer Valley Historical Society Westinghouse Business file.
It was obviously a lot easier for Kennedy and Boland to tell workers they would try to put
more contracts in the city than tell a Fortune 500 corporation that they were going to be cut
off from defense work, especially in the absence of any laws or regulations that tied the
contracts to specific geographic regions. Local 206 tried again in the mid-1980s to get

Congress to curtail contracts to the new plant owner United Technologies. The corporation
had a several hundred million dollar defense order backlog and was in the process of
closing the Springfield plant ostensibly because there was a lack of work for the facility.
56 SDN, February 28, 1959,

p.

1.
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Conclusio n:

A Weak

Economy Getting

By May, 1954 Bosch union leaders conceded

Wnr^

was

there

could be done to stop the relocation of work to
Mississippi.
titled

"Reward

for Faithful Service"

accompanied

worker being kicked out the door of the

More

lay-offs

There are

affected directly
will be affected

will be

hard

and

a cartoon

It

editorial

showing

a

read in part:

when the moving starts rolling
many employees who will be

indirectly.

by these

lay-offs

Some

for

some

do anything

of these

employees that

have been with the company

to twenty-five years,

move from under our
can't

An

that

can be expected

in high speed.

between ten

factory.

little

and some even

of us to stand

noses, and

longer.

by and watch our

what hurts most

to stop this flow of

is

It

living

that

we

work from going out

the door. 57

Weaknesses

in the regional

economy were

difficult to ignore.

Three area plant closings are symptomatic of the problems workers and
unions faced. In July, 1954 the Springfield Thread Works,
family business closed

its

doors.

the plant over 40 years. In the

announced plans

Of

its

Summer

a 52 year-old

70 employees, ten had worked
of 1958 the H.L.

at

Handy. Co.

to leave the area, laying off 500 workers.

This meat and

provisions firm, founded in Springfield in 1883 by Herbert Handy, was

now

part of Swift and

company's program

Company. Swift

to close

stated the closing

uneconomical

units,

57 LB, May, 1954,

a three generation

p. 4.
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a part of "the

improve others,

consolidate operations where possible into the most

The Fleming Foundry,

was

modern

facilities."

family-owned business

announced

it

was ceasing operations

unemployed. Foundries, the

were

in March, 1959 leaving 50
workers

starting point for

feeling the effects of the declining

much

US machine

of basic industry,
tool industry.

Fleming was also losing work because many
industries were switching

from the purchase of gray iron

castings,

The closing of these three well-established
area, along

sole product, to

its

firms, with

it

materials.

deep roots in the

with several others, might have prompted

concern, but

new

much

public

did not. 58

In 1956 Future Springfield, Inc., a local business
and industry group,

prepared an economic blueprint
there

were 12 manufacturers

for the city.

that

employed over

In just ten years, as a consequence of

number dropped
updated

two

its

to eight;

Its

work

research established that
1,000 people in the city.

relocations

by 1976 there were only

report in 1986 they

of their original twelve

would have been

companies were

manufacturing. 59 Labor's response to threats

still

and

five.

If

closing, the

the

group had

distressed to learn only

engaged

like the

in

one posed by the

Mississippi plant and such manufacturing job loss remained ineffectual in
Springfield and other older Northeast manufacturing cities like

Bridgeport, Connecticut and Trenton,

At the national
and

failed to

global

58

mount even an

economy and

SMU, July

level unions

its

24, 1954, p. 10;

New

Jersey.

remained indifferent

to the

problem

educational campaign about the changing

potential impact

SDN, August

on

jobs

21, 1958, p. 1;

and communities. The

SMU, March

5,

1959, p. 13.

59 Future Springfield, Inc. Report (1956) found in Pioneer Valley Historical Society
Business Collection series. The 12 are American Bosch, Chapman Valve, Gilbert and
Barker, Package Machinery, F.W. Sickles, Springfield Armory, J. Stevens Arms, U.S.
Rubber, Van Norman Machine, Westinghouse, Monsanto Chemical, and Spaulding. Only
the last

two

are

still

in operation.

Forrant, Plant Closings (1987).
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American Federation of Labor strategy focused
mainly on ending
bond subsidies for runaway companies, along
with

investigations

calls for

expanded mainly
1960s, rendering

in

of the Mississippi plant, the

much

of the

AFL

in national

AFL-CIO

Bosch workers resorted

make

were enough

to

ARMA

position meaningless.

and plant expansion decisions were made was more

to

Congressional

Corporation

Europe and South America through the
1950s and

1940s argument that labor needed a place at the
table

company

and

on runaway shops.

With the exception

champion

tax

to

circles.

Without

what they knew

the product better

keep work

when investment

apposite, but

had no

a national labor strategy,

They argued with

and stated repeatedly

in the plant

191

best.

Reuther's late

and make

it

the

that their skills

competitive.

CHAPTER

7

THE UNION AND CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION IT
GRIEVANCES, LABOR CLASSIFICATIONS AND STRIKES

Introduction

Chapter 6 discussed the two most important external events
affecting

United

Union

union

activity in the plant, the acrimonious struggle

Electrical,

between the

Radio and Machine Workers and the International

of Electrical Workers for control of Local 206, and the
corporation's

decision to build a plant in Mississippi. In this chapter three
internal
issues are discussed:

the operation

the job classification
plant,

and the

and uses

of the grievance procedure,

and rating system and how

Fall 1958 solidarity

it

affected workers in the

walk-out in support of the Bosch

engineer's union.

The union had
after the

UE-IUE

a difficult time regaining

split.

momentum

The most notable manifestation was

in the

a failure to

achieve needed quorums for monthly membership meetings.
benefited from this as they sought to
of internal cohesion

made

the issues of job loss,

With workers

in

it

work

make changes

Bosch unionists and others

shop and community-wide program

to

silent as well.
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defend

jobs.

lack

with

and global expansion.
the threat of

outright closure or large layoffs, the Springfield trade union

Labor Councils remained

The

difficult for the local to deal effectively

most large metalworking plants facing

failed to pull together, as

ARMA

in the plant.

relocation to Mississippi,

shop

failed to

The

movement
develop

a

region's Central

The union however, did become

contentious in the shop whenever

from

Then,

lay-off.

leverage

it

had

it

work

increased and

members returned

attempted to use what temporary bargaining

to achieve

wage and

outstanding issues on the shop

benefit

improvements and resolve

floor.

The Grievance ProrpHnrp

Introduction

Workers

in the Bosch, like their counterparts in other
large

manufacturing plants across the country, chafed under the arbitrary
authority of foremen through the 1920s and early 1930s. They
especially

resented management's unilateral right to determine

who

did not.

From

who worked and

the outset, unionists determined to solve this problem

by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms the company would have
to observe.

wage

There

is

reason to believe that

this issue

considerations were to Bosch workers

campaign. 1

A

1940

of Allis-Chalmers

UAW pamphlet, cited by

and the

shop supervisors "were

were accustomed

to

who

UAW,

little tin

was

led the 1936 organizing

Stephen Meyer in his history

supports this view.

gods in

their

as important as

own

Before unionization

departments. They

having orders accepted with no questions asked. They

1

Early union activist Ralph Chicketti's remembrances discussed earlier bear this out.
Lining up for work early each morning and relying on the good will of supervisors to have a
job and be assigned decent work had to rankle particularly the more highly skilled workers
in the plant. The affront contributed to this group playing a leading role in union

organization in the late 1930s. In 1973 the grievance procedure still performed the function
of regulating behavior between a foreman and worker. In one incident a 30-year gage maker

was accused by his supervisor of not working the first half hour of his shift. Upset, he left
the shop and was suspended. At the first step hearing the steward got the suspension
rescinded. At the next step union and management got the worker and supervisor to shake
hands and the issue was resolved (Series III, Local 206 grievance files, UMass Labor
Archives).
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expected workers to enter into servile
competition for their favors." After
unionization, the pamphlet continues,
"The foreman finds the whole

world turned upside down. His small-time
dictatorship has been
overthrown, and he must be adjusted

to a

democratic system of shop

government." 2
Ronald Schatz found much the same
with

UE members

at the East Pittsburgh

operator Art McCollough commented:

goddamned

in interviews

Westinghouse

he conducted

plant.

Machine

"The company had the

thing so unequal you know, that a foreman's
favorite would

be making a hell of a

guy might be doing

lot

more money than somebody

more...

."

Operator William

Winn

bring in farm baskets and get good jobs and privileges

nothing about

it.

What could you

else

-

and

this other

agreed:

"People

and you

can't

do

do?" 3

Bosch Grievance Procedure

In the

first

delineated, but

defined.

Bosch contracts, procedures

what constituted

For example, the

to settle disputes

a contract violation

first line

was not

were

clearly

of the 1941 contract's section

on

the

grievance procedure begins, "in the event of a grievance" and outlines the
procedures. While no early grievances were preserved
the late 1930s

it is

likely that in

and early 1940s the union and company spent considerable

time debating whether an issue the union raised did in fact constitute
grievance. In 1941 a steward system

be resolved

at the

department

2

UAW

3

Ronald Schatz, American

level

was

established

a

and problems were

to

between the worker, foreman, and

1940 pamphlet quoted in Stephen Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin: The Making and
Unmaking of Militant Unionism, 1900 - 1950 (New Brunswick, 1992) p. 109.
Electrical

Workers
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(diss.,

1977) p. 68.

union steward whenever possible.
level, a

If

a dispute

could not be settled

at this

four-person grievance committee would
meet with management

to solve the problem, with the

company paying

the

wages

of

all

in

attendance.

Time
At the

limits

were

also in effect to insure speedy dispute
resolution.

stage the foreman, steward, and grievant
were to meet in the

first

department

to solve the problem. Failing resolution,
the issue

would next

be placed before the personnel department by
the union business agent
within one working day.

A

formal investigation would take place in the

next two days by the grievance committee

if

the business agent and

personnel department could not satisfactorily resolve the
problem. After a

formal hearing, to be held within one week, the company
had an

week

additional

to

answer the complaint.

If

a settlement

was

still

out of

reach, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to a three-member
arbitration board for final resolution.

The union agreed

clause that

its

down,

it

"will not cause or

stay-in,

permit

members

in the arbitration

to take part in

slow-down, or stoppage within the period of

Agreement." Management, in turn, agreed not

to "lock

any

sit-

this

out any

employee." The 1958 walk-out in support of another striking local in the
plant discussed in the next section tested this clause. 4

By

the

end of World War

II

this

relations officials across the country.

system upset corporate labor

Skillful unions, they

argued, used

the vagueness of the system, to gain an unfair advantage for labor
infringe

on

a

company's right

to

Lens pointed out in 1948 that in
procedure to "consolidate

its

manage

fact

base,"
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the enterprise. Historian Sidney

each side used the grievance

and

4 Local 206 Contract, 1941.

and

"to

plan and prepare for bigger

conflicts at the termination of the
contract or

wage reopening

period."

During the war production boom, union
stewards did diminish the
arbitrary

power

of

foremen but

management was determined
Limiting labor's
aspect of

abilities to

in the late 1940s

to take

and

early 1950s

back the power

it

believed

it

had

lost,

use grievance machinery effectively was one

this. 5

An

Historical Overview.

electrical, glass,

and rubber

Milton Derber visited several unionized

factories in 1939

and 1940 and prepared

a series

of case studies under the direction of University of
Wisconsin labor
historian Selig Perlman.

Derber determined that while labor generally

agreed that management had the right
everything possible to

managers, union

allocated.

the

and rank and

production they also did

During interviews with

restrict this right.

officials,

wages

the issue of

to direct

file

workers he found that

after

most important question was how work was

Workers were attempting

arbitrarily give the best piece

work

to eliminate the ability of

jobs to friends, relatives,

foremen

to

and non-

union machine operators. Conflict also ensued over the issue of foremen
operating equipment and performing other work unionists
to

felt

belonged

them. The union and company also argued frequently over the

establishment of a proper role for the union in verifying the fairness of
piece

work

rates.

5 Sidney Lens, "The

Derber indicated that unions were learning

Meaning

how

to

of the Grievance Procedure", Harvard Business Review, Vol.

26 (1948) p. 721. By 1971 the Bosch contract defined a grievance as "a claim by an employee
or the Union, that an action or non-action by the Company violated a specific provision or
provisions of this Agreement." In the late 1970s the
filing

grievances in the contract but failed.

committee was

fearful the plant

was going

It

succeeded

to close.
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company
in

tried to get

1983

when

time limits for

the negotiating

utilize the grievance

procedure to prevent management encroachment
on

early contract gains.

Derber noted, as well, that
"has

become

in the plants

he visited top management

slightly less antagonistic" to labor.

for "exceptions

and not too

When

the union allowed

rigid a system," in turn, "The petty
tyrannies of

minor supervisors have been eliminated and production
that extent increased."6

efficiency has to

Derber's examination of the history of

unionization in the electrical industry revealed that there
was "relatively

wide and peaceful adoption of

two

things:

futile;

First,

collective bargaining."

employers realized that the

fight

stemmed from

This

would be

costly

and

second, the union organizers were extremely skilled and

resourceful. 7
In Springfield, the Westinghouse union

and plant manager had

regularly scheduled meetings to discuss outstanding problems. In
1934 the

company had
to

also established

work on such

what

it

called

shop regulation committees,

issues as plant housekeeping

and maintenance. The

union selected two workers from each department
these committees.

During

this

in the plant to serve

on

period grievances were largely resolved on

the shop floor or in regularly scheduled meetings between the Industrial

Relations director and the union's business agent and president.

According

to Derber, the

and the public

union wanted

to

demonstrate to management

that "a responsible labor organization could

make

constructive contributions to the welfare of the plant," and this

°

Milton Derber, The

an industrial relations

was

the

New Unionism and Collective Bargaining (1940) p. 26. Derber cites
director who commented that his job was "to keep the peace without

selling the plant," p. 46.
7 Derber based his observations

on interviews with managers and union officers at the
Schenectady Works of General Electric, the East Pittsburgh and Springfield Westinghouse
plants, and a Philco and an RCA plant in Philadelphia. Derber most likely talked to
Matthew Campbell while in Springfield.

197

case.*

Westinghouse managers estimated

was

labor

lost to

that 12 percent of productive

waste and defective work

in 1937.

This had dropped to

6.1

percent by 1939. Derber added:

However, even

if its

economic value were

campaign would be worthwhile,
on labor relations. Through the

for

has a notable influence

it

joint

departmental and

inter-departmental committee meetings

workers and supervisory

slight, the 'scraps'

it

has given the

officials a clearer appreciation of

each other's problems and has destroyed many of the bases
of
misunderstanding and antagonism. 9

Stephen Meyer,

UAW,

in his recent

book on Allis-Chalmers and the

examined hundreds of grievances

Meyers notes two important categories
"a significant

for the period 1937

-

1940.

of grievances, those that presented

challenge to the shop floor authority of straw bosses,

foremen, and supervisors," and those that "touched on the complicated

new production

question of

technologies." 10

He found

that 48 percent of

2,500 indexed grievances filed between 1937 and 1940 involved wages, and
that

most of these protested unfair piece

present for

new

studies or

Meyer contends
resisting

from

new

demanded

and requested the union be

access to

management

studies.

that grievance activity "constituted a

technologies and

a sense of "equity

rates

and

new

means

production methods" and sprang

fairness."

The grievances were

contractual vehicle workers had to stave-off speed-up.

also the only

From

operator's perspective, an unfair rate connoted an attempt by
to gain

more

8 Derber,
9 Derber,

p.

93

pieces per hour for the same, or less pay.

-

99.

p. 100.

10 Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin, esp.

p.

111-117.
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for

the machine

management

As automatic

machinery was introduced these

rate grievances also

gave workers an

opportunity to protest both the technology and
the rates on the jobs the

equipment performed. Examples from Bosch grievance

help to

files

make

this clear. 11

Tob Structures and Labor Classifications

The System

By

the late 1940s every Bosch worker

job description that defined

what he

had

a labor grade

or she did in the plant.

with the seniority system that governed layoffs and
regulated the

movement

of workers in

assignment and

The

In

tandem

recalls, these

and out of the

time they significantly limit management's

and detailed

factory.

At the same

flexibility in the areas of

job

staffing.

entire

system evolved during World War

incorporation of the

first

job classification

book

II

with the

in the contract.

Along

with the piece work incentive structure, the seniority-classification system

was

a principal source of friction in the plant until the

locked.

Each worker had

a detailed job description

day the doors were

and labor grade

that

defined their occupation in the plant and encompassed their classification.
In addition, the parties agreed to "establish straight plant-wide seniority"

using these occupations; layoff procedures were also based on them. As
will

be discussed below, unionists refused

to

perform functions they

believed strayed from their classification and argued for a higher rate of

pay

11

if

directly ordered to

Meyer,

do

so.

When ordered,

p. 113.
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a grievance

was

filed,

which

in turn,

important

slowed production

to get the job

guarded what they

at the precise

it

was

assignment done. Workers also zealously

felt to

be the work in their classification and grieved

whenever they believed somebody
union stewards kept an eye out
to

moment when

else

was performing

for instances

perform tasks ordinarily done by

a

worker

where

a

In addition

it.

worker was ordered

who may have been

laid off.

During every contract negotiation period from the late-1960s
through the
1980s

management

tried to rid the plant of this system,

contending that

it

placed severe restraints on their ability to produce cost effectively.

However, union negotiators spurred on by high
their heels in

and defended what they viewed

seniority workers,

as their only

dug

modicum

of

job protection. 12

Each worker had

a detailed job description with a labor grade

occupation code attached to

it.

The lower

higher the base rate payment. There were

workers running from labor grade 4
job description read as follows:
finishes.

-

9.

the labor grade
six

A

and

number, the

grades for production

grinding machine operator's

"Grind to very close tolerances and fine

Finish grind plunger outer diameter, and plunger helix, also

rough, semi-finish and finish grind camshaft lobes. Set up complicated
jobs.

Dress Wheels." This occupation carried with

it

a Job

Grade 4 and

Occupational Code 307A. There were two other descriptions for grinding

machine operators with subtle
occupational codes.
tolerance

12

and

finish"

SMU, December

A Job

distinctions

and

Grade 5 grinder "did

different job grades

repetitive grinding to close

and "performed production

10, 1958;

April

8,

1959; July 29, 1960;
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and

setups", while a Job

March

15, 1962.

Grade
finish"

6 grinder

performed

"repetitive grinding to average
tolerance

and

and did "production setups."^
Turret Lathe operators had three job
descriptions, occupational

codes and job grades. Distinctions centered
on setup responsibilities and
tolerances.

and work

The top operator was required
to close tolerances; the

tolerances;

to

perform complicated setups

middle range, simple setups and close

and the lowest performed no setups

at all

and worked

to

average tolerances. 14
Floor inspectors

moved throughout

quality of parts being produced.

Inspector Class

1,

They had

the factory checking

on the

An

three job descriptions.

Job Grade 4 performed final inspection

work on

complicated and expensive products, needed to exercise a high
degree of
responsibility

Job Grade 5

and required very

little

worked on complicated

supervision.

parts

An

inspector Class

and assemblies, had

to

2,

have

knowledge of blueprints and used minimal judgment. An Inspector Class
3,

Job Grade 6

worked on simple

parts

and assemblies. Traditionally an

inspector in job grade 4 could 'work down' and perform less complicated

work, while the obverse would prompt an immediate

done

to prevent the

by assigning

L

*

their

company from

work

IUE Local 206 Red Book

to Job

Grade

eliminating

protest.

This was

more well-paid

inspectors

6 inspectors. 15

of Job Classifications, p. 20, 21.

14 Red Book
of Job Classifications, p. 20, 21. There were over 150 descriptions and
occupational codes in place by the completion of 1958 contract negotiations.
15 Red Book,
12.
While piece workers had to contend with the rate issue,

inspectors,

p.

stock handlers, set-up men, and other of

what were termed day workers, always had to be
aware of company efforts to assign higher labor grade work to lesser classified people.
Since it was difficult for the company to establish time standards for the work these
individuals performed, the next best thing was to pay as little as possible to get it done.
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The

A ATM

Rating Manual.

Bosch labor grades were established

using a complex job rating system established
by the American Association
of Industrial
that

made

Management (AAIM). AAIM

possible to "determine the differentials between
jobs in terms

it

of their relative requirements,

such
a

differentials."

company

relations

and provides

According to

of "establishing

relationship

utilized a point-based system,

between

jobs,

AAIM

the factual basis for obtaining

such ratings yielded the benefit

and maintaining

which

the equitable

fundamental

is

to

good

to

wage
industrial

and sound wage administration."

AAIM
skill, effort,

attached point values to the application of such things as

and

responsibility, totaled the points,

predetermined point ranges, arrived

at a job

and through

grade for the hundreds of

occupations in the plant. For example, the Job Grade 4 Grinder in the

example above had

a point total in the 294-315 range while the Job

Grinder was in the 272-293 range. In each broad category
there

were

factors

specific factors to

to

initiative,

5

be reviewed

be rated. For example, in the category

were education, experience,

Grade

skill

the

and ingenuity. Finally

within each of the factors there were five degrees of proficiency. Such a

complex and subjective system was bound

to cause

disagreement between

workers and supervisors.

Within the overall system experience could gain the most points,
followed by education and

was needed

to

do

graduated from

a

the job.

initiative.

Thus, a

Points were based solely

drill

press operator

on what

who might have

machinist apprentice program and could interpret

complicated blueprints gained the same points for education as a co-

worker

who had

never finished high school.

based only on what

it

took to become a good
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He
drill

or she received points

press operator. Workers

wore never paid

for

knowledge or

overall ability, but for the precise

functions they were expected to perform.
The system

was

inflexible in this

regard. 16

Here, as with the job descriptions, the finest
of distinctions existed

between the degrees

in a factor being reviewed.

operative words were the

"minimum

Under experience,

length of time

it

would

normal qualified person working under normal
supervision
quality

and quantity performance standards." The

learned the lower the point value attached to

ingenuity

"the

were

take a
to attain

faster a job

Under

could be

initiative

and

independent action, use of judgment, the making of

decisions and the
requires"

it.

the

amount

rated.

The

of resourcefulness
difference

and planning the job

between the top two degrees were

"requires the use of considerable judgment" and "requires the
use of

outstanding judgment".
of mental

and eye

Mental or visual demand evaluated the "degree

and /or visual fatigue sustained through

in

performing job duties.

the application of

mind

"Concentrated" attention and "intense

and exacting" attention made the difference between

the top

two degrees

in this category. 17

AAIM
on

and Quality. The

the issue of quality work.

category in the manual.
loss

which may

maximum

result

system placed almost no emphasis

Quality was mentioned in just the Effort

measured

"the responsibility for preventing

from negligent inspection or

testing.

"

It

carried a

point value of 25, the lowest a factor could receive in the entire

16 Bosch job Rating Manual
17

It

AAIM

Bosch job Rating Manual,

p. 3.
p. 4, 6, 9.
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system. The greater the dollar-value loss
caused by bad work, the high
the points achieved. 18

Each time

a

new machine

was placed

tool

negotiations followed before a labor grade

company had
had

to

prompted

established.

However,

the

the final authority to set the labor grade for
the job and only

provide the union with

management

was

in the factory lengthy

slotted every

the worker

on

its

new

rationale.

Not

surprisingly,

job at the lowest possible level. This

the job to grieve his or her labor grade

and

resulted in several arbitration cases. 19

In

summary,

three features

governing transfers, layoffs and

-

precise job descriptions, labor grades

recalls,

and the

AAIM

rating system

established a formal, rule-bound system regulating worker

-

movement

throughout the plant by the early 1950s. By the mid-1940s a management

team was established
this

to

keep track of the paperwork required

won

system, while the union

elected Seniority

Committee present

their various options.

numbers

the

numbers on

way
their

the right to have a

Workers knew

a returning

dog

at all layoffs to

their labor

World War

II

member

to

document

of their

advise workers on

grade and classification

veteran could recite the

tags.

Economist Richard Edwards argues that

this entire

system was

designed by management to gain bureaucratic control over the factory
floor.

For Edwards, "bureaucratic control

18 Bosch job Rating

Manual

is

embedded

in the social

and

p. 11.

19 Bosch Job Rating Manual,
And Respective Degrees Used

p. 1.
in

The

AAIM

manual was

entitled Definitions of Factors

Rating Production, Maintenance and Service fobs
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.

organizational structure of the firm and
rules,

promotion procedures,

responsibility

and the

and places Charles

discipline,

is

built into job categories,

wage

scales, definitions of

This accurately describes the

like."

work

AAIM

approach,

Perelle's reorganization of the labor
relations

department and his drive

to limit

union involvement in plant

production decisions in the context of events taking
place across U.S.
industry.

Edwards

is

correct

when he

developed unions were drawn
to strike

during the

predictable

wage

life

in to

it,

points out that as the system

giving up such things as the right

of a labor agreement, in return for fairly

modest pensions, and other

increases,

as the Bosch case demonstrates, workers

manipulating the system
to establish authority

on

to

slow

benefits.

However,

were quite capable of

down and

block

management attempts

the factory floor. 20

The Grievance Proce dure and Corporate Consolidation

Under

Perelle

Problems are Not Solved

By the mid-1950s the Bosch grievance system was

in disrepair.

A

1956 Labor Bulletin ran a front page cartoon showing Director of Industrial

Mote seated

Relations James

foreman who was rubbing

The word 'NO'

a

at a table across

from

a

sweating and gagged

magic lantern with 'answers' written on

floated in a cloud above the foreman's head.

side of the table

was

a file cabinet

it.

Off to the

with grievance forms spilling out of the

drawers. In a near-by waste basket lay a copy of the labor agreement.

^u

Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of
Twentieth Century (New York, 1979) p. 132.
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the

Workplace

An

in the

accompanying

article

reminisced about the old-days

when

labor relations

personnel had open and tolerant minds
and negotiated settlements
instead of issuing dictatorial ultimatums.
article

went on,

principles

who

"the

many

pleasant hours spent with

human

treated us as

reserved for those

who

resolution of problems

lead us." The message

on

men

recall," the

of high

beings and received the proper respect

the shop floor,

Foremen were no longer allowed
step.

"We cannot help but

was

clear:

was not taking

to

The timely
place.

answer grievances

in the first

Every issue had to be handled by Mote's labor relations
department.

This meant delay, and often

foremen. The irony here

is

compounded problems
that

for

stewards and

speedy dispute resolution could have

contributed to management's concerted efforts to increase
plant efficiency.

However, by delaying the settlement

of even the simplest problem, the

aggrieved worker often slacked off in quiet, personal protest. 21

What Bothered

Table

Local 206

7.1 is

Members?

based on

a

sampling of two hundred Local 206

grievances filed from the early 1950s through 1968.

How

do the

issues

here compare with Derber's and Meyer's findings? Each studied an earlier
period, but there

deemed

is

a great deal of continuity

significant in the 1930s through the 1950s

Z1 LB, April,
1956, p.

1.

what workers believed

Mote had now been given
to

files

the

and

1960s. 22

nickname 'Mote the Goat'

in

honor of

be his stubborn and mean-spirited personality.

22 The local maintained excellent grievance
these

between issues workers

are well organized in the

by worker and department. Hundreds of
UMass archives and provide a rich source for a more
files

exhaustive study of grievance activity in the plant. In many instances the grievance
committee's notes are attached to the original grievance and in almost all cases the
company's formal written response is attached as well.
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Rate Grievances

given to

and

me

to

7.1:

On

rates,

be extremely low.

equitable;"

Table

.

Bosch workers argued,
I

want

new

a

"Time study eliminated

my

fatigue allowance;"

-

work

Miscellaneous
Seniority in layoffs and recalls

do

work

the

of classification

assigned,

I

am

already overloaded;"

up." In the drill press area of the shop,

"I

fair

cannot

30%
26%
11%
11%
8%
3%

Foremen performing union work

possibly

be

1970.

Job classifications

Working out

find the rate

rate taken that will

Sample of 200 Local 206 grievances 1953
Rates of payment on piece

"I

"I

claim speed-

where the company made

a

concerted effort in the mid-1950s to reorganize production well over 50
percent of
entire

all

grievances filed concerned

new piecework

sample 30 percent of grievances were on

rates

rates.

In the

and improper time

studies.

In early 1960 the issue of fair rates intensified to the point that

union leaders had to caution angry workers not
proliferation of unresolved rate grievances.

to

walk out over the

In a letter to officers

stewards union president Depathy warned "employees

body

walking out in

a

are subject to disciplinary action. Instead, he instructed workers to

place a grievance on "each and every part

and on

all

23 Local 206

number and operation number

set-up time studies." 23

files,

Series

Series 3, grievance

when

if

and

the job rating

files.

III,

grievance

The job

files.

Letter to Officers and Stewards found in

classification issue will be analyzed in the next chapter

and seniority systems are discussed.
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The answer

to

one such grievance demonstrates the
complex nature

of rate complaints as well as

management's

how

was

rate setting

efforts to exert greater

shop

integral to

control.

After a 1959 grievance

hearing Shop Superintendent Charles

McCobb

the study

However we did deem

were

all

found

to

be

correct.

to increase the utilized time factor

which increased

$9.78 per 100 parts produced." This largess

warning
rate

I

am

to the

worker

sure there

is

wrote, "The elements in

the rate

to increase production: "With this

late-1950s, as rate setting

page union

1942

-

memo

from $8.60

to

explicit

change in the

no violation of the contract and operators can

of the grievance procedure to protest
five

advisable

was followed with an

produce much more than they are presently turning

By the

it

in." 24

became more complex workers' use

bad

rates heightened. 25

An

undated

provides an analysis of rate-related problems from

1966 in Department 110 demonstrates

The department

this.

contained lines of large Warner and Swasey chucking machines and
Gridley bar-fed automatic screw machines.

It

had

Acme

the largest concentration

men and

the

most

Workers were responsible

for

keeping three or more of these machines

of skilled set-up

skilled

machine operators in the

plant.

running. The entire department was paid on a group output basis. The
first

the

memo

entry read, "During the

many problems were

war years and

for a period afterwards

kept in the department and resolved by an

aggressive group of old timers, so written grievances were at a

minimum." 26

24 Series III, Box 10 grievance files.
25 Local 206 1941 Labor Agreement,
p. 36. In 1941 the contact read: "The policy regarding
the speed of operations

is

that time studies shall be

made on

the basis of fairness consistent

with quality workmanship, efficiency of operations, and the reasonable working capacity
of

normal operators."

26 Department 110 Grievance History Memo, author

208

unknown

(Local 206

files).

When
was one

Perelle

began

his modernization

of the first to receive

new machine

program Department 110

tools

with simplified

set

up

procedures, automatic part loading attachments,
and increased tool
capacity to boost output. After 1953 grievances
were filed to resolve the
issue of

how many machines

protested whenever the

up men
the

company attempted

in the department,

number

each operator was required
to

Workers

to run.

reduce the number of

set-

and there were continual skirmishes regarding

of floor inspectors assigned to the area.

Such grievances

mitigated against management's position that they
determined staffing
patterns

on

the shop floor.

Workers

in the

department also protested the way they were

compensated when machines broke down during production.

In January,

1954, for example, a 'downtime grievance' resulted in a chart being

by

made

a time study engineer so that a standard formula could be
applied.

March, workers grieved the accuracy of the

chart,

and

in April

it

By

was

discarded and another prepared.

Whenever management introduced production changes workers
argued that

their jobs

changed

as well, necessitating reevaluation

and

possible upgrading. During the 1940s and early 1950s operators in the

department mainly roughed out parts
operations elsewhere.

improvements

in the

By the

to be finished in successive

late 1950s,

department made

to finished dimensions.

engineering and tooling

it

possible to produce parts closer

Management then

milling and grinding machine operators

laid-off large

who had performed

secondary machining operations. To protect

which asserted

that since the "tolerance

increased since these machines were
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numbers

jobs, grievances

of

these

were

filed

and closeness of work has greatly

first installed to

do

just

blank work,"

and "now

a

more

finished product

is

demanded under

conditions far in

excess of capabilities of machines and
personnel; the jobs should be
1

changed

way

to the

they were.

If

not, operators should

have

their job

grades elevated, base pay increased and several
more floor inspectors

added

to the

department

to insure the close tolerances required
off the

machines were being maintained. There

is

no evidence

in the union's

arbitration files that such grievances succeeded. 27

When
signed

it

a

department grievance

like this

and attended the hearing. The work

and production could cease

for hours.

Not

was

would become deserted
group

In the case of Department

especially so, for roughly 80 percent of

the factory started there.

who

area

surprisingly, such

grievances were unnerving for management.
110 this

was written every worker

all

parts

machined

in

These grievances were empowering to workers,

witnessed a mini-shutdown that was perfectly legal under the

collective bargaining agreement. 28

Supervisory personnel performing what was considered union

work generated

large

numbers

of grievances, particularly following layoffs.

These grievances were usually written by stewards
instructed

by union

were written up

for

officers to crack

down on

such things as moving

who most

these practices.

pallets of

likely

were

Foremen

work, carrying a

handful of parts from one work area to another, inspecting parts, carrying
tools

from the

tool crib to a

machine, and adjusting machines. The

27 Department 110 Grievance History Memo. Grievance that involved arguing for
a job
upgrade were seldom successful. In a review of 15 arbitration cases, the union won only one
upgrade.
28 Department 110 Grievance History Memo. It is instructive to compare the scene of
collaboration Derber described in the late 1930s at Westinghouse with this almost constant

what can be arguably viewed as the most important production department in the
Bosch. The company tried repeatedly to change grievance procedure language in order to
limit the number of workers attending a hearing but the union resisted these efforts.

battle in
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company responded

one such grievance hearing: "The arguments
of

after

the union have been reviewed

and considered and

it is

the company's

opinion that the contract was violated by the
supervisor going to the tool
crib to find the correct boring bar."
after the tooling for a set-up

third example,

the

On

another occasion a foreman going

was charged with

company

stated

it

a contract violation.

In a

"does not condone or have any

intention of permitting foremen to secure and
transport gages and
fixtures."29

Like group grievances, these too were empowering.
The steward

and workers who witnessed the
their

own

illegal activity

had

the authority to stop

machines, request a meeting with their boss, and inform him

he was in violation of the labor agreement. Overbearing foremen
ran the
risk of

having production

tied

up

minutes

for several

a

day by

skilled

stewards determined to uphold the contract. During the company drive
for increased productivity

on

spot-light

advantage.

such interruptions were costly and shined

a department's leadership.

Stewards could use

with plant labor relations personnel.
that supervisors

were wrong

license to ridicule foremen.

gain control on the factory

few ways

for the

resist Perelle's

29 Series

III,

this to their

In addition, foremen suffered personal embarrassment

issue proceeded through the grievance procedure

union

for

the

company put

This also undermined
floor.

a hearing

if

the

was held

in writing

performing union tasks, workers had

management

efforts to

These grievances remained one of the

to exhibit a

speed-up campaign.

Box 12 grievance

When

and

a

files.
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modicum

of

power and

control,

and

Tob Ratinp
classifications

ones (Table

ordered to

and

Classification GriPvanrpg

were the second most common

7.1).

Set-up

men

Grievances on job

filed in the plant after rate

continually filed this type of grievance

move completed work from one department

complaining that they were not stock chasers.
Set-up
strongly against instructions to run production

completed and the job was ready

Machine department
to

move

parts

filed

to run.

to another,

men

work once

Workers

in the

when

also reacted
a set

up was

Chucking

numerous grievances regarding requirements

and inspect finished work. Like Department

110, the

majority of workers had high seniority and the machines
in the area were

some

of the

most

difficult to

maintain in the factory. Management

continually tried to force operators to run more machines or
perform

more

of the support tasks

including,

needed

to

moving work, inspecting

keep the department running,
parts, oiling machines,

and doing

simple set-ups and tool changes. Since none of these tasks were contained
in their formal job descriptions,

workers resisted what they believed were

management encroachments on

their jobs.

The company response

such grievance: "At times operators will have

to relocate parts

to

one

from one

area to another within the department or walk a greater distance than

usual to get parts to load into the machine," captures the essence of
issue. 30

A

second answer makes

flexibility in

making these types

it

clear that the

company sought some

of assignments, while the union

unwilling to accede to this easily. Set-up

men were

being forced to clean machines, claiming

it

30 Series

Box

grievance

Two

was

a

this

was

upset that they were

maintenance department

department , Vincent Motyl
and Donald Staples, filed numerous grievances on theses. Each became a union stewards
and eventually were elected to more responsible positions in the union during the 1960s and
1970s. But they made their reputations as strong unionists in these departmental
III,

12, ff 125,

files.

skirmishes.
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workers

in the

The company denied the grievance and
informed the union
"during peak loads, to meet production
demands,
task.

we may need

this to set-up

Union

When

shop

that

to assign

men." 31
leaders viewed these classification
violations as a jobs issue.

floor reorganization plans

were introduced large numbers of

stock handlers, packers, and other
non-machine personnel were laid

The company then attempted

to get this

reassigning operators to these tasks.
union's position clear on such a
classification

for efficiency

on day work

jobs

A

tactic:

must be

and productivity's

off.

work done by temporarily

brief

newspaper

article

made

the

"Operators working out of
halted.

Let's hire the

needed help

sake." 32

Issues of job classifications, descriptions, and the
assignment of

work became so nettlesome

that quite often special contractual side-

agreements were negotiated

to resolve

union and company signed

a

document

harmonious relationship among
Grade 4 millwrights,

painters,

them. For example, in 1954 the
to

"promote and maintain a

the skilled maintenance workers."

and masons were

reclassified to Job

with a seven cents an hour increase, as a result of
their

being ordered to

move machines around

Job

Grade 3

a grievance filed against

the shop.

In return for the

upgrade, the union agreed to language that stipulated "maintenance work
often arises in large quantities, particularly during the

department. In the interest of

efficient

movement

maintenance operations,

of a

it is

necessary at times to have maintenance workers perform other types of

work than

31 Series

their classification imply."

Box

The union saw this as a jobs issue and in one
newspaper article wrote "Operators working out of classification on day work jobs halted.
Let's hire the needed help for efficiency and productivity's sake.
III,

12, ff 126,

32 LB, October, 1959,

grievance

files.

p. 3.
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Grieving skilled tradesmen

some

may have been

attempting to maintain

vestiges of craft distinction in job
assignments.

agreement ended

this

when

notion

the union

and company agreed

consideration of this upgrading of these
classifications

maintenance workers

shall

But the side-

it is

"In

agreed that

perform such maintenance work as may be

assigned to them by their Supervisors without
detailed regard for job
descriptions or job content." 33

Conclusion

Frequently the union utilized the grievance procedure
and the job
classification

system

company, correct
reorganization.
rates set

to gain a

inequities,

The

filing of

measure of respect and recognition from the

and slow down management's shop-floor
group grievances, the determination

which included proper allowances

to

have

to insure a fair day's pay, the

vigorous efforts to limit supervision's encroachments on union work,
the
attempt to protect laid off workers' jobs by grieving
out of classification, are very

much

when ordered

to

work

connected to the notion of working

people's self-worth and honor that labor historian David Brody writes
about.

The issue of

fairness

was

integral, as

was

the attempt to achieve a

degree of job security in a factory with wild employment swings. While
the union

fell

eerily silent

when

it

came

to publicly protesting

mass

layoffs

33 1954 Supplemental Agreement found in
Maintenance Department grievance files. This
agreement actually supplemented an earlier one in 1953 which could not be found. By the
late 1970s there were over 20 side-agreements like this one resolving classification issues,
including a six page document titled "Split Class Agreement" which broke 30 occupations

even more distinct categories and included lay-off and recall to work language. One
occupation. Experimental Machinist, now had 12 categories, while another, automatic
screw machine operator, had seven.
into
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and the possible closing of
in the plant.

They were

the plant, workers did stand-up for
themselves

also willing to support other
unionists

when

the

occasion warranted, even at considerable
risk to the jobs they were

attempting to protect. 34

1958 Wildcat Strikp

Background

During 1957 contract negotiations while small gains were
made
the pension

and insurance

cost of living clause.

in

plans, Local 206 failed to gain a highly sought

The company granted

a small raise

and both

sides

agreed to hold wage reopener talks in August, 1958. Union negotiators

gambled

that the business climate

would have

would improve

During the

better results.

in a year

and

that they

half of 1958 the plant received

first

orders to build test equipment for the government's B-52 bomber

program. With slight employment gains workers believed they were
the best bargaining position they
negotiators'

gamble appeared

to

The union argued hourly
average.

A

had been

pay

off.

rates

for several years.

were nine cents below the
that

we

want

don't

to

want

Lichtenstein and Harris, eds.,
(

New

35

1957, p. 14;

to these

"However

each year, and

"Workplace Contractualism," in
Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise
this subject see

York, 1993).

SMU, August 31,

"The

a strike," a press release read.

go through negotiations similar

34 For Brody's recent thoughts on

local

Bosch average hourly pay

of $2.66 exceeded ten similar firms in the region by 19 cents.

naturally doesn't

The

But no agreement was reached. 35

company spokesman countered

company

in

September

6,

215

1957, p.

1.

we're not going

The company added

to."

dollars over the past six years to

that

it

improve plant

had spent

efficiency

six million

and meet

the

challenges of foreign competition and that
the increase the union sought

would

cancel the investment. 36
All finished

and nearly finished products were moved

warehouses in anticipation of
in early

a strike.

The move seemed reasonable

August the membership had given

the authority to call a strike.

But

to

their negotiating

when newly

since

committee

elected Local 206 president

Ernest Depathy remarked that the membership
was divided over the
strike vote,

company
broke

remarks were reported in the

his

negotiators realized the union

off,

contract

and

-

but unlike the 1955 negotiations

no work'

in a

when

weak

a

position.

Talks

the union took a 'no

position, production continued.

agreement was reached on

union

was

newspapers,

local

After a few

more days

seven cent an hour increase. However, the

failed to gain cost of living protection; the

company's aggressive

negotiating stance seemed successful. 37

The Walkout Takes Shapp

After such disastrous negotiations union leaders

show
on

of internal unity

the

morning

SMU, August

in order.

of October 10

striking Engineering

Jb

was

When

reporters that warehouses

L

picket lines

were

set

felt a

up

early

by the 175 members of the company's

and Architectural Local

14, 1958, p.

may have

112,

Local 206 had the

Leslie Neville, director of public relations, told

were stocked with products and

that the

newspaper

company was ready

for

a long strike.

37 SDN, August 14, 19, 1958. The 1955 two-day strike was the first in since the
plant was
unionized in 1936 and broke what the Springfield Union called an "astounding record of
tranquillity"

(SMU, September

2,

1955).
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opportunity

was looking

it

1,300 Local 206

members,

management, refused

for:

in a

Machines

show

fell silent

of solidarity

to cross picket lines set

206 business agent Jim Manning explained:
a strike

for several

and defiance

up by

days as

to

the engineers.

"We cannot promote

Local
or assist

without being in violation of our contract with
the company." He

added, "We cannot, however, control the actions
of individuals in our
local."

The Daily News carried

a front

and Local 206 members blocking the

page photograph of striking workers
front gates of the plant while

hundreds of other union members could be seen
from the
days,

plant.

was

factory.

The

hill,

sitting

where workers congregated

directly across the street

from

all

on

a hill across

for several

more

the corporate offices in the

Seeing hundreds of union members perched on the

morning angered management and represented

hill

every

a challenge to their efforts

to gain greater control in the plant. 38

The pace
away.

Company

violation of
to the

of events quickened

its

homes

officials notified

contract.

local press that "I've told

work but they say they

M SMU, October

Manning

that the

of the 1958 stay-

union was in

Personnel manager James Mote also sent

of every Local 206

participating in an illegal

on the second day

member informing them

they were

work stoppage. Manning once again

my

don't

people the plant

want

to

is

letters

told the

open and they can go

to

be called scabs." 39

The Union reported

on the

day of the walk-out
workers refused to enter the plant lobby to receive their paychecks. The October 10 Daily
News carried a front page photograph of striking workers and Local 206 members blocking
the front gates of the plant while hundreds of other union members could be seen sitting on a
hill across from the plant. The hill, which workers congregated on several more days, was
visible from the various corporate offices in the factory.
39

SDN ,October

10, 1958, p.l.

11, 1958.
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that

first

Talks broke off between Local 112 and Bosch
negotiators with
neither side willing to

sought a

3.5 percent hike

federal mediator

the

move from

was

called

and raced

not want to

local

went on

an

October 9th as

strike

of labor relations,

effort to

end

settle the

3.1 percent.

A

the corporation's problems,

W. Gerard

their

Tuttle,

the Engineers,

that strike as quickly as

of the engineers' local charged that the

resolve of Local 206.
officials

The union

proposal.

where he had been negotiating with

to Mississippi in

The head

possible.

To compound

in.

ARMA's head

hastily left Springfield,

wage

while the company was proposing

Columbus, Mississippi IUE

contract expired.

its last

company did

dispute and was more interested in testing the
that

If

was

the company's intention, corporate

underestimated the depth of anti-company

feeling.

Picket lines

held firm over the weekend, blocking trucks from moving work
out or
materials into the plant.

now informed
By
to the

Tuttle remained in Mississippi,

Local 112 that there would be no talks until his return.40

the fifth

day of the stoppage Local 206 members started

walkout as the "49-cent

weekly pay

differential

The company sent

a

hill

Forty-nine cents represented the

letter to

and return

to

Local 206

work, but

members urging them

to

no

avail.

Workers

to

still

across from the factory each morning, and the shop floor

remained dark and
effort to

strike".

referring

between the company and union wage proposals.

second

cross the picket lines

occupied the

and the company

silent.

Tuttle

was

called back

break the negotiating stalemate. In his

from Mississippi

first

in

an

action he refused

Local 112's request to send the dispute to binding arbitration and return to

work.

40
206

SMU, October
members

finally

the plant's cafeteria,

SDN, October

SDN, October 13, 1958, p. 24. Local
received there pay when the company agreed to distribute checks in
located across the street from the main production facility.

11, 1958;

11, 1958, p. 1;
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Nine days
Local 112 picket

end
it

to the

worth

into the strike not

For a third time management sent
a

lines.

walkout.

It

money, what

is it

letter

urging an

read in part "Next Friday you will
receive no pay

for the small

it

one Local 206 member had crossed
the

amount

that divides Local 112

and us?

If it is

then? There must be a great principle
involved."

- is

not

It

concluded:

After lengthy negotiations your union gained
for you
increases averaging approximately seven
cents an hour,
which is $2.80 a week. Do you realize that you have
already
lost

43 weeks of your recent increase by your six days absence

from work? You
Since union

will

never make up the pay you are losing."

members were unhappy with

settlement this reminder

may have

The Local 112 contract was
agreed to the company's

settled

3.1 percent

pay

their

August wage

stiffened their resolve. 41

on October 20 when engineers
increase.

Local 206

members

returned to work after suffering wage losses that averaged
$121 per

worker. They maintained a strong sense of labor solidarity throughout,
risking their jobs to support other unionists as well as letting

know how
walkout

why

they

felt

about events in the plant.

a perceptive

Local 206

news

reporter

members stayed

contrast in business conditions
the strike idled 3,500.

On

the

may have come

off the job

when he

was provided by

first

management

day of the

closest to explaining

wrote:

"A vivid

today's walkout. In 1955,

Today, no more than 1,300 were involved." 42

SDN, October 18, 1858, p. 1. Four hundred workers filed unemployment claims during the
second week of the walkout. The company informed the local newspapers that it would
fight every claim. There is no evidence that management every filed unfair labor practice
charges against the union or sought injunctive relief from the courts during the entire
dispute. There is also no evidence of any attempts to pressure the city to provide a large

enough
42

police presence to escort

SMU, October

10, 1958, p.

any willing workers

1.

219

into the plant.

In an effort to capitalize

expiration

if its

contract

of living language.

on unity

in the plant Local 206 struck at
the

on August 14,1959 hoping once again

to gain cost

But the economy did not help the union
cause:

Massachusetts unemployment was high as the
country struggled through
the 1959 recession.

The

U.S.

Department of Labor determined

that

Massachusetts had seven of the 33 labor markets in
the country with

unemployment

rates exceeding six percent.

Springfield

With employment so unpredictable, workers wondered

made

if

of them.

a lengthy strike

sense. 43

However,

it

appears the company looked forward to the

opportunity to reassert

Company

earlier.

its

control after the nine-day illegal walkout a year

negotiators gave their counterparts a

two hours before contract
settle

was one

shape for

a

detail.

Bosch spokesperson

informed the media that "The company

good

in

is

long strike and has a warehouse stocked with products." The

company now demanded
more wage

just

expiration, forcing the union to strike or quickly

without time to review the proposal in

Lesile Neville also

wage proposal

a three-year labor

agreement in order

stability in the face of increased foreign

competition.

When

money

would not be discussed

issues

management

and domestic

the strike began union negotiators were

a three-year contract.

To increase

to gain

warned

that

unless they were willing to consider

the pressure further

sent a letter to workers on August 21.

It

on

negotiators,

stated that Bosch

faced a serious challenge from foreign companies and that only a small

wage

increase

was

possible in order to keep the price of

pumps

competitive.

43

SMU, August

17, 1959, p. 3.

A

Federal Reserve Bank study released

in

August noted

post-war recessions employment declined more on a percentage basis
England than in the rest of the country (SMU, August 18, 1959) p. 1
in all three
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in

that

New

After 13 days a settlement
the three-year agreement

sought.

it

the cost of living protection

it

rate before

company gaining

the union failed to gain

them

to grieve

new

get

improved

rates in the plant

when

Previously an operator had to run a job and
try out the

set.

new

could be protested. This was hailed as a
"protection against

it

automation."

company's

Once again

the

demanded. The union did

contract language that allowed

they were

was reached, with

But problems with the grievance procedure,
especially the

failure to abide

contract clause difficult.

by time

limits,

The rank-and-file

made
also

utilization of this

found

it

new

difficult to

become

too excited about the clause after losing 13 days
pay on the heels of the 9

days

lost in the

1958 walkout. 44

At the union
people on and

we

ratification

Just ten

weeks

He added, "When

beat them".

corner you have to fight.
later

I

meeting Manning stated, "We took these
they back us into a

don't believe you'll ever have to fight again."

Manning was soundly defeated

in the race for business

agent by Ralph Chicketti, ending his almost fifteen years as an office

holder in the

local.

Chicketti

was

and had worked with Manning

a founding

to defeat the

member
United

of the local in 1936

Electrical

1949 and 1950. Manning received just 220 votes out of 823

and

file

did not share his views on the outcome of the

Workers

cast.

strike, or

in

The rank
support

his role as their chief negotiator 45

44

SMU,

August,

14, 15, 17, 21, 26, 29, 1959.

45 Local 206 election results, Series

Box 3, ff. 34 - 36, UMass Labor Archives. Total votes
cast in the shop elections of 1955, 1957, and 1959 are indicative of the problems unionists
faced in the factory. Vote totals dropped steadily, from 1,642 in 1955 to 1,320 in 1957, and
finally

833 in 1959. This

is

1,

almost a 50 percent decline.
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Conclusion

During the decade of the 1950s the labor force
dropped an
astonishing 70 percent, to under 750 from
a post-World
2,500 in 1955.

Over the same period corporate

equally erratic.

dropped back

to slightly

new product development

failed.

in 1957, but to the

of stockholders,

dismay

Profits

were

New

-

in

1959 recession and

surged to a high of $5.1 million

plunged

sales of $125 million as the corporation reached

lows on the

profits

high of

under $120 million

Bosch and other divisions were hurt by the 1958

1958.

II

For example, sales jumped to $134.3 million in
1957 from

$73.8 million in 1955, then

on

and

sales

War

York Stock Exchange. Neither

to $1 million in 1960
its

nadir, hitting record

Perelle's strategies to

boost productivity, or his global expansion efforts achieved the
desired
financial results.

Meanwhile Local 206 remained excluded from
the future of the plant.

Union leaders

utmost care in manufacture of parts or

still

all

discussions about

urged workers

in assembly.

to:

"Exercise

Take pride in your

craftsmanship." In an April, 1960 Bulletin article titled "Our Jobs"
unionists were told "The business

secure

it

by

quality, fair pricing,

same people

that led Bosch

is

there,

won't come to us,

it

and dependability.

on top once,

the

It

floor problems.

the corporation

When

this

membership of Local

was written

had commissioned

to

can be done with the

But management never looked to the union for help to solve

shop

we have

unionists

206."

difficult

had no idea

that

a study to determine the viability of

the Springfield plant. 46

46 Both quotations from LB, April, 1960,
p. 1. For example, in April, October and November
1959 and again in February, 1960 Local 206 called on management to form a joint automation
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In 1960 stockholders watched in
disbelief as

German

competitor

Robert Bosch wrested 70 percent of Springfield's
fuel injection business.

However, Defense Department orders associated
with
activity in Viet

dollars of

new

Nam

arrived in Springfield.

contracts

and hundreds of

escalating military

This resulted in millions of

recalls

and new

hires

by the

mid-1960s. The orders masked two underlying
problems in Springfield:

Demand

commercial automotive,

for

agricultural,

and truck products

remained weak; and foreign competitors continued
at the

to gain

market share

expense of the plant.

With the plant study completed,

would be

better to

spend more money

product development in an
shift all the

Perelle decided in late 1960
in Springfield

effort to revive the facility,

work elsewhere. The union, no longer

solving factory floor problems as

securing the best

wage and

on machine

it

had been

it

tools

and

than to attempt to

as interested in

in the early 1950s, turned to

benefit packages possible.

By 1960, the

plant's

job roller coaster resulted in there being a core of high seniority workers

along with large numbers with less than five years in the factory.

These

high seniority workers were concerned about pension improvements,

more vacation

time,

and job

security.

compromise regarding such things

They were unwilling

as labor classifications

believing contract language protected their employment.

to

and

seniority,

Unlike former

business agent Manning's earlier contention that workers in the plant

would never have

to fight again, these unionists

committee. The committee
together

we

is

the "sane

and

conducted three

intelligent course,"

and

can deal better with the issue," LB, December, 1959,
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p.

it

1.

will benefit everyone,

defensive strikes between 1960 and 1971
to hold onto rights and benefits

they believed the corporation was trying
to take away.
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CHAPTER

8

EXPANSION ABROAD, SPRINGFIELD INVESTMENTS
AND LABOR DISQUIET: 1960 1971
-

Introduction

In a 1993 collection of essays

on

the impact of corporate strategies

on

workers and communities, editor Bruce Nissen describes what he
and
several other historians of post-World

The Accord sprang from

Accord'.

War

II

the United

labor history call the 'Social

Auto Workers'

contracts in

the early 1950s, especially the 1950 agreement with General Motors
(GM).

The five-year contract established
productivity and
the

life

wage

of the contract,

the early 1950s

UAW

direct links

between increased

increases, established an annual

and boosted pension and other

wage

increase over

fringe benefits.

By

agreements contained supplemental unemployment

benefit protections that guaranteed workers several

weeks of wage support

above

1

their

normal unemployment compensation.

The 1950 contract gave
relations with the

in

wage

UAW,

GM a needed degree of stability in their

particularly in the area of labor costs.

increases over a five year period

By locking

GM gamed a tremendous

advantage over Ford, Crysler, and other automotive companies struggling
to control labor costs

and unit

prices.

GM also gained control over

managerial decisions regarding plant location and construction,
technology acquisition and utilization, and product pricing. These were
the issues

UAW

president Walter Reuther raised in the union's

For a discussion of the Accord see Nelson Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and Shop-Floor
Conflict: 1946 - 1970," Industrial Relations, 54 (Fall, 1985) p. 360 - 381.
1
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acrimonious 113- day strike in 1946. The union,
in return, gained annual

pay increases and

membership

who

a

modified union shop that provided

According

stability.

to labor historian

has researched and written extensively on the

after the strike tied its fate

more

a

modicum

of

Nelson Lichtenstein,

UAW,

the union soon

closely to that of the industry

and

increasingly subordinated the endemic shop-floor
struggle over working

conditions and production standards to the

program.

Reutherism moved, according

for structural

change in the auto industry

supplemental benefits

for

UAW's

national bargaining

to Lichtenstein,
to negotiating

from

a

demand

wage and

autoworkers while leaving power relationships

in the industry unchallenged. 2

Much

of post

Accord parameters.

-

World War

It is

II

labor history

is

framed by these

generally accepted that industrial unions, for

better or worse, operated within boundaries circumscribed
-

UAW

labor agreement.

Whether

cajoled, forced, or willing partners,

unions gave assurance to management that they had the right
business.

GM

by the 1950

This included a free hand to

make

technology, and plant location decisions.

to

capital investments,

From

there,

run

their

new

workplace

contractualism took over and unions focused their energies, to the
exclusion of almost
for their

all else,

membership

on

getting the best financial packages possible

at contract time.

UAW agreed not to strike over the
of the five-year
This provided GM with the ability to better determine labor

In 1950 the
contract.

life

2 Frederick Harbison,

"The General Motors - United Auto Workers Agreement of 1950,"
journal of Political Economy, 58 (February, 1950) p. 397 - 411.
called the agreement
"unprecedented in labor-management relations" and noted that now "all concerned can face
the future with added confidence," Harbison, p. 399. Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and
Shop-Floor Conflict," p. 362 - 363. The result was dramatically improved pensions,
supplemental unemployment benefits, cost of living and productivity wage improvements.

GM
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costs as well as set production schedules
with

Soon one-year agreements, which had been
were

a thing of the past.

In return,

labors concerns by insuring steady

little

the

tear of a labor Stoppage.

norm

in all basic industry,

corporations ostensibly acceded to

wage and

benefit gains, speedy dispute

resolution through the grievance and arbitration
procedure, and a

semblance of job

security.

But did the Accord have the deep roots attributed
like Local 206, that

Did unions,

to it?

were not involved with national pattern bargaining,

gain the wage, benefit, and job security guarantees
attributed to the

Accord?

If

the Bosch case

the discussion,

is

typical, the

should not close

it

it

off.

answer

is

no.

The Accord frames

Also as Mike Davis points out, the

Accord was contingent upon the continued success of American
capitalism.

He

writes,

"...

any slowing of mass consumption, import

penetration of the domestic market, deregulation or decline

in

defense

spending would directly undermine and destabilize bargaining structures

and progressive wage agreements." 1

Local 206 and the 'Treaty of Detroit

As

shows

1

the previous chapters demonstrate, the Bosch plant's history

the danger of writing post-World

War

II

labor history primarily

through the prism of the United Auto Workers and the Accord.
Springfield events, from the

On

UL-IUL

split, to

the Mississippi decision, to

Accord see "A Post-World War II 'Social Accord," in Nisscn, cel., U.S. Labor
1989: Accommodation anil Conflict (New York, L990) p. 173
Relations, 1945
208.
For a
critical examination of the impact of corporate strategies on workers, unions, and
communities see Nisscn and Craypo, eds., Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate
Strategies on Workers, Unions, anil Communities (New York, 1993). Mike Davis, Prisoners
of the American Dream: Politics ami V.conomy in the History oj the US Working Class
*

the

-

(New

York, L986)

p.

1

18.
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the creative uses of the grievance procedure,

stoppage, are

rich,

complex, and

and the 1958

difficult to force into

Certainly, lor a period after the war, a measure of
job security

were offered

production corporations

market

to

workers employed

like

such

solidarity
a

paradigm.

wage improvement and

in large,

General Motors and U.S.

mass

oligopolistic

Steel.

Above many

forces, they could raise prices, pass along part of this
gain to

workers, and
lived for

still

satisfy their shareholders.

But this advantage

was

short-

most companies, and the so-called Accord eluded most

Springfield metalworkers. 4

Job security was non-existent. The plant's wild employment swings

have already been discussed. Worker anger on
in

I960

when

from 1,400

work

in

layoffs

and the 1958

brain-boys upstairs.

employment?" 5 Unlike

1970s.

How

we

down

The

local also

two

of Bosch's

are supposed to possess
a

lew of these experts

can have an even flow of

and

sisters in auto, Local

206 failed

a cost-of-living clause until late in the

This became a precipitating factor
1970s.

builders,

about getting

their brothers

income protection through

and early

to close to 600,

1959 recession's ^(\cci on

"We

In 1960 unionists asked:

together to formulate a plan so that

to gain

-

equipment producers and truck

largest markets.
real

fell

simmered over

mid- 1958. These deep cuts were caused by the relocation of

to the Mississippi plant

agricultural

some

mounted and membership

this issue

in three strikes in the late 1960s

never gained pay increases

tied directly to

productivity gains.

4

SiH" Filippdli,

Labor Relation*,

"The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations,"
p.

137

5 ill April, 1%0, p.

-

172.

3.
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in

Nisson, U.S.

Two

failed research

and development

efforts in the late 1950s,

growing foreign competition, and the relocation

meant

a

the upswing.

walk-out would hurt

way

to try to control

Consequently, management had
their

do everything possible

than

six

to

company

its

concern that

hold

down

a

negotiators maintained they had to

product costs or run the risk of losing

after the strike the plant

almost 70 percent of

little

expense of the workforce. During

at the

market share. These were not

months

chief rival,

to Mississippi

customers and used labor negotiations as

product costs

the 1959 strike, for example,

significant

work

union bargainers rarely negotiated with
employment and

that

work on

of

idle negotiating threats:

went on

week

a four-day

diesel fuel injection business

Less
after

was captured by

Germany-based Robert Bosch. However, during

this

its

same

period of time workers were in fact arguing that they should be allowed
participate in

shop

be utilized to more

As has been

seen,

floor reorganization efforts so that their expertise could
efficiently

make products and hold down

management turned

The grievance procedure

Long delays

to

a deaf ear to these overtures. 6

failed to adjudicate

in resolving disputes

caused tensions

problems as intended.

to build in the plant

on more than one occasion workers were warned by union
walk-out of the shop in protest.

final costs.

As shown

in chapter six,

officials

and

not to

workers

resorted to creative utilization of the grievance procedure to stage mini-

slowdowns when they believed

rates or

working conditions were

unsatisfactory and to confront particularly onerous foremen.

By the

late

1960s the dispute resolution aspect of the grievance procedure had
collapsed and the union argued "that use of the arbitration process

value because there are so

6

SMI, July

many

violations

19, I960, p. 9.
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it

would be too

costly

is

of

no

and time

consuming, and furthermore, the company
would not honor the
awards." 7

The union now methodically used

the grievance procedure to

thwart company reorganization efforts and
slow

down

production. For

example, in 1966 management decided to
monitor workers performing
set-ups with movie cameras so rates could then
be established

on

pieceworkers whenever they changed machines over
from one job
another.
this

was

to

Workers who exclusively did set-ups protested, concerned
a step

toward establishing set-up

up work was notoriously

difficult to

rates

time as in

that

throughout the plant. Set

many

cases

it

required a

series of fine adjustments to bring tools into
their proper settings to

achieve required production tolerances.
productivity,

how many

management wanted

Interested in increased

desperately to be able to determine

set-ups could be expected in a day in order to plan production

scheduling with greater accuracy. Since the contract required that

pieceworkers were taken off of incentive rates and paid

their

average

hourly rate of pay for time spent on set-ups, Stephen Jaross, the union
business agent, informed the

company

that the attempt to gather this

information was a contract violation.

A

union

On May

memorandum summarizes what

transpired next.

27 the company approached an operator to

taking studies, a pre-set arrangement

made with

start

the Business

Agent and the steward

to

have

on union business and

to

meet with the business agent

discuss the situation took place.

was aware

that as each operator

7 Local 206 files, Series

III,

Box

25.

this

At

was

Comments were

Relations Board charge.
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operator called off the job

this point the

to

to

company

be studied, the same

contained

in a

National Labor

procedure would be followed by the Union, and
as
everything being done followed a pattern,
the

company

stopped

all

further taking of studies. 8

The company never attempted

Can

labor historians

men who

workers winning

would argue?

as Nelson I.ichtenstein

to

as

and desperate

a defensive

set-up

on set-ups again.

the union's application of the grievance
procedure to block

management be viewed
some

to establish rates

Or

effort to hold

a

is

this

on

to

degree of job-control as

more accurately assessed

some

as

vestiges of self-respect

and others contend? The machine operators and

took collective action, and staved off the company's effort

gain more control over the work day surely saw the victory
as positive,

as did other workers, well

From
history

is

aware of what was

the Bosch case study,

richer

staked

appears post-World

and more contentious

labor historians have contended.

and

it

at

at

the

shop

War

II

labor

floor level than

some

Lacking forward-thinking theoretical

strategic leadership at the national level

on issues

like

runaway

shops, corporate investment strategies, in-plant production problems,
local leaders

were

where much

of the

left to

their

work was

own
still

skilled

unregulated by automated assembly

and pride

^

i

Local 206

in

September 36/

lines

workmanship remained

If tirr to /(//.'

Legal Department,

1966, Local 206 archives,

In plants like the

devices.

Bosch

-

and semi-skilled and
-

vestiges of craft identification

strong.

Workers believed they

(Stephen Jaross

to

Correspondence Series

Attorney Mel Warshaw)
it,

box

5.

l

Stephen Jaross to Attorney Mel Warshaw,
September 36, 1966, Local 2i)o archives, Correspondence Series H, box 5. For discussion see
Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and Shop-Floor Conflict."
'

Local 200 letter to

III!',

Legal Department,

.1
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could make the plant run smoothly and
asked to have their

knowledge

utilized.

Murray and

the

councils they

USW

While Walter Reuther and the
shifted

away from

had espoused through

UAW

skill

and

and Philip

the ideas regarding industrial

the 1940s, this

was not

the case

everywhere. 10

The 1958 wildcat
to let

strike

was one

of the local's last concerted attempts

management know workers counted

for something.

The disastrous

negotiations of the previous year, the repeated failure
to receive cost of
living language,

and continued

rejection of

and quality committees, culminated

in

union

calls for

automation

an unprecedented, and

eight-day walkout in support of another union in the plant.
In
unionists demonstrated they were needed

if

illegal
effect,

products were going to be

shipped on time to customers. However, the corporation was unmoved.
For the next ten years a plant that had just a two-day walkout since

it

was

organized in 1936, had three walkouts including lengthy ones in 1968 and
1971.

Calls for cooperation to solve production-related problems

all

but

disappeared as the union tuned to securing the jobs of the plant's high
seniority workforce
gains.

and exacting the greatest possible wage and benefit

This set the union and

management believed
they sought

was

the

hold

to

way

company on
to

a collision course since

be competitive in the global markets

down U.S.

labor costs and /or find places to

manufacture more cheaply.

1U For a discussion of

many

of these issues see David Brody, In Labor's Cause: Main Themes

on the History of the American Worker (1993) esp. chs. 5 and 6. In ch. 6, "Workplace
Contractualism" Brody writes: "What happens on the shop floor is not a secondary affair

working people.
worth and honor." The concern
in the lives of

On

the contrary

it

engages

their

innermost sense of

for production-related issues in the

certainly a manifestation of this.

232

self-

union newspaper

is

The high

seniority workforce posed problems in
this regard.

By

1956 close to 30 percent of the workforce had over
25 years seniority; in

one department alone

five

In 1959 an in-plant party

year of service.
spirit of

collectively

was held

teamwork and friendship

demands

for 40

For them, the Bulletin

management and

wage

men

labor"

the union

workers celebrating

comment "Gone

that has always

is

total service.

their 45th

the fraternal

been associated with

had deep resonance. The pension and vacation

began making

differentials the

had 180 years of

for this

group added

significantly to the

company saw when comparing production

costs in

Europe, Japan, Mississippi, and Springfield. However, the
demands could
not be ignored since the group was a sizable, vocal, and unified
segment of
the workforce at contract time. 11

these high seniority unionists

down

at the union's 25th

One can only wonder what many

must have been thinking when they

management working

sat

anniversary dinner and heard their long-time

nemesis William Tuttle, manager of labor relations
corporation, remark:

of

for the entire

"Local 206 exemplifies a situation

where labor and

together have created a strong union and a strong

company." 12

were 378 members of the 25-year Club out of 1,200 working (LB, April, 1956,
p. 3). The quote is from LB, April, 1957, p. 1. See also Progress, January 23 and March 13,
1959. The company newsletter continually ran articles about long-service workers and their
importance to the success of the plant even as they disdained their input on the shop floor.
1

In 1956 there

12 Progress, September, 1963, p.

1.
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The Corp oration

Military Sales Lead the

A
Profits

Way

key to the Bosch plant's success in the 1960s was defense

and employment had

While corporate

sales

fallen steadily

were up

economic

shifts

from mid-1958 through 1961.

slightly, total profits fell to $1 million in

1960 on sales of $125.5 million. The up and
indicative of

sales.

down

sales record

occurring in the post-World

was

War

global

II

economy.
In The Deindustrialization of America economists Barry
Bluestone

and Bennett Harrison point out
world

sales

by

US

that by the 1960s the percentage of total

producers in several industries was

concentrated in fewer firms.

,

and

In electronic components, for example, the

sales of the four largest corporations

from 13 percent. According

flat

jumped

to Bluestone

to 36 percent of the

and Harrison

market

this led to "the

control over capital location, and therefore jobs (being) wielded by a small
set of decision

makers." 13

Even though

its

profits

had

fallen sharply,

with 1960 sales of $125.3 million and assets of $64.5 million, as an
international leader in the production of fuel injection systems,

could make capital location decisions. This
plant relocations.

left

At the same time, according

ARMA

workers vulnerable
to Jules

to

Backman, an

expert on the industry, because there was such intense interunion and

intraunion rivalry in the electrical machinery industry, "more so than any

13

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York,
1982) esp. ch.

5.
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other mass production industries in the
nation," a coordinated labor

response to corporate relocations was highly
unlikely. 14

Table

8.1:

Sales

and

Profits 1955

-

1970. 15

Year

Sales (millions)

Profits (millii

1955

73.8

3.4

1956

86.7

3.2

1957

134.3

5.1

1958

—

1959

H9.9

3.5

I960

125.5

l.O

1961

133.6

2.0

1962

H9.6

2.9

1963

84.3

2.4

1966

H2.8

4.5

1967

H9.3

5.9

1968

151.0

6.3

1969

160.0

6.4

1970

155.9

1.6

Weak
1961 the

first

profits in I960

two

of

orders reversed the
to build

weapons

program and

14

p. 213,

and 1961 alarmed stockholders, but

what would be

downward

slide.

a $3 million order to

in April,

millions of dollars of defense-related

Bosch received a $2.5 million order

control systems for the government's B-52

Backman, The Economics
Appendix Table 2, p. 359.

Jules

4.1

produce

fuel injection

bomber

systems for 792

of the Electrical Manufacturing Industry

(New York,

15 Note: Data taken from local newspaper reports, issues of Progress, and the

1962)

AMBAC

Industries Prospectus, for April 1971. Figures from 1950 forward are for the entire

corporation, not just the Springfield plant.
figures.
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It is

difficult to

disaggregate Springfield Bosch

M-60 tanks currently under construction by
Michigan-based Continental
Motors. 16

Bosch engineers were always concerned that
the
systems they developed were too costly

been the case in the

was made
first

late 1950s.

automobile market, as had

With defense orders

abandon the development

to

increasing, a decision

of a gasoline fuel injection system

experimented with in 1957, and focus product development
on

military applications.
tests

for the

fuel injection

The decision was momentous

since independent

conducted by Dupont Corporation showed that even

in the early

developmental stages the systems saved 14 percent in automobile

fuel

consumption. 17

Even
to focus

on

greater defense sales convinced corporate officers the decision

was

military markets

correct.

The Studebaker-Packard

Corporation of South Bend, Indiana ordered 4,000 multi-fuel injection
systems for military trucks

was

it

building.

The multi-fuel pumps were

unique engineering design that allowed the user
vehicle to run

on any of three available

and kerosene. 18 This

flexibility

in battle field situations.

added by
to 350,

16

17

the

end of 1961

It

was

to

made

to easily convert a

fuels, regular gasoline, diesel fuel,

the

pump

attractive to the military

anticipated that close to 500 jobs

complete

new

orders.

The

final total

however, because commercial business continued

SMU, April 27, 1961, p. 10.
SMU, November 26, 1961. This

a

to

would be
was

closer

slump badly,

an important example of how defense production and
manufacturing research were linked during the Cold War. Had Bosch engineers continued
to develop the new gasoline injection system in the early 1960s there is no way of
determining how much more viable the plant may have become once defense work abated.
For a discussion of Pentagon influence over manufacturing research and development see
David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York,
1986) esp. chs. 2 and 3 and Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War

Economy (New York, 1992)
18

SMU, June

is

esp. chs.

1

and

3.

24, 1961.
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especially in automotive

and farm equipment.19 But by

expanded military orders resulted
from under 750

delivers to begin in early 1964

million.

A

in early 1965.

and run through

decision

The

was made

to 1,200,

up

purchase the

to

5-ton trucks from Springfield with

its

late 1965.

followed by a contract for fuel injection systems for

renewed again

1963 greatly

union members climbing

The Army now agreed

in January, 1961.

fuel injection systems for all of

in

fall,

total

2.5

was

This

ton trucks that was

value of the contract was $9

to invest $2 million in

new equipment

to

boost military production even further.
Business also improved when, for the

first

time in three years,

Bosch received a substantial order from General Motors
injection

pump

for small truck engines.

well, reaching record highs in 1963

Export sales were growing as

and accounting

for six percent of

Springfield's total sales. Since 70 percent of the sales

America and Canada, new distribution groups were
the Far East to stimulate sales there.

contracts helped

and

were

started in

a

World War

In fact, increased

economy, reflected

sharp economic contraction and high unemployment

1961;

March

stability in

Korean and Vietnam Wars masked

significant structural changes in the Massachusetts

7,

and

II. 20

The Bosch defense connection was not unique.

SMU, March

Europe and

coherent production schedule,

in turn provided a greater degree of workforce growth

military spending during the

to Latin

All of these multi-year production

management develop

the plant than at any time since

19

for a fuel

15, 1962.

Progress, April, 1962, p.

at the

in

conclusion of

4.

20

SDN, October 31, 1963; Progress, May-June, 1964, p. 2; SMU, August 28, 1964. On exports
see SMU, March 24, 1964, p. 11. By the end of 1964 ARMA had a $24 million backlog in
defense work, over 60 percent of this in Springfield. However even with this defense gain
and income dropped from 1963
weakness in commercial sales.
total sales

to 1964 reflecting a
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continued and troubling

each

Near the conclusion of the Vietnam War
Massachusetts was

conflict.

receiving over 10 percent of the nation's
total prime defense contracts.

when

the mid-1970s
led the nation.

Springfield

this

spending was

cut, the state's

unemployment

By
rate

Bosch workers were among the thousands in
greater-

who

lost their jobs as a result. 21

Charles Perelle Steps

Down

In the midst of the remarkable early 1960s turn-around
Charles
Perelle stepped
officer of

down

ARMA;

after ten years as president

chief executive

he remained chairman of the board. Elected by the

Board of Directors

to replace

him was Charles

Beck, president and chief

executive officer of Philco Corporation, a wholly

Motor Company.

and

It

was hoped

would secure increased

his

knowledge

sales in that

owned

subsidiary of Ford

of the automotive industry

slumping but important market.

Perhaps the growing international competitive pressures had worn Perelle

down.

Just

months before

his decision to step

down,

Perelle

had

negotiated a manufacturing and sales agreement with Germany-based

Robert Bosch,

to give a

major competitor rights to manufacture a newly

designed diesel injection systems in
royalties.

its

The deal was an admission

difficulties entering

Stuttgart plant in return for sales

that the

US company was

having

European markets. 22

21

For a discussion of Massachusetts and the impact of defense spending on industry see Jack
Tager, "The Massachusetts Miracle," Historical journal of Massachusetts, Vol. 19 (Summer,

and Elyse Cann, The Demise of the Massachusetts
Defense Connection, (Springfield, 1993). Tager states that this defense link was wellestablished by the end of World War II. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for
example, saw federally-sponsored research jump from slightly under $20,000 in 1939 to close
to $44 million in 1944 -1945 (Tager, p. 122). The Springfield unemployment rate in 1975 was
11.2 percent compared to a national average of 8.5 percent.
1991)

,

esp. p. 122

-

128; Robert Forrant

22 Progress, July-August, 1964, p.

1.
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In his

first

public reception, held at the

Longmeadow Country

Charles Beck declared "The American Bosch
Division

and so

is

Springfield as a community." His

comforting to union

officials in

is

very important

words may have been

attendance at the gathering

.

informed those in attendance that the Springfield
plant was
largest division in the corporation, surpassing
the
facility

which

just lost a

Club,

major defense contract.

Beck

now

Arma Long

He added

the

Island

that overall

corporate growth for the foreseeable future would come
from three
sources:

internal product development; further penetration
of present

markets; and the acquisition of other companies. 23

Springfield Investments Pick-tip

In March, 1964, to back

announced plans
equipment.

to invest in

up

his Springfield

new

commitment, Beck

engineering and product testing

At the same time three new machines, valued

at $300,000,

arrived at the plant, two automated finish grinding machines and an

automatic indexing

was placed with

drill

with 24 tool

the Keene,

New

stations.

In addition, a $500,000 order

Hampshire Kingsbury Corporation

three multi-station machining centers, and a $60,000 order
the

DeHoff Gun

Drill

for

was placed with

Corporation in Cranston, Rhode Island for two

machines. The purchases provided a boost to the Northeast's slumping

machine

tool industry. 24

23 Progress, November-December,
1964, p. 1. SMU, November 13, December 17, 1964. Beck
had a Master of Science in Business Administration from Wayne State University and had

assumed

a

number

of progressively responsible positions in the planning department at

Philco before becoming president.

24

SMU, March

official

May-June, 1964, p. 4. In Progress a company
indicated that machine tool purchases would be made from New England
28, 1964, p. 16; Progress,

companies whenever

possible.
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On
decision

pump

the negative side, with defense

was made

to subcontract the

used on farm equipment

and assembling

New

to the

diesel

and

Jersey-based Singer Sewing

prior experience machining close

pumps. Soon

completed the union complained that
as high as 60 percent

the plant busy, a

production of a small fuel injection

Machine Corporation. Singer had no
tolerance parts

work keeping

was

from Singer shipment s were

rejects

that defective

after the deal

pumps were being shipped

to

customers. 25
Early in 1965 a $2 million investment
Scott, vice-president for

was announced by Robert

commercial operations. While past machine

tool

purchases had been mainly for defense work, these acquisitions
were

commercial production. Scott was attempting

farm equipment

to boost flagging truck

sales in the eventuality of a defense

spending

for

and

cut.

Acquisition of the equipment was hampered by delivery delays of up
to 40

weeks

for

many

machines, setting back the company's aggressive

effort to

gain a larger market share. 26
In March, 1965

production

ground was broken across the

facility for a $2.6

million research center.

plant construction at Bosch since

World War

II,

and

street

This

technicians.

new

facility

The center was needed

if

would

was

solidified

largest of the corporation's four manufacturing divisions.
fully operational in 1966, the

from the main

hire 72

the

first

Bosch as the

Scheduled to be

new

engineers and

Beck was to succeed with his plan

to

10 LB, November, 1964,
p. 2; February, 1965, p. 2. Since the end of World War II one of
Bosch's chief marketing slogans was 'The world knows it can depend on premium

performance from any product that bears the name American Bosch.' Workers worried that
this was no longer the case. The slogan was first used on the cover of the May, 1948 issue of
The Craftsman.
26

SMU, January

28, p. 16,

May

14, 1965, p. 12.
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boost engineering and product development
capabilities by 40 percent over
the next

two

In a

years. 27

May, 1965 public

relations effort Beck released figures

Bosch's role in the regional economy.
total

with

workforce of 2,101 lived within
a

on

Ninety percent of the company's

a 30

minute drive of the

plant.

Along

$14 million payroll, an additional $4 million was spent locally
on

services

and

supplies.

new machine

tools

Two

from

million dollars

New

England

had

been spent purchasing

also

firms. 28

Engineering center construction was followed a year
decision to build a $2 million assembly building to house

later

by

all fuel

a

injection

assembly work along with packaging, shipping, and receiving. Plans
included an automated monorail to
facility to the

new

area,

and

move

all

parts

from the production

a temperature-controlled

assembly room for

extremely close tolerance hand-fitting of special products. The expansion
created 30 percent

more production space

when assembly equipment and

in the old building, as well,

personnel were relocated.

Company

spokespersons stated the expansion would provide adequate

manufacturing space through the early 1970s, and that 700 additional

workers would be hired by 1970, bringing

compared

to 1,400 in 1961.

39 percent for the

z/

SMU, March

2,

first

March

total

Optimism soared

employment

further

when

to 3,000,

sales increased

half of 1967. 29

23, 1965.

The

total

corporate investment

in the city

$13 million since 1956. Progress, March, 1965, p. 1.
28 SMU, May 4, 1965,
p. 1. Firms that received the largest dollar amount of
the long-established area metalworking companies

Drop Forging, Agawam Tool and

Die,

29 Progress, February-March, 1966,
p.

Hampden

Brass

and Production Tool and
2;

SMU, March
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1, 2,

now

reached

work included
and Aluminum, Moore

Die.

1966, July 28, 1967.

Corporate Expansion: Foreign Vpntures Lead the

At the end of 1959,
study to determine the

it

Way

will be recalled, Perelle

feasibility of

had commissioned

buying components abroad

a

for

assembly into fuel injection pumps in Springfield. Final
assembly and

pump

calibration required a great deal of skill

and knowledge

of the

product, something not easily reproducible at a lower labor
cost elsewhere.

A

decision

several

was made

to continue local production,

hundred workers.

But, at the

same

preserving the jobs of

time, Perelle completed a joint

venture in 1960 with the British conglomerate DeHaviland Holdings,
to increase

Ltd.,

production capabilities and establish a presence in important

European markets. DeHavilland had recently acquired

S.G.

Brown,

Ltd.,

England's leading manufacturer of precision navigation instruments, had
close financial ties to the

Hawker Sidney Group,

a

major industrial

organization with interests in aircraft engines, missiles, diesel engines,

and automotive products. While

Perelle

hoped

business successful, he was trying to position

European markets.

how

If this failed

to other corporations.

talks

make

ARMA

he was willing

Merger

to

the Bosch diesel

Corporation to enter

to sell Bosch's diesel

know-

were also undertaken with

Illinois-based Standard Kollsman, a manufacturer of electronic

communication equipment, and Lionel Corporation, the maker
trains,

which had

partners.

just entered the

of toy

guided missile market and was seeking

Neither discussion yielded much, but did demonstrate the

corporation's aggressive expansion effort. 30

Charles Beck continued Perelle's acquisitions strategy. In 1965

Bacharach Instruments was purchased

30

SMU, June

11, I960, p. 14;

March

for $8.5 million

27, 1962, p. 17.
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and

in 1967

Packard

Instruments for $12 million. Packard and Bacharach
were major

producers of a variety of measuring and testing
instruments for medical

and radiation

research.

and Steelweld,

Also in 1967 Hispano Suiza,

Ltd., a British firm,

a

Dutch company,

were acquired. Each was

producer of factory automation equipment.

a leading

In 1968, Pace Industries, a

Tennessee defense manufacturer, and Michigan Dynamics, a
producer of
scientific

and medical instruments were acquired.

At the time of the European acquisitions Beck commented on

growing world-wide competition: "Our job
increasingly

more challenging and we

is

going to become

are developing a master plan to

meet that challenge." For Beck the challenge was "the
differential

between the Springfield plant and those

of $1.52 an hour in England, Holland, and

including fringe benefits."

determine the future of any

will

He

He added

Germany

in

skilled

Europe

-

an average

as against $4.45 here,

that "competitive

facility in

wage

market conditions

Bosch's corporate structure."

pointed out that Bosch's chief competitor Robert Bosch had average

labor costs of approximately the

same

$1.52.

To succeed against

this

competition, especially because in Beck's estimation Europe and Japan

were closing the technology gap,
of productivity,"

and

this

meant

"labor
for

must maintain the highest degree

Beck "automation

Beck also noted that the greatest growth potential
in electronics, thus the Packard

and Bacharach

to the

nth degree."

for the corporation

acquisitions.

was

The union

should have been concerned: There was no electronics production

in

Springfield. 31

31

SMU, March

For wage comparisons between England, West Germany,
and the U.S. see Backman, The Electrical Industry, p. 291 and Appendix table
Italy japan
31, p 363. Backman determined that the gap between U.S. electrical industry hourly wages
and those in the other countries studied widened between 1950 and 1958. For example, the
differential between West German and U.S. hourly wages, was $1.15 in 1950 and $1.56 on
,

23, April 8, 1967.

,
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Beck's efforts in Europe were part of a
dramatic expansion of U.S.

corporate foreign spending between 1965 and
1980. According to

economists Harrison and Bluestone
factories, office buildings,

than $50 billion in 1965
billion in 1980.

from

faster,

,

machine

tools,

and

investment abroad in

office

equipment was

less

reached $124 billion in 1975 and surpassed $213

They note

that profits

$5.2 billion in 1965 to

In-plant St rategies:

total direct

Workers

To insure new orders

Still

at

from these investments "grew even

more

that $424 billion in 1980..

."32

Excluded

competitive prices, shop floor

reorganization efforts proceeded, building on efforts undertaken in the
late 1950s.

Two

critical

aspects of the plan were the installation of an

International Business Machines (IBM) data collection system and the

implementation of a value analysis engineering program. The entire IBM
unit,

complete with 25 data entry stations interspersed throughout the

factory

was capable

of doing the payroll and performing inventory and

production analyses.

Management estimated

that there

were 130,000 separate machining

operations to monitor, as various components
to final assembly.

moved through

According to a company press

system "reduces by

at least 48

release, the

the plant

computer

hours the time lag between completing and

reporting a manufacturing operation." The location of computer stations
in each manufacturing

department also meant that production employees

between England and the U.S., $1.15 in 1950 and $1.19 in 1958. With the final
machining and assembly of fuel injection pumps still very labor intensive, labor savings
gained by shifting production out of Springfield were significant.
1958;

32 Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and
the Polarizing of America (New York, 1988) p. 26.
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would walk

15,000 fewer miles a year. In addition the
system

of tracking operating time

on various machines so

that the

department could better schedule preventive
maintenance

was capable

maintenance
to

avoid

lengthy equipment breakdowns. With close to
1,600 machine tools in the

was

factory this

disruptions.

quite important, especially to insure minimal

The data could

work flow

also be used, the union feared, to monitor

individual workers in an attempt to speed them up
and cut rates .33

The IBM system provided
efficiently

the capability, for the

with the flow of work as

it

time, to "deal

progresses through the various

At the same time an attempt was made

operations."

first

to reorganize the

factory "along the concept of product line assembly" so
that systematic

layouts were established for the complete assembly cycle of one
product.

However, the problem persisted

that the

machining of the thousands of

highly specialized components was not done by product

machining function. In other words, parts

to

still

But,

but by

be ground went to a general

grinding machine area and parts to be milled went
the plant.

line,

to the milling area in

even with the sophisticated IBM system, parts-in-progress

traveled a crazy-quilt pattern back and forth the length of the

sprawling manufacturing building as they went from one processoriented department to another. Just three years after installation, the

system was

totally

upgraded

for

an additional

anticipated sales growth for the plant.

M

The number

$1.3 million based

In the end, rather than

on

make

the

machines was contained in Progress, September-October, 1964. p. 2;
Progress, April-May, 1966, p. 2. Mike Davis argues that the introduction of technologies
like the IBM system were part of U.S. managements' effort to break the power of shop
stewards through the control of vast amounts of information on production and that this
amounted to significant speed-up and a diminution of union shop-floor power (Davis, p.
of

122).
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plant

more productive,

management

to

more

the expensive computer system simply
allowed

effectively track this

work flow anarchy .34

The value analysis program consisted

of a careful study of every

part produced in the plant to determine cheaper
and easier

Two

produce

it.

series of

pumps had always been machined

review,

it

examples

was determined

clarify the

ways

to

program. Operating levers on one
using

the levers could be

steel stock.

After

produced using

operation and cheaper material. This resulted in

a

savings on the levers. Spring guides on injection

a

stamping

66 percent labor cost

pumps had always been

turned in a very time consuming series of machining operations
out of
bar stock. Value analysis determined the springs could be

molded

plastic at 33 percent of the original labor

over 250 components in

company claimed

it

off:

Record

were

sales

and

it

and

out of

costs.

With

close to 200

significant.

was generating $200,000 annually

At the end of the decade
paying-

and material

a typical fuel injection system,

different systems built, savings possibilities

made

In 1964 the

in savings. 35

appeared that the investments were

profits

were now recorded. Total

sales

reached almost $170 million by 1970. The Springfield plant was
single largest supplier of fuel injection assemblies to

now

Mack Truck and

the

the

General Motors Truck and Coach Division. 36

J4

SMU, December

3^

SMU, February

The saved time translated to a gain of almost 4,000
additional production hours in the plant. The system had another, more subtle advantage.
Stations in each department helped foremen reduce the numbers of workers walking the
aisles to report their work and get coffee, gossip about sports, discuss union politics, and
complain about the company.
10, 1963, p. 17.

14,

1964, p. 11.

The head of engineering

told the local

newspapers

"every material, design feature and manufacturing operation will be analyzed to determine
if

36

parts are over-designed for their intended purpose."

On Mack Truck and

General Motors, SDN,
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May

9,

1966, p. 21

It is

assumed

likely that

their

workers viewed these developments favorably
and

employment was

secure.

However,

closer scrutiny

would

have revealed the investments were mainly in
the engineering and
product design area. Once developed,

manufactured in

number

a

products could be

of the corporation's production

Workers would have noticed,
machine

new

as well, that the

overwhelming number of

tools in the three football field-long factory

The purchase of 25
but hardly

to 30 technically sophisticated

sufficient,

when

there

were not upgraded.

machines was dramatic,

were 1,600 machines

in the plant.

Islands of efficiency in a sea of production confusion were
the

new

facilities.

no match

for

plants being built elsewhere by the corporation.

Finally,

and perhaps most important,

the rapid expansion of

production capacity should have greatly troubled union leaders. The

major source of employment growth in the 1960s was defense orders:

What would

fill

the void created

when weapons procurement wound

down? 37

A Long. Hard Struggle:

Local 206 in the 1960s

Background

In the 1950s

enjoyed

its

and early 1960s organized labor

greatest gains. Higher productivity

and

in the

United States

profits in large

corporations in auto and steel led to higher wages, shorter

and an increased standard of

employed
37

in such sectors.

SMU, March 5,

living for workers fortunate

And

1968; February

7,

as has

1969;

enough

to

be

been seen already, spending by the

SDN, May

247

work weeks,

9,

1966, p. 21.

military-industrial

complex meant

that unions in aerospace, electronics,

and weapons production were able

steel,

improvements

for their

to

win wage and

members. Historian Patrick Renshaw noted

American Labour and Consensus Capitalism that "At
the

American labour appeared
of

in

start of the 1960s

be in a powerful position. After eight years

to

Eisenhower the Democrats

accelerated

benefit

won

the White House."

and unemployment dropped

as the

Defense spending

Vietnam War

escalated.

But by decade's end labor's position had been eroded.
Automation was
reducing the need for workers in several basic industries. Renshaw

GM

president Harlow Curtice's remark to the

while touring a highly automated car plant:

UAW will not be
strategies

in basic industry

Harvey Swados

in "The

Myth

began

on

strike."

Relocation

curtailed production.

to drop.

of the

Walter Reuther

"Walter, in the future the

able to call the machines out

and foreign investments had

membership

UAW's

cites

On U.S.

Union

factory floors, as

Happy Worker," and

Eli

Chinoy

in

Automobile Workers and the American Dream pointed out in the 1950s,

workers were increasingly alienated from

1962

-

1968:

Things Are Good For

The 1962 contract was

their

a While.

ratified

work. 38

But Quickly

Go Bad

without controversy, attributable in

large

measure

to the steady

want

to risk a

walk-out that might cause defense prime contractors to

growth in defense work. The company did not

question the reliability of the plant and jeopardize the cost-plus contracts

38 Patrick Renshaw, American Labour and Consensus Capitalism, 1935 - 1990 (Jackson,
1991) p. 152, p. 170. On the 1960s see James R. Green, The World of the Worker: Labor in
Twentieth Century America (New York, 1980) esp. ch. 7. Green points out that by 1970
skilled workers had decreased as a proportion of the working class, while between 1950 and
1970 the

number

of service

workers doubled
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to 9.0 million

from

4.5 million (p. 226

-

227).

now

the plant

they had.

had. Union negotiators were well aware of
the leverage

Bolstered by the rank and

file's

authorization to

call a strike, the

committee achieved significant wage and benefit
improvements

for the

time in ten years. 39

first

The

cost-plus arrangement

contractors
estimates.

all

pump

if

a single

Bosch passed on

that

production costs that acceded

For example,

claimed the

meant

prime

priced at $475 and Bosch

ultimately cost $560 to manufacture, the prime

contractor paid this

amount and

in turn charged the

the overall cost of the truck increased accordingly.

Cold

its

agreed upon

initially

pump was

to

War Economy, economist Ann Markusen

government because

In Dismantling the

cites a

study that found for

twelve large defense projects in the 1950s and early 1960s

on average 320 percent

of original estimates.

According

final costs

to

were

Markusen

defense contractors benefited as well because they were often the sole
source for the weapons system or components being produced. This was
in fact the case
states,

with the Bosch multi-fuel pumps. Finally, Markusen

government demand was

unlikely,

Markusen contends,

fewer weapons
a client

if

relatively "inelastic."

for the

unit costs escalate.

with relatively

inelastic

government

It

was

quite

"to cancel orders or

buy

Oligopolistic companies dealing with

demand can

raise prices considerably

above costs without losing business." Unionists now took advantage of
this

and obtained long sought wage

increases as sales climbed in the Diesel

Division to $48.1 million in 1968 from $27.7 million in 1964.40

39 LB, June, 1962, p. 1.
40 Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New York, 1992)
94. The authors cite studies that conclude that costs in the absence of competition were
usually 25 percent higher. Sales figures

in

AMBAC
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1971 Annual Report.

p.

While the corporation continued
locally

its

parallel strategies of investing

and securing production partners abroad,

improve even though wages increased. Union

management

improve

to

in-plant relations did not

officers challenged

Why

relations with the local.

its

risk a multi-

million dollar investment, they asked, by turning
shop floor workers

ARMA

against you? The

Long Island plant dropped

workers in 1965, from 4,800 two years

employment was

still

earlier.

under 1,000

to

Even though Springfield

up, the rapid growth of the early 1960s ceased.

Workers now wondered, and with good reason, what might happen
defense orders were cut,

when

in 125

workers losing

1966.

The union complained

added

a 1965 contraction of military

their jobs.

to these reductions.

This

was followed by

were

in progress.

Two

of the six

were

officers indicated in the Bulletin that a full-scale

news

resulted

500 in

machine shops

also angry over the suspensions

of six workers from department 300 for refusing to
the layoffs

a lay-off of

that subcontracting to local

The union was

work

if

work overtime while

active unionists,

and

walk out almost followed

of the suspensions. 41

By mid- 1964 management expressed

its

unhappiness with the

union newspaper's repeated attacks on company

The paper carried

met with union

a front

officers

page

article

management

for

explaining that

and asked them

Union president Al LeBeau seized

to tone

and supervision.

management had

down

the paper's rhetoric.

the opportunity to once again criticize

not living up to the contract.

subcontract large amounts of

policies

He blamed

work from departments,

a decision to

110, 120, 160,

and

300 for large numbers of layoffs and charged that the company's recent
elimination of floor inspectors led to an increased scrap

41

LB,

May,

1964, p.

3.

250

rate.

Finally,

he turned the tables on management and compared
Bosch

supervisory staffing patterns to those in foreign
companies. While

management needs

true that

and

stay in business,

another

...

ways

LeBeau suggested

way

bring the level

to find

to cut costs in order to

it is

compete

there was:

compete with foreign competition, let's
of "Top Management" down to what most
to

foreign companies have, not a heavy overloaded drain on
the profits of the company with high salaries but competitive
in the
be.

same sense

as the average

worker

is

informed he must

Seventeen high level management personnel drew

salaries

and remuneration

totaling $837, 171 as per last year's

annual report to the stockholders. 42

He concluded by warning

unionists, "This

hard struggle in which everyone must do
survive the viciousness of
security." 43

management

-

in protecting

our jobs and
their rhetoric.

class,

but

we

are

still

the people that

those fantastic profits for the stockholders." 44

However,
671

his or her part in order to

thing management," a front page editorial read, "we are

people of what you consider the lower
all

only the beginning of a long

By the end of the summer the union escalated

"Remember one

make

is

in 1965 the rank

and

file set

aside their anger

and voted

310 against the strike recommendation of their negotiating

committee and executive board, accepting
cents an hour

including

wage

increase.

a three-year contract

with

The contract contained long sought

upward wage adjustments

a 26

benefits,

for the skilled trades, early

42 LB, June, 1964, p. 1. LeBeau added, "You cannot keep giving your customers excuses for no
delivery of parts or bad parts without eventually losing them."
43 LB, June, 1964, p. 1. There is no actual proof, but it seems likely that the refusal to work

overtime was at least in part a protest against subcontracting.
44 LB, September, 1964, p. 1.
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retirement language allowing a worker 55 or
older with at least 10 years in
the plant to retire without any reduction in
pension benefits,

additional fifth

week

The wide margin

of vacation for those with 30 years or

of acceptance

was

a

rebuke

to

and an

more

service.

union leaders, especially

business agent and negotiating committee chairman
Jim Manning.

Manning was defeated
to office in 1962.

for business agent after the 1959 strike but
returned

However, soon

he decided not to run for

after this

another term. The easy ratification indicates that management
correctly

determined what was important
cents in the

first

year,

to a majority of workers.

were not high. However, the high

The

raises, ten

seniority

workforce received improved pension language and extra vacation time,
while the skilled trades,

a substantial

still

group, received raises above the

gains others made. 45

Large layoffs in 1966 disrupted the momentary calm.
Bulletin, entitled

"My

summarized

Boss"

He's

As

my

if I

can't

have

changed mood.

boss, tho' he looks

I

make

He jumps on me,
I

in the

down

crawled out of the ground

When

Why

the

A poem

a

little

there

mistake

is

no break.

he learn I'm not a machine.

faults,

if

you know what

I

mean

Even an automatic breaks down,
I'm not the one wearing a frown.

45

SMU, August

The pension gains were no small matter. Before the new
language was added high seniority workers could lose three percent from their monthly
pension check for every year they retired before age 65. For example under the old contract,
a worker with 40 years service who retired at age 65 would receive $10 multiplied by each
year of service for a $400 a month pension check. If the same worker decided to retire at age
62 he would

now

21, 1965, p.

1.

receive 37 years times the $10 for $370 but be penalized 9 percent for

His check would be approximately $337. Under the new
language he would be able to retire early and get a monthly check of $370, a significant
difference, and one that made early retirement more attractive to many.
retiring three years before age 65.
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We

are people,

Do you know

just

human
what

Children, problems,

beings,

that means.

bills

and such

Things that get us into dutch

We are working hard
Why do they just make

The 1968

and true
us blue? 46

Strike

The

week 1968

five

strike

and

fifteen

week 1971

points in the history of the plant. In 1968, for the
their night sticks

on picketing workers and

first

strike

were turning

time, police used

forcefully escorted supervisory

personnel through picket lines in an effort to keep production going. The

company made
leaders.

Letters

increases
strikes

direct appeals to the rank

were

also sent to strikers

were impossible, and

marked

a

watershed

and

homes warning them

that the plant

Throughout the year

foreign competitors were

met with

made

derision, as

that

factories.

Workers were well aware of the

them.

a strike

and elsewhere because

elected 318

Jaross claimed during his

46 LB, June, 1966,

-

all

the

p. 3.
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that

wage

in

if

relief

from

surrounding

company newspaper
available

300 over longtime

campaign

but a

large investments being

saying so for several months. In union elections a

was

These

was management's

Bosch wages were higher than those

Union negotiators believed money was

Steve Jaross,

to close.

the company's appeals for

argument

in Springfield

might have

pay

that

for labor solidarity in the region as well.

Events leading up 1968 negotiations
certainty.

break with their

file to

new

officer

elected he

made

profiled

and had been

business agent,

Ralph Chicketti.

would achieve

a

contract settlement that included
ever, representatives

wage improvements. For

the

first

time

from seven Bosch unionized plants met together

to

compare contracts and negotiating experiences.

The union now reacted negatively
improve

to

each company effort to

quality, arguing that as long as rates

were cut and foremen were

attempting to speed up workers quality work was out of the
question.

"You keep cutting the

shadow
thirty

A

to

make

rates until a

a buck,"

one

machine operator has

Bulletin article charged.

gages on them yet your time study

second

article

until

never time the checking."

down

right cheapness

is

"You're

going

to

skilled trades,

the

company

failed to offer a

wage

one hour before the midnight April 15 contract expiration. 48

The union wanted

the shop.

jobs have

industrial grave." 47

The showdown came when
package

"Some

challenged management and issued a warning:

wheeling and dealing and cutting and

make your

men

to beat his

a cost of living clause, extra

and additional vacation time

Union leaders did not

for

wage

increases for the

workers with 10-20 years in

anticipate a quick settlement

to organize collections at area factories to bolster their strike

union members. Surviving records of the
19 plants visited. In one

week

The money was used

run

to

a

$12,330

and

started

fund and

rally

strike contained a listing of the

was dropped

soup kitchen

in collection cans.

for picketers in the

basement

of the union hall. 49
47 LB, November, 1967, p. 3.
48 LB, August, 1967, p. 1. Two of the plants were in Perm., 3 in N.Y., 1 in Miss., and 1 in Ma.
SMU, April 15, 1968, p. 1. The unionized engineers refused to cross Local 206 picket lines just
as the

IUE had not crossed

their strike lines ten years earlier.

49 1968 Plant Gate Collection List, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 83. Plant gate
collections have historically been a way for union locals to gain some financial support and
help publicize their strike issues. One effect of such collections was to build a sense of a
labor movement in a region. When walking the picket line it was nice to know you were not
alone. This sense of solidarity is a casualty of the spate of metalworking closings that is
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For 24 days the plant was shut

tight.

Then supervisory and other

non-striking personnel were ushered across picket lines
by police to

resume production
negotiations

in an effort to complete

had been held

continued to claim that
"fair

and

since the strike

fair

with their

offer.

The

original

it

was

to price products

Management attempted an end-run around

the union's

they claimed they had been

wage and

had now been increased

cents over three years
letter

began and the company

company

leadership with a letter to every striker. In

very

No

financial offer of 50 cents over three years

its

equitable, while allowing the

competitively. "50

and ship orders.

benefit proposal of 44

to 50 cents.

"Why/' the

asked, "have your union leaders not allowed you to vote on our

offer?"

E.F.

workers

Shannon, Bosch vice-president, concluded the

to "urge the

union committee

you can express your opinion

all

divide households with the

swift

membership meeting

and took the form

Shannon was

plant gates.

letter,

Shannon was

on May 16 with

so

and

sent

on

of a leaflet

castigated for attempting to

for being incompetent.

corporate officials seem to have concurred, for on
into the strike,

by asking

of our final offer."

The union response was
distributed at

to call a

letter

a trip to

May

10,

Top

almost a month

Europe. Charles Beck met

the union's executive board, steward's council

and

negotiating committee, and four days later the strike was over. The final

package, valued at 56 cents an hour, was 12 cents above the company's
original offer.

Once again

and economists discuss the decline of manufacturing
region. For example, of the 19 plants on the Local 206 collection list 13 are now closed.

not often considered
a

when

skilled workers, including all electricians,

50 SDN,

May

historians

15, 1968, p. 1;

SMU,

April 25, 1968.
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in

mechanics, tool and die makers, and experimental
machinists received
additional increases averaging 20 cents an hour
over three years .51

The 1971

Fifteen

Diesel

No

Wepk

StrikP

Longer Number One. Information contained

corporate Prospectus and the

AMBAC

Annual Report provide

for the April 1971 contract negotiations.

production

facilities

under construction

$4 million Brescia, Italy plant, 80 percent

square foot

facility set

components ostensibly

pumps

actually

up

produced

a context

The Prospectus described two new
in Italy

and the Netherlands. The

AMBAC-owned, was

to build diesel fuel injection

for the

in the 1971

a 65,000

systems and

European market. However, the

in the plant

were

first

for U.S. agricultural

equipment maker International Harvester. The development and
prototype machining for the

new pump had

$3 million Breda, Netherlands factory

AMBAC
built

was

a

occurred in Springfield. The

wholly owned subsidiary of

constructed in 1967 and twice the size of the Italian plant.

pumps mainly

all

for International Harvester during

its first

It,

too,

year of

operation. 52

By 1970 the corporation had
electrical products, scientific

industrial products,

defense contracts
total sales

-

six divisions:

diesel

and

and medical instruments, aerospace,

and ordnance.

With

in 1970 the corporation

from the U.S. government

-

a continued over-reliance
still

amassed 35 percent of

every division

felt

Union Relations, Box 8, ff 82; SMU, May 20, 1968, p.
dubbed the Beck discussions "the family meeting."

AMBAC,

2972 Annual Report;

AMBAC

1;

Industries,

Prospectus, April, 1971.
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LB, lune, 1968.

Securities

on
its

the affects of the

51 1968 Strike Letter, and Local 206 Response, Local 206 archives Series

52

fluid power,

III,

Company-

The union

article

and Exchange Commission

decline in

and

Vietnam War spending.

1970, falling to $155 million

plummeted

$1.6 million

slumped

from $160

to $1.6 million in 1970

Remarkably the
start of the

Sales

But net income

million.

from $6.4 million

was only

between 1969

slightly

a year earlier.

slightly better than figures at the

decade, before the reorganization and investment programs

were implemented. Diesel

sales fell to $30 million in 1971

million in 1968 (Table

Aerospace dropped

Only two

million.
Scientific

8.2).

divisions

AMBAC

8.2:

went up

Net Sales

$15 million from $25

to

sales gains

and medical instruments climbed

million while electronics

Table

had strong

between 1968 and

to $36.6 million

to $26 million

in millions

from $48

from $20

by Division 1964

from $22.6
million.

-

1971.

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

27.7

33.9

40.6

43.6

48.1

47.9

34.0

30.0

13.4

14.9

17.4

16.4

19.9

21.6

21.7

26.0

11.6

13.7

18.1

22.5

22.6

26.4

32.3

36.6

Aerospace

31.2

25.4

32.0

28.5

25.6

20.7

20.5

14.8

Industrial Products

3.6

3.8

4.7

8.2

12.3

12.2

16.9

10.6

22.5

31.2

30.4

16.8

Diesel Systems
Electrical

Products

Scien/Med.

Inst.

Ordnance

For 1971, the Annual Report pointed out, "27 percent of
percent of total profits came from
industrial instruments, products

scientific,

all

1971.

total sales

and 40

medical, environmental, and

acquired or developed in the

last five

years." 53

53

AMBAC

AMBAC

1971 Annual Report, p. 3. The corporation's name was changed to
Industries by a vote of the stockholders in 1968 to reflect the expansion, acquisition and
added divisions of the company. Divisions were now headquartered in eight U.S. and
three European

and the other

in

cities.

New

In the early 1950s there

York.
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were

just

two

divisions,

one

in Springfield,

Between 1966 and 1968
division:

This

and

acquisitions
in

machine

on

The wage

far

outdistanced any other

After tremendous growth through

and the investment of millions

the corporate bottom line,

efforts,

and the

of dollars

management was

diesel

slump focused

Springfield, especially with contract negotiations pending. 54

promised

differential issue

plants

had

and plant modernization

the 1971 contract talks.

new

the case.

joint ventures,

tools

unhappy with
attention

was no longer

diesel sales

and

be a key stumbling block in

The corporation was making

outfitting

equipment. While the

to again

them with

facilities

were

the

a large investment in

most modern production

built for specific

product lines there

was no reason why other components could not be manufactured

in

them. With several years of production experience in Europe, and an
established joint venture with world-class diesel manufacturer Robert

Bosch, technical expertise

was

workforce had been hard

to duplicate.

why

available.

In the past, Springfield's skilled

This

may have been

Charles Perelle decided to remain in the city in 1960

slumped

like they

were

in the late 1960s.

the reason

when

sales

But technology and joint

production ventures were quickly rendering the one

critical

bargaining

edge Local 206 members had moot. 55

Issues of Concern.
collar

Between the 1968 and 1971 negotiations the blue

workforce dropped by almost 450.

leaders offered

improve shop

what they

felt

was

floor conditions.

54 Figures contained

in

3.

the slide began, union

constructive criticism in an attempt to

Business Agent Steve Jaross used his

AMBAC Industries,

Prospectus, April 20, 1971, p.

When

and Exchange Commission
Division sales figures in AMBAC 1971 Annual Report,
Securities

p.

1.

Charles Beck's comments upon succeeding Perelle as president that the corporation's future
was in electronics were born out by these figures.

55

AMBAC Industries,

Securities

and Exchange Commission Prospectus, April
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20, 1971, p. 8

monthly column
to relocate the

in the Bulletin to discuss the

company's abortive

toolroom and make the case once again

for

worker

involvement in production decisions. The company, according

move

decided to

the tool

room from

the third floor to the

production area. However the choice of a

"Now

does

it

make any

location

disastrous.

sense," Jaross wrote:

and gages

tools, fixtures,

to Jaross,

main

was

department such as the toolroom, where

to take a

to be

new

effort

manufactured

to

all

the

be used throughout the plant are

at close tolerances....

and place

in

it

an

area just recently vacated by a cast iron manufacturing

department with the added inconveniences of poor

uneven flooring
tolerances,

machines which must hold close

for

and dust from the nearby manufacturing

departments which

settles

on

plates

the daily performance of these tool

makes

lighting,

their

work

of

CLOSE

and

size blocks

used in

room employees and

tolerance almost guess work.

There are some tool room grinders, whose

skill in

determining the precise amount to be ground from a
fixture, or

and

this

Had workers

gage

is

judged by the sound of

tool,

their grinding

wheel

can no longer be done.

in the tool

would have known

room been

the location

consulted, Jaross concluded, they

was

incorrect

and saved the company

a

great deal of time, the expense of the move, and the subsequent derision

from workers. 56

Nine months

later, in

an essay

president Al LeBeau urged the
to settle cases quickly

56 LB, February, 1968,

and

titled

company

fairly,

"The Lost Horizon" union

to utilize the grievance

procedure

and requested regular meetings with top

p. 1.
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management through

the re-establishment of the

management

-

labor

problem-solving committee. The company failed to respond
to the
request, nor did
five critical

it

comment on

the union's analysis of

problems on the shop

failure to repair defective

floor.

The

what

five were:

it

termed the

the consistent

equipment, resulting in excessive

lost

production time and scheduling problems; a lack of proper tooling
when

needed

to

complete set-ups and keep production jobs running; incomplete

data on job processing sheets and

work orders leading

to inventory

and

planning problems; the generally dirty conditions in the plant; and poor

work flow and production

bottlenecks, resulting in lack of

departments and excessive overtime

The same

From

left to

money

in

right in the cartoon stood first the stockholder,

one hand and the other hand out looking

him was

for

Command'.
fist full

of

more, smoking

a

the plant manager, with formulas swirling

his head, eyes crossed,

came four foremen,

some

for

for others.

issue featured a cartoon entitled 'Chain of

big cigar. Next to

around in

work

and

a vacant stare

called the pinheads.

on

Last in line

operator with a chain fastening him to his

his face.

was

a

Then

machine

drill press. 57

Rather than deal with the substantive issues LeBeau raised, Beck

now met

with union

officers to discuss the future of Springfield.

He

reassured everyone that the European plants were only going to produce
for foreign sales.

contradicted

However, the stock prospectus and annual reports

this.

Beck added that should

production from Springfield,
assurances in 1953

when

57 LB, February, 1968,

p. 3.

it

would be

it

become necessary

replaced.

to

move

Having heard such

plans to build a plant in Mississippi were
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announced, the meeting with Beck

left

union leaders with

feeling. 58

The

Strike.

negotiators were

Even before the contract expired union and company

making appeals

to the rank

and

file

of Local 206. In an

April 13 leaflet the union blasted the company's effort to
change the piece

work system
introduce a

as outright theft from workers.

new system

operations and

that

movements

The company wanted

would apply pre-determined times

in the plant.

movement
cameras

machine

of stock

to establish

to all

Every job could be given a time

using such a system including those that up until
set-ups, basic

to

now had no

repair, the building of a tool or fixture,

and parts from one department

rates, like

and

to another.

the

First

using

base line times, management proposed to bring in an

outside consulting firm to go through the entire plant and re-rate every
job.

The union

leaflet

charged the company wanted

1930s working condition era,"
rights to argue

how

they were

when workers had no

position of the

company

a letter

The goal was

employees had

company needed "improved

say over rates or

from the vice-president of

to insure that the competitive

deteriorated no further.

essential, Hershfelt told Local 206.

1,000 Springfield

us back to the

set. 59

Management responded with
operations Ralph Hershfelt.

to "roll

Production changes were

He reminded them

lost their jobs,

that since 1969 over

and wrote

that the

control over the organization of work,

streamlined grievance handling, and an up-to-date incentive plan which

58 LB, October, 1969, p. 1; March, 1969, p. 1. It should be noted that the five points the
union articulated read like a management text book for the 1990s in the area of shop floor
On the Beck meeting, LB, June, 1969, p. 1.
reorganization.
59 Union 1971 contract leaflet, April 13, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 90.

261

make

will

letter

possible increased productivity and reduce unit costs."
His

concluded:

We

We

are in a difficult competitive position.

diligently reducing costs for

must

more than

Company

enable to

to maintain

its

The Union

a year.

face the necessity for changes in the

have been

Agreement

to

competitive position and

thus continue to provide and expand employment in
Springfield. 60

The
Hershfelt

strike

was

began on April 22 and the war of words

particularly upset that the union never responded to the

company proposal with
the

a counter proposal.

company's incentive plan, and

offer

any counter

company took

May

to

it:

They wanted

to

But the union did not want

mind

in their

was no reason

there

comment

determined time study proposal other than
strike's

ninth

negotiating committee.

week

to

maintain the status quo. The

the initiative by offering a revised proposal.

the union held firm and refused to

during the

escalated.

at all

to reject

to get rank-and-file

But through

on the preHershfelt tried

it.

workers

He informed union members

that

to pressure the

European

production would not take jobs from Springfield, but that the chief source
of Bosch growth, military work,
in the next

two

years.

"It is

was going

to shrink

by close

to 80 percent

our responsibility," he said,

to plan a course of action for

the survival of the Division.

American Bosch
At

this

that can insure

time the improved

technology and capabilities of European manufacturers, their

advanced engineering, low import duties and the low
transportation bring

60 Company

letter to

new

competition and

new

pressure to

workers, April 16, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series
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cost of

III,

Box

8, ff 86.

bear with our efforts to maintain a volume of
business in the
heavy-duty truck manufacturing industry of this country.6l

Hershfelt then turned his attention to the piece-rate
system
labeling

it

inaccurate, unfair,

than a reasonable

effort,"

and

new system would

less

he charged, "can attain higher than average

spite of their very best effort."

of the

"Some employees with

impractical.

and many employees have

earnings,

itself,

a limited

earning opportunity in

Hershfelt concluded that the introduction

allow methods to be improved and costs

controlled so that "we could earmark a reasonable

pension increases in the years

to

amount

for

wage and

come." 62

For added emphasis he reminded workers of the

many

Springfield

plants that already closed, including Sickles Electric, Wickwire and

Spencer, the Springfield General Electric plant, Perkins Gear and Machine.

"Some of these
and not

are substantial firms," Hershfelt wrote, "national in scope,

really affected

by

a

temporary set-back or recession. They

left

Springfield because of a limited future considering manufacturing costs in
this area." 63

Workers were not persuaded by the company
15

weeks

a settlement

was reached on

July 24,

which included

hour improvement in wages and fringes over three
significant increase

Finally after

letters.

years.

a 75 cents

an

This was a

from the company's early June proposal of 41 cents an

hour that had been contingent on union acceptance of the pre-determined
time system, because in a bitter defeat for the corporation they failed to
obtain the

new

61 Hershfelt

to

Employees, June

8,

1971, Local 206 archives, Series

III,

Box

8, ff 86.

to

Employees, June

8,

1971, Local 206 archives, Series

III,

Box

8, ff 86.

to

Employees, June

8,

1971, Local 206 archives, Series

III,

Box

8, ff 86.

62 Hershfelt
63 Hershfelt

incentive program.
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The stop watch system remained

in

place

and no attempts were made

closed in 1986.

how

to

change

it

until just before the plant

The management negotiating team badly miscalculated

long workers would be willing to hold out over the issue
of changes

in the piece

work system. They

comprehend

also failed to

the deep

resentment toward management that had built-up on the shop

During the 1965 negotiations management knew,

what workers were

better than the union,

willing to settle for, but not this time. 64

Conclusion:

Manage ment and

At the end of the decade and

management could

Local 206 Remain at

into the 1970s

remained contentious over three main
that

floor.

issues:

union and management

the timing of

establish uniform rates

Odds

all

set-ups so

on machine changeovers;

modification of the piece work incentive system to insure greater worker
productivity;

and

utilization of the

newly

installed

IBM system

to bring

order out of the excessive inventory and chaotic work flow in the factory.

Management and

the union also disagreed

in resolving production-related problems.

on the proper

role for

workers

Management continued

to

confront workers with the argument that labor costs had to be lowered for
the plant to be competitive.

Companies
actively seeking

on

in competitor nations like

ways

the shop floor.

to

improve

Germany and Japan were

their productivity

by engaging workers

Toyota Motors and other Japanese corporations no

longer argued about whether to time set-ups; instead they were devising

techniques to alter the

way

set-ups were done.

German companies were

not attempting to organize their factory floors through the introduction of

64

SDN, July

24, 1971, p.

1.
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computers. Instead, they were rearranging machines
and developing
entirely

the

new

need

for

shop-floor layouts to achieve better

expensive overhead items

the final analysis the computer system

did nothing to help you solve

like

let

little

you know you had

a

problem:

It

it. 65

system demonstrated

just

workers believed management's pronouncements regarding

labor costs.

was

eliminate

stockrooms and inventory. In

Finally, the 1971 strike over the incentive

how

work flow and

The union observed the corporate

acquisitions,

knew

the recipient of millions of dollars in defense contracts, and

the plant

was

well

aware of how much top executives were compensated. For the company's
central bargaining

that

argument

to be effective, there

workers and managers were confronting

together were going to shape solutions to
this

was not

it.

a

had

to

be a shared sense

common

As chapters

problem, and
6

-

8

make

clear,

the case.

^

For a example of what competitor firms were doing see Taiichi Ohno, The Toyota
Production System: Beyond Large Scale Production (Tokyo, 1978). "In the Japanese system,"
Ohno writes, "operators acquire a broad spectrum of production skills and participate in
building up a total system in the production plant. In this way, the individual can find
value in working," (p. 14). The purpose here is not to debate Japanese-style management
and its affect on unions and workers or to lightly treat the historical literature on the
subject but to show what competitor countries were in doing on their factory floors to solve
the same problems Bosch was struggling with. By-and-large U.S. companies took the
approach Bosch utilized, mainly an overtly confrontational one, as opposed to the teambuilding and problem-solving orientation employed elsewhere.

265

CHAPTER 9
SKILL

ALONE WAS NEVER ENOUGH
Introduction

In a

Company

May, 1994 award ceremony

in Springfield the

received a prestigious Partners in Progress award from Sears
and

Roebuck Company

for

being in the top one percent of

suppliers for on-time delivery and quality.
operators, represented by the International

produce thousands of Craftsman wrench
located in Springfield's North End.

from

a

group of

Norman

-

Danaher Tool

factories

that at

-

The

The plant

10,000 world wide

firm's 175 machinists

Union

and

of Electrical Workers,

week

sets a

its

for Sears in a facility

the last one in operation

is

including the American Bosch and

Van

one time employed over 20,000 workers in the heart of

industrial Springfield.

Block after block of near-by
buildings,

first

home

immigrant workers

to

many

triple

of the

who made

their

decker

German,

way

wood frame apartment
and

Scottish, Italian,

Irish

to the city for the well-paying

jobs these factories offered, have been torn

down

or are in disrepair. In a

part of the neighborhood that formerly housed several bars and
restaurants frequented by workers before and after their factory

shifts,

stands a low-rise office building housing the local cable television

company.

A

state recycling center

The Bosch Local 206 union
the scene of
strike rallies,

opened

in 1990.

hall has fallen into total disrepair.

monthly membership meetings, union education
the parking lot

is

now overgrown
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Once

classes,

with weeds and

and

littered

with broken

glass.

The main plant was purchased

in early 1988 for

$250,000 by a real estate development group which resold

developer for $1.37 million several months

later.

it

to a

second

The building contains

an All-for-A-Dollar discount store warehouse, and provides
storage space
for several trucking companies.

The near-by three-story Van Norman

factory houses a small automobile motor repair facility
and several light

manufacturing companies. Near-by, the large and growing Puerto
Rican

community

struggles to survive

thousands of jobs
living in the

and find work

their predecessors found.

neighborhood stands

in the absence of the

The poverty

rate for children

at 30 percent, the highest in

Massachusetts. 1

The Decline

of Western Massachusetts Metalworking

Economic Restructuring

By spring 1994 the greater-Springfield economy had not rebounded
from the closings of several metalworking companies during the

1980s.

Referring to the sputtering job outlook, economist Paul Harrington noted,
"For the

first

time, manufacturing

out of recession."
real personal

is

not the industry leading the region

In Western Massachusetts

unemployment was

income growth slower, and business incorporations lower

than in greater-Boston.

The slow turn-around

after the 1981-1982 recession.

technology and defense industry growth.

SMU, October

parallels

what transpired

Then, too, greater-Springfield lagged behind

the eastern part of the state, as job growth there

1

higher,

11, 1988, p. 1.
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was fueled by high

When

recovery

came

it

was

based

to a great extent

on defense prime contractors

like

United

Technologies Corporation, Raytheon, and General
Electric providing
smaller Springfield-area machining firms with lucrative
subcontracts.

During the early 1980s these primes had

laid off

thousands of union

workers, including tool and die makers and experimental
machinists.

Now

they utilized small non-union firms to get their

work done more

cheaply.

John Mullins, a professor of urban planning
Massachusetts-Amherst describes

this

at the

University of

trend toward large firms closing and

small firms becoming dependent on contracts from outside the region
as
the "colonization of Western Massachusetts."

In a 1991 article University

of Massachusetts-Amherst historian Jack Tager depicted the decline as part
of a

continuum stemming from

industry growth in the 1970s

sharp

boom and

bust cycles.

the fact that

was highly
"It is

much

defense-related and subject to

worthwhile

term factors that constitute the Bay

State's

to

War

II

keep in mind the long-

economic

"Federal largesse in the form of defense spending

post-World

of Massachusetts

fabric,"

sowed

Tager argued.

the seeds for the

Massachusetts economic miracle." The Bosch history

certainly confirms this perspective. 2

A

1993 study of the Massachusetts economy determined that

manufacturing job

loss has

been steady since 1982 with whole

industries,

1

Christopher Geehern, "Lagging Recovery Reflects Structural Economic Changes,"
Springfield Sunday Republican, June 19, 1994, p. A - 16. Textile mills, once the dominant
industry in near-by Holyoke fled the area much sooner, and the paper mills had fallen on
difficult times as well. On the decline of these labor-intensive mills see William
Hartford, Working People of Holyoke: Class and Ethnicity in a Massachusetts Mill Town,
1850 - I960 (New Brunswick, 1990) esp. ch 8; Jack Tager, "The Massachusetts Miracle,"
Historical journal of Massachusetts, 19 (Summer, 1991) p. 132; Robert Forrant and Elyse

Cann, The Demise

of the Massachusetts Defense Connection:

Shrinking Markets, and the Future (March, 1993).
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Lost Manufacturing jobs,

including shoes,

disappearing. Across
jobs

were

lost

and machine

textiles, furniture,

New

tool building, virtually

England 86,000 durable goods manufacturing

between 1984 and

1988.

One thousand Massachusetts

manufacturers closed their doors between 1977 and 1992. Remaining

metalworking firms are smaller, dependent on subcontracts from
large
companies, and non-union. 3

Laree Metal Working Companies:

An

Endangered Species ?

At the Danaher Tool ceremony Springfield Mayor Robert Markle
remarked:

"This

can do

it -

mayor

in such

shows

they can compete worldwide." 4

Is

there cause to join with the

optimism? Should anyone anticipate

metalworking 'hay
Rolls

that people in this revered manufacturing center

day',

complete with

a return to a

a late-20th century version of

Royce locating on the banks of the Connecticut River?
Nineteenth and twentieth century metalworking growth stemmed

from three related

factors:

development stimulated
nucleus of locally

continual innovation in product design and

initially

by the Springfield Armory;

owned machine

tool builders

whose

a diverse

expertise provided

the region with the benefits of their technological break-throughs

first;

and

3

Forrant and Cann, The Demise of the Massachusetts Defense Connection, p. 1 - 2. The
study noted that the region's dependence on a few dominant companies in the slow growth

defense and mini-computer industries meant that "the links in the chain that supplied
high skill - high wage work to small manufacturing firms have been weakened and in some
cases broken," p. 3.
4 The award article appeared in the Springfield Union,

May

2,

1994.

The working

agreement between IUE Local 228 and plant management is similar to the labormanagement production committee that flourished in many Springfield metal working
plants during and immediately after World War II. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the
Westinghouse committee. Bosch Local 206 was certainly calling for the formation of
problem-solving committees through the 1960s and early 1970s although the union never
suggested the elimination of classifications and vigorously resisted any changes in the
incentive system.
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a

base of skilled workers,

many

of

them German,

Scottish,

and

British

immigrants, capable of performing the precision machining
required
turn out world-class products.
that the region's strength
capabilities shared
its

nickname

-

Historian David Hounshell determined

was embodied

by firms and

to

in the rich

their workers.

the Industrial Beehive

-

was

it

problem-solving

When

Springfield earned

a diversified

manufacturing

center with over 300 firms and thousands of skilled workers producing
a
variety of products. This

decline from 1970

-

was no longer

the case.

After a slow, steady

1980, in a five year period during the mid-1980s

eighteen metalworking firms closed or permanently laid-off thousands of

workers (Table

9.1, p. 273).

Springfield Closings

:

Ownership Changes and

Finance Capital

Wieo

Prestolite.

in

Control

Wico was founded

in

Brooklyn

in

1897 by

Witherbee, the inventor of the portable storage battery. The firm
to Springfield in 1904

and moved across

Springfield in 1925.

was bought and

It

the Connecticut River to

Thomas

moved
West

sold three times between 1956 and

1967 before becoming part of the Prestolite division of the Toledo, Ohio-

based Eltra Corporation. In 1974 the plant employed 530 workers, 10
percent of West Springfield's industrial workforce, producing electrical

and electronic components
controls.

for small engine ignition systems

and power

Layoffs starting in 1980 cut the workforce in half and in late 1981

management announced

the plant

was
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closing, with

all

remaining work

shifted to "support a marginally profitable
operation in the Sunbelt that

i

modern building with more modern equipment." 5

located in a

Van Norman.

Charles

E.

and Fred. D. Van Norman, brothers from

Hamilton, Ontario, founded the Waltham Watch Tool

Watertown, Massachusetts, in

Two

1888.

Company

years later they

business to Springfield and incorporated as the

moved

in
their

Van Norman Machine

Tool Company. The firm's engineering department helped

it

develop a

variety of innovative machine tools and attachments that resulted in

rapid growth in the 1920s and 1930s producing machine tools for the

automobile industry.
This success caught the attention of
Segal in the early 1950s.

and

establish

it

New

At the time Segal wanted

as the nucleus of

power

Van Norman

to

shares, Segal

to force several directors off the

surviving co-founder Fred

New

York

City,

industrialist Herbert

to acquire

Van Norman

what he hoped would become

'General Motors of the machine tool industry'.

35 percent of

York

was

Through

the

the purchase of

able to acquire sufficient

company board, including

Van Norman. Corporate headquarters

and Segal began acquiring

companies. However, the recession of the

shifted

several smaller machine tool

late

1950s and continued

lackluster sales in the early 1960s led to a merger with the Universal

American Corporation

in 1962

and

and Western Corporation. Over
to

this

second merger in 1967 into the Gulf
period Springfield employment

fell

300 from 1,100 in 1958. Finally in 1979 Gulf and Western sold Van

Norman

5

a

to

Winona Tool Manufacturing

of

Winona, Minnesota.

Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings, and Major Layoffs

(Springfield, 1987).
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in

For a

Hampden County, 1967

-

1986

time,

Winona did some work

primarily to utilize

Van Norman's

The plant was closed

builder.

Van Norman nameplate

Chapman
quickly

in Springfield, but

Valve.

became one

to

It

of only

imported

employed 3,600

in

Valve was founded in the 1870s and

struggle ensued,

and

Chapman became

custom-made valves

By World War

II

the

for

company

U.S. firms building precision valves for submarines.
its

foundry, pattern, mold making, and machine

When Chapman's

shops.

the

Italian machines. 6

of the leading producers of

two

company

and Winona began attaching

large construction projects in the world.

was one

acquired the

reputation as a premier machine tool

in 1983

Chapman

it

after

chief executive died suddenly in 1958 a

two years

power

of behind the scenes machinations

part of the world-wide conglomerate Crane

Corporation.

Crane owned

a

non-union valve plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee

and almost immediately

shifted

work out

of the unionized

At the time of the acquisition Chapman had

Chapman

to

it.

2,700 employees, but layoffs,

including the closing of the foundry, resulted in there being just 200

workers in the
in 1986.

6

facility

mainly doing repair work on valves when

The Springfield plant had earned

Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings.

it

closed

the corporation's ire in 1982

Van Norman's demise

is

similar to that of

another U.S. machine tool builder, Burgmaster, richly described in Max Holland's When
the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America (Cambridge, 1989).
Holland writes that in the 1960s, because of their profits and seeming hold over the
market, U.S. tool builders became enticing targets for conglomerates. He estimates that
two-thirds of the industry was affected. The end result of this process was that "A distant
managerial capitalism replaced entrepreneurial capitalism... ." (p. 266).
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when

it

became

wage and

benefit givebacks. 7

Which
Table 9.1

Table

the conglomerate's only union plant not
to negotiate

is

Were

Plants

layoffs

and

metalworking companies
Gorrpary

While the plant closing

list

in

not exhaustive, trends are discernible which indicate the

Permanent

9.1:

T.ikelv to CIosp?

Status

closings of Springfield-area

in the mid-1980s.

Qosuedate

#Jcts

O'ship

Yrs-indty.

eliminated

Am Bach

dosed

1,000

2/86

ChaprranValve

do6ed

250

Sp'fldFandiy

dosed

Portage Casting

Peakerrp
since 1960

1979

80

1,800

Yes

6/86

N;Pb
N;Pb

100+

2700

(1959)

75

4/86

l^Pr

100+

doeed

60

8/86

N;Pr

36

100

Yes

VanValkenberg

dcsed

40

7/86

N;Pr

100+

135

Yes

WicoPrestdite

dosed

250

3/82

80

675

Yes

RaffeitySteel

dosed

50

11/85

N;Pb
N;F

40

VanNorman

dosed
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10/83

N;Pb

90

1,200

Yes

PlainvilleCast

dosed

65

4/87

N;Pr

65

75

No

Oxford Precision

dosed

60

9/86

N;Pb

40

120

Yes

EascoHandTod
CdurbiaBicyde

downsized

2000

1980s

75

2200

Yes

dosed

250

6./8S

N;Pb
N;Pb

80+

800

(1968)

dosed

400

9/88

l£b

100+

950

No

AtlasGopcD

downsized

565

1980s

70+

800

Yes

KidderStacy

dosed

90

9/89

100+

250

Yes

RexnordCbelt

dosed

200

6/89

N;F
N;Fb
N;Pb

100+

575

Yes

NortheastWire

dosed

35

1990

N;Pr

22

110

No

StcrmDropRirgp

layoffs

125

1980s

Npr

60+

250

Yes

Package Ma ch.

On

ownership: L

N

Yes

Yes

Pb - public; F - foreign. BuyOut since 1979: Plant changed ownership prior to closing. With the exception of Plainville
Casting, Rafferty Brown, and Oxford Precision all plants were unionized.
Notes:

difficult position

exceptions,

-

local;

-

non-local; Pr

-

private;

unions were in the 1970s and 1980s. With just two

none of the closed plants were

7 Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings.

By

locally

owned, though

the late 1970s Crane

was

all

plants

getting large valves

cast in overseas foundries at a fraction of the Springfield cost, using patterns designed
built in the Springfield pattern

shop by highly
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skilled machinists

and designers.

and

on

the

list

had been

change

just a

shifted

work out

at

one time. Most had undergone an ownership

few years prior
of

to their closing.

was an important

most cases the closed plants were the oldest

become part
facilities. 8

of.

owners

Western Massachusetts: The closings were never

case of lack of work. Capital control
in

In addition, outside

They were,

The cumulative

thus,

no match

for

factor here.

just a

Finally,

in the corporation they

had

modern, better capitalized

affect of these closings created a

historical continuity of the Connecticut River Valley as a

breach in the

world leader

in

precision metalworking that appears irreparable. The loss of the creative

and dynamic aspects of the metalworking manufacturing base

is

now

all

but complete. 9

The Bosch Closes

Shortly after the lengthy 1971 strike
division

up

for sale so that

it

AMBAC

put the entire diesel

could concentrate on more profitable parts of

the business. In 1978, Hartford, Connecticut-based aerospace and defense

giant United Technologies Corporation (UTC) purchased
Pratt

and Whitney

Aircraft, Sikorsky Aircraft,

° Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings.

it.

UTC owned

and Hamilton Standard

For a detailed discussion of a series of shut-downs

another community with a rich manufacturing tradition see John Cumbler, A Social
History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick:
in

1989).

See Robert Forrant, Elyse Cann, Kathleen McGraw, Industrial District or Industrial
Decline? A Survey of Western Massachusetts Metalworking (Springfield, 1991). There are
currently less than 25 unionized metalworking firms in the region, each much smaller than
it was in the 1950s. Each has engaged in concession bargaining and made numerous changes
in such things as their incentive system, and seniority and classification language, areas
that produced the greatest conflicts in the Bosch. There are now various efforts underway
to work with the remaining small firms to help them find markets to replace the loss of
defense work. There are also several programs to improve training to preserve the
dwindling skill base. It should be noted that the average age of a skilled machinist in
9

Western Massachusetts

is

now

55.
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Technologies,

all

heavily defense-dependent. In 1978

UTC

also acquired

Carrier Air Conditioner and Otis Elevator as part
of a reorganization

designed

to decrease their reliance

on defense and aerospace.

UTC had

a

reputation for being anti-union, and had fought the
establishment of

union shops in
Springfield

New

its

now

many

Connecticut plants for years. Problems in

intensified. 10

Standards Plan

Between 1978 and 1981 41 percent

UTC

laid off.
to

of the Springfield workforce

was

forced the union to arbitration on several issues in an effort

weaken long-standing

seniority, job bidding,

and

job classification

language. Finally, in May, 1981, ten years after the former owners failed in
their

UTC

attempt to change the incentive system,

gave the local an

ultimatum. The entire piece work incentive system had to be scrapped

once and

a

new one

installed.

changes were made a $20- $30 million

If

modernization program would be
further investments

A
"We

corporate

instituted.

would be made

memo

mailed

to

still

a part of the

many
past

10

home

loyal

read in part:

and hard-working

and present

They deserve

conducive to improved efficiency and output
security."

changes were rejected no

each worker's

company whose

contributions cannot be minimized.

If

in Springfield.

are mindful of our obligations to the

employees

at

a

work

climate

in order to preserve their job

Reluctantly, the union negotiating committee agreed to discuss

SMU, October

10, 1980, p. 52.
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a

new

incentive system at the direction of the

the they

were

in the middle of a three-year labor agreement. 11

As negotiations on management's

commenced,

a

second

reminded unionists

letter

was

sent.

New

Standards Plan (NSP)

Vice-President

that cost competitiveness

determining factors in any

critical

membership even though

effort to

Henry

Fuller

and product quality were

remain viable in the face of

aggressive Japanese, German, and British competitors.

"The competitive

position of the Springfield facility has deteriorated in recent years," he

wrote.

Productivity has declined while our operating costs have

Some

skyrocketed.

of our machines

become outdated. Our options
modernize our Springfield

and processes have

are clear.

facilities,

We

must

introduce advanced

machining concepts and develop new processes and systems.
Or,

we must

develop another modern manufacturing

in addition to the South Carolina plant.

Either option will

require a major investment on the part of the

main

obstacle

we

face in

we must

Fuller concluded

we

.

12

Henry
Henry

the

In order to be competitive,

facility. 12

by warning

that investments

would be made elsewhere

can secure an agreement by the union to cooperate by

modifying the wage incentive system." 13

11

is

restructure our incentive system in addition to

modernizing the

"unless

Company. The

modernizing Springfield

deteriorated piecework system...

facility

Fuller memo,
Fuller

May

memo, June

13 Henry Fuller memo, June

,

9,
9,

1981.
1981.
1981.
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While negotiations dragged on

pump

manufacturing

facility in

UTC

rushed to complete a new

Columbia, South Carolina. The 322,000

square foot state-of-the-art plant was designed
Springfield product line.
there

was

sufficient

work

Bosch's activities and

is

However,
both

for

the union

facilities.

to

produce every remaining

was repeatedly assured

"This

not intended to replace

is

it,"

that

only an expansion of

a

company

press

release informed. 14

Several stewards and officers actively opposed the NSP, claiming

was

a

management

shifting

all

work

to

union had signed

effort to

study and reengineer jobs in preparation

South Carolina and abroad. They argued

a three-year contract in April, 1980,

and

it

for

that the

that efforts to

revise the incentive system should only be undertaken during

Then

negotiations.

demands

for

file

would have an opportunity

to

make

have vote

of talks

they agreed

own

Importantly, they contended, only then could the rank
to strike

if

they were dissatisfied with the proposal.

The negotiating committee remained divided throughout

months

its

such things as plant closing language and limitations on

subcontracting.

and

the local

and made no recommendation

on was

that the rank

and

file

had

to the

the five

membership. All

a right to vote for or against

the plan. In an October, 1981 secret ballot workers voted 531-453 to accept
the

NSP. Just

a

month

later a

new

business agent and slate of officers

openly opposed to the plan were elected. They pledged
plant they
close. 1 5

now

to fight to save the

believed United Technologies had already decided to

Less than a year after the affirmative vote, these officers were

14 United Technologies Corporation press release, March, 1980.

campaign fliers in Local 206 holdings, UMass, Amherst Archives and
Manuscripts. The Springfield Union hailed the vote as proof-positive that American
15 Leaflets and
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leading protests against a two-week shutdown of
the plant caused by a lack
of work.

A

union press release read in

No more
this

crawling

-

part:

no more concessions.

company shipping out work

country and overseas.

who come
nowhere

And we

We

are

opposed

to

to other plants in this

opposed

are

to the politicans

-

to the plant gates looking for votes, but are

to

be found

when

their help is

needed

to pass plant

closing legislation. 16

Between 1980 and 1983 there was
duty trucks and major customers cut

a

sharp drop in

demand

their orders sharply.

for

heavy

With the

additional production space in South Carolina, the division had excess

manufacturing capacity and a decision was made
lines to

limit

to shift several

South Carolina and Europe. Management decided, as

product

well, to

production in Springfield to military contracts. The planned

modernization and diversification of production did not occur.
Subcontracting to local shops increased.

400 workers were laid

off,

and

at the

Between 1982 and 1984

end of 1984 the company informed

the union that an additional 100 to 150 workers

during the

first

half of 1985 as part of

its

single German-built plant in 1911, Bosch
in the

ARMA

lose their jobs

'redirection program'. 17

had grown

to

From

a

be the leading plant

AMBAC

Industries,

and now was

a small

and

and quoted company spokesperson Frank Guisti who
be made" (SMU, October 23, 1981).

in Springfield to stay

"investments will
16

would

Corporation, eventually became part of the most profitable

division in world-wide

Bosch was

close to

now

SDN, September 4,

1982, p.

3.

17 Judith Leff, "United Technologies and the Closing of American Bosch," Harvard
Business School Case Study 386-174 (May, 1986) p. 3.
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stated

aging plant

owned by

a Fortune 100 corporation that

employed 205,000

workers world-wide.

In-plant Conflicts Hscalatp

Union-company
heard a week

at the

conflict escalated.

On

average 15 grievances were

second step of the grievance procedure in a plant of

approximately 750. There was always a backlog of 50

The company

tried to

weaken

seniority

won

expense.
floor.

on the defensive by UTC,

every arbitration case on the issue, but

UTC was

of workers

who

hearing, tried to end the

steward

lost

the

at great financial

also determined to limit union rights

During 1983 negotiations they sought, but

number

75 cases to be heard.

by denying workers with high

seniority jobs they successfully bid on. Put

union

-

on the

factory

failed, to limit the

could attend a group or department grievance

company

practice of paying for

worker and

time during grievance hearings, and attempted to limit the

time a steward could spend a week engaged in union

Between 1984 and 1986
division's Italian

and Dutch

UTC moved

facilities.

activity. 18

product lines

Joint ventures

to the diesel

were entered

into

with Toshiba Corporation of Japan, Renault of France, Westland PLC of

18 Local 206 Grievance files,

UMass-Amherst Labor Archives,

Series

II.

For a discussion of

the escalation of grievances at General Motors after 1960 see Nelson Lichtenstein,

"Reutherism on the Shop Floor: Union Strategy and Shop-Floor Conflict in the USA 1946 1970," in Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., Between Fordism and Flexibility:
The Automobile Industry and Its Workers (New York, 1992) p. 134 - 138. Lichtenstein
contends that the rise in grievances was a consequence, at least in part, of workers' concerns
for such in-plant issues as speed-up, automation, health and safety, and production
in the
standards. Wildcat strikes, for example, dramatically increased at Crysler and
Department Director Leonard Woodcock called the
late 1960s in response to what
industry's gold-plated sweatshops. Nationally publicized strikes at GM's Lordstown and

GM

GM

Norwood assembly

plants in the early 1970s centered on similar issues related to

production was done on the shop

floor.
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how

England, and Fiat of

UTC

and Taiwan.

Portugal,

Start-up companies were built in Spain,

Italy.

President Robert Daniell

"Our markets are increasingly

international sales are likely to

According

And

global.

grow

faster

commented

over the next five years

than domestic

Week the key motivation was the

to Business

that

sales."

fact that

"UTC

earns a higher profit on foreign sales than on domestic sales." 19

The Case

of the Laid Off Inspectors: Resisting

Management One

In the

summer and

group grievance

most

likely

Last

fall

Time

of 1985 the

two

sides

in

one

final

that rivaled the 1970s fight over the timing of set-ups

hastened the corporation's decision

incident began

engaged

when

The

to close the factory.

Personnel Manager Michael Patulak laid off 33

inspectors in the plant and on the

with new inspectors

and

at

same day sought

to

lower pay grades. The union

fill

first

the positions

sought

injunctive relief through the federal courts to block the move, but failed.

The

local

argued that because of the complex layoff system close

to 100

workers could be affected and that these personnel moves would cause

undue

financial hardships to all affected workers, particularly those

would be permanently
During the

were only

to

be

fall

albeit at

laid off.

arbitration case the union contended that layoffs

made when

in this situation the

who

there

company

was

a

demonstrated lack of work: Since

hired an identical

number

of inspectors,

lower rates of pay, there was no such lack of work. Union

officials

19 United Technologies Corporation Annual Report, April, 1985; "UTC Adds Westland to
- 89.
Its Growing Foreign Arsenal," Business Week, February 24, 1985, p. 88
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charged

this

was an attempt

UTC

provisions of the contract.
inspector's classifications

management had
good

to slash

were

wages and weaken the

lawyers countered that the lower

in the contract to be utilized,

the absolute right to staff the plant as

of their business.

seniority

it

and

saw

fit

for the

The union's viewpoint was upheld, with

arbitrator dismissing the

company's maneuvers

as

an attempt

wages, close to $125,000, and reinstate

all

the

to

circumvent clear contract language. The company was ordered
lost

that

to

pay

all

workers to the jobs they held

prior to the layoffs. 20

February 1986: The Closing

The victory proved

to

Is Officially

Announced

be hollow for on February

4,

of scheduled contract negotiations, in a terse twenty line

informed the negotiating committee of there decision

Adamson

Vice President of Operations Jon

We

memo UTC

to close the plant.

told negotiators that:

are unable to continue operating four facilities with this

continuing over-capacity situation.

inform you that a very

made

moved
Italy;

I,

therefore, regret to

difficult business decision

to close the Springfield

end of August

of this year.

has been

manufacturing operation by the

The military products

will

be

to

Columbia, South Carolina;

injectors to Brescia,

and

industrial products to Fluid

Power

Components

20

1986, at the start

SDN, August

of the

Division. 21

22, 1985, p. 8.

The

grievance and arbitration rights

federal judge ordered that the union exhaust

first.

its

National Labor Relations Board charges were also

and the Board essentially mimicked the court and told the local to arbitrate the
The company's financial liability totaled close to $100,000 and over 150 workers were
affected in some way through the lay-offs and subsequent shuffling of personnel.
filed

21

Jon

Adamson

to all

employees, Plant Closing Memorandum, February
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4,

1986.

case.

Three weeks

an Interview with

later In

newspaper,

a local

spokesperson Alan Muncaster stated, "We have
not a viable

and nothing

company anymore. We're
to nil

and no hope of

it

do something or we're

to

stuck with manufacturing space

filling

The Columbia, South

It."

Carolina plant represented a $110 million investment lor

who would

lose their johs in Springfield

corporation's world-wide payroll.

UTC

were

UTC and

the 900

0.5 percent ol the

All alone, Local

206 was no match for

this.22

Springfield

Mayor Richard Meal
good

city ot Springfield, In

to ten

months ago,

never knew

we were

until

in

held a series

faith,

which we offered

today what was going

betrayed, because the

meetings, thai began eighl

oi

all

kinds

to

happen. Each step

wore not going

told not to worry, that they

And

oi assistance.

to

c

lose.

i

way

ol the

To

..

tell

p.m. that the eventual phase out was Imminent does not, to

at 2:00

mind, demonstrate high regard hy
Stale Sec retary ol

I

year old

i

us.

in the city

>onald Staples, a 36-year veteran

workers when he remarked,

under

that corporation lor this

It's

me

my

community."

ahor Paul Eustace called the corporation's previous

assurances that they would remain

lor

"I feel

said:

more

"It's

"hold laced lies".

in the

Bosch,

Sixty-one

summed

it

up

best

not like they pulled the rug out horn

like they pulled the trap

door out horn under the

hangman's noose. "23

The announcement confirmed predictions union
months

before.

22

"II

all

memorandum

that

were Involved here was

Holyoke Transcript Teltgram, March

23SMU

February

made

Alter watching 300 workers lose their johs in the spring

L985 the union issued a scathing
Officials.

leaders

5, p,

I;

February

7,

L,

1986, p.

L986, p,
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I,

i

to

c

ity, stale,

and

the loss ol 300 or

federal

more

well

ot

paid jobs, there would be enough cause for very serious
concern/* they
wrote.

But these job losses are only the beginning.

mismanagement and disinvestment on

A

clear pattern of

the part of United

Technologies, the parent corporation of American Bosch,
point toward a phase-out of all operations at American
Bosch's Springfield plant.

American Bosch and

that

Repeated management assurances

UTC

have

a strong

commitment

to

continuing operations are contradicted by management
All of this occurs while the markets for AB's

actions....

traditional product lines are

becoming more

Meanwhile we
remains here
its

to

booming.

and investing heavily.

cost competitive

see

UTC

milking

Other firms are

this plant for

be taken in profit and moving

commercial product

lines

and much of

its

whatever
all its jobs, all

machinery

elsewhere.

The

local's

memorandum added

close to 100 percent since 1981

been

fired or resigned since

and

that

management turnover was

that ten top production

November,

1984.

somber warning: "The union has cooperated

It

managers had

concluded with the

fully in trying to

absenteeism, in trying to increase production. We've

shown

stem

results.

cooperation has been repaid with layoffs and the promise of more

We

see clearly the

impending closing of

The company response

to the

Such

layoffs.

this plant." 24

memorandum came from Alan

Muncaster, vice president for communications.

We

want

two

in Europe, but

to maintain all four of our plants, including the

we have

lines to better utilize

24 Local 206,

UTC

to redirect a

number

of product

our manufacturing capacity. Nothing

Disinvestment Points Toward American Bosch Closing,
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Summer,

1985.

has changed since

layoffs.

done exactly

are

we announced those SO
what we said we'd do. There
down."

shul the plan!

seven months

|usl

Including

moved

was announced.

later the closing

to other

H IV

facilities

r.nd plants

then, did

Machine

tools

to

South

arolina,

C

were
All

and the

tight. 26

How

Mow,

Between

or sold to local machine shops.

remaining diesel truck work was relocated
building was locked up

to

were terminated,

1,200 people

total oi

engineering and office personnel.

all

no plans

1

im a

February and October,

We've

Did Danahcr Do

Danaher manage

to

It

?

survive?

have made the kind of recovery?

Is

C

ould other North

the story instructive or

unique? Originally Moore Drop Gorging Company, and then Kasco
Tool in the 1970s

engaged

in the

Incorporated

and

employed

l^SOs, the facility

production

ol a variety ol

in the city in 1**00, the

hand

land

close to 4,000 workers

tools

complex had

I

its

during World

own

War

II

foundry, forge

shop, heat treating furnaces, tool and die shop, and several departments

ol

production machinery. The drop forging department was utilized
extensively by Rolls Royee in
the l%()s

2'
l

tin*

l
l

However,

>20s.

and intense foreign competition from

[olyoke Iranscripi Tclcxnwi, |wne

?7,

l,
i

s r\

|>

million

In
in

$31

I

million

unemployment

In lost

Income

(

>ver

Run companies

two /ears the

to the area, the additional

1,000 lost jobs

expenditure

ol

$9

insurance, welfare, ami other benefits, and $H 0 million

federal ami state taxes (Forrant, Metolworkinn
L987, p, L3)

Pacific

investment

io

26 The financial costs ol the closing were staggering
resulted

a lack ol

Vhmt Closing

ml

Mfl/oi

Layoffs

I

lost In
t

(uly,

in

lor

low and mid-priced wrenches and socket
permanently laying

off

thousands of workers through the 1980s. The

company remained open because
commitment

to

sets resulted in the firm

purchasing

its

its

biggest customer, Sears, had a

top of the line Craftsman wrenches from

U.S. producers. 27

Now

part of the world-wide Danaher Corporation,

grown slowly over

the past

two years and stands

at 300.

employment has

Close to $9

million has been spent on plant modernization and several product lines
are

now manufactured

using the fastest computer controlled machine tool

technology available. The plant

non-union

facility to

is

in direct competition with

maintain the work

it

has.

an Arkansas

In order to stay price

competitive and maintain a wage scale roughly 20 percent higher than the

southern factory the union and company negotiated
that eliminated labor grades

commitment was made
jobs.

Teams comprised

convene weekly

job classifications.

to cross-train all

of

to tackle

member has undergone

and

workers

to

a labor

agreement

A management
perform multiple

machine operators, engineers, and managers

production and quality problems. Each team

several hours of training to insure a high level of

participation from every worker.

The contract guarantees workers
through quarterly bonuses. Union

will share in productivity gains

officials

have access

to all

production

records and profit and loss statements and participate in meetings to

determine bonuses. There are also assurances that workers

employment

will not lose

as a consequence of productivity improvements.

Instead,

they will be shifted to other occupations, with earnings protected during a

27 Information on Danaher based on interviews with plant manager Bruce Graham.
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new

training period for the

job.

Finally, the piece

work system was

eliminated in favor of hourly pay rates based on the levels
of crosstraining workers have mastered. 28

The Production Conundrum and
Post-World War

It is

now

Labor History

II

possible to turn again to David Brody's search for

common

threads capable of pulling American labor history together. In his 1978

paper before the Organization of American Historians,

it

will be recalled,

he put forward the notion that an economic approach that centered on

work and
useful

jobs

and broadened out from there could possibly provide

framework

for

understanding particularly post-World

history. 29 Certainly the history of the Bosch

understood utilizing
this history to

this

approach.

understand

a

It is

and

its

War

a

II

labor

workers can be

also possible to generalize from

good deal about what happened

to

thousands

of metalworkers in the Connecticut River Valley.

The ways

in

which the union attempted

to interject itself

on

the

factory floor to secure a role in improving the plant are brought to light, as
is

the cogent analysis the rank and

shortcomings of management.

28 The award article appeared

A

file

and union

officers

work-centered history

in the Springfield

Union,

May

2,

1994.

provided on the
tells

the story in

The working

agreement between IUE Local 228 and plant management is similar to the labormanagement production committee that flourished in many Springfield metal working
plants during and immediately after World War II. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the
Westinghouse committee. Bosch Local 206 was certainly calling for the formation of
problem-solving committees through the 1960s and early 1970s although the union never
suggested the elimination of classifications and vigorously resisted any changes in the
incentive system.

29 David Brody, "Labor History in the 1970s:
in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us:

United States (Ithaca, 1980)

p. 268.
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Toward

a

History of the American Worker,"

Contemporary Historical Writing

in the

a

way

plant's

that

an institutional approach could

problems were not going

IBM computer
Management

to track

work, or

that the

to be resolved with the acquisition of an
a

handful of automatic machine

tools.

persevered, however, disregarded union efforts to develop

joint strategies to solve shop-floor

problems, and in the end compiled

computer print-outs informing them of

The union

many

Workers realized

not.

their

problems, and

little else.

did, in fact, articulate strategies to get at the causes of

in-plant problems.

For example, unionists called for the

establishment of a consistent approach to the repair of machine tools to

prevent costly break-downs during production runs. Such disruptions

played havoc with delivery schedules and alienated customers counting

on

deliveries to

keep

their

own

plants running.

Union leaders never

shied from urging workers to produce quality products, and several times

issued detailed statements on

how

that the union's 1960s perspective

to

on

improve

quality.

It is

ironic to note

several of these issues closely

approximates underlying management principles guiding world-class
manufacturers today. But in the face of an intransigent management and
their drive for bureaucratic control,

expansion, the

local's single plant

conceived, could never prevail.

downsized

a decision

and aggressive international

production strategy, no matter

Danaher survived because

was never made

to close.

Local

as

how

well

it

management was

able to persuade union leaders to agree to the various changes needed to

gain greater flexibility on the shop
factory problem-solving teams

the realization that

extensively

many

floor.

They were

and assure

a

also able to introduce

measure of job

security, with

of their international competitors relied

on the same approach.
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Bosch workers sought

little

more than

through the 1950s and 1960s when they argued

this
joint

lor the return of the

production committee C harles IVrclle had disbanded.

Martin Kenney and Richard Florida

in their

study of Japanese

transplant companies in the U.S state that "Perhaps the key element
of the

Japanese industrial system

harness workers' knowledge

lies in its ability to

as a source of value directly at the point of production." 3 "

According

business historian William l.a/onick the Japanese were putting ideas
practice originated in the United States through the

and quality experts
managers' drive

environment

like

of

in

management

F.dward Deming and J.M. Juran. However, U.S.

for shop-floor control did not

for these

work

to

concepts to take

those at the Bosch, represented

root.

provide

While

a threat to U.S.

elsewhere they were mainly viewed

a

skilled workers, like

managers,

in I.a/.onick's

receptive

words

in

Japan and

as "a source of

creation." 31

enhanced value

Japanese and (lerman firms gained organizational advantages over
U.S. firms because

control
the

workers played an

integral role in designing quality

and shop-floor production systems. By comparison,

company and union

sufficient time to

Bosch

fought over whether or not rates included

check work, and

how many

floor inspectors

to

cover the plant. These were the wrong arguments

30

Martin Kenney rind Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production:
Transfer to the U.S. (New York, L993) p. 39.

its

in the

to

were needed

be having.

U.S.

The Japanese System and

31

For examples of this see Ira Magaziner and Mark Patinkin, the Silent War: Inside
Global Business Buttles Shaping America's future ( New York, 1989) esp. ch. 4 on West

Germany; Michael

best,

The

New

Competition:

the

Institutions of Industrial Restructuring

(Cambridge; L990) esp. ch, 7 on die Third Italy; Michael Cusumano, The \apanese
Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota (Cambridge/
(Cambridge,
L989); Michael Dertouzos, Made in America: Renaming the Productive f.d^e
WO)
floor (Cambridge,
1989); William Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on Hie Shop
I

esp. chs. 9

-

10.
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management, Lazonick points
and authority
work."

that they

out, "was not about to grant workers skills

might use

to exercise control

over the flow of

But since Bosch unionists were not allowed a positive role they

used the various means

at their disposal, including the grievance

arbitration procedure, articles in their newspaper, strikes,

and

and both

individual and well-organized shop-floor resistance to blunt attempts to
cut piece rates, change the incentive system, alter inspection techniques,

and change job

and the flow of work was negatively

descriptions,

affected. 32

Whether or not shop-floor
and ever more repressive shop
fact

participation

programs lead

floor regimes, as

some

remains that current management rhetoric aimed

critics

to

speed-up

contend, the

at inclusion

and

worker input resonates with workers and can not be ignored by trade
unions. 33 Bosch workers thirsted for
it is

management

that

wants

it

and were

resisted.

Now,

to introduce these changes, as the

ironically,

Danaher

story bears out. Finally, the Bosch story supports an observation

made by

historian Philip Scranton that "top-down attempts to by-pass workers'

knowledgeability by creating 'smart' machines create as
achievements."

32

In fact, the continuous

William Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on

33 For recent discussions on

many problems

improvement of

the

Shop Floor

,

p.

as

U.S.

290

-

292.

Team Concept

in

Mike Parker, "Industrial Relations Myth and Shop
the Auto Industry," in Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell

John Harris, Industrial Democracy

in

America:

Floor Reality: The

this see

The Ambiguous Promise

(New

York, 1993)

p.

"Product and Labour Strategies in Japan," and Ulrich Jurgens,

Shimokawa,
Knuth Dohse and Thomas Malsch, "New Production Strategies in West German Car
Plants," in Stephen Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, Between Fordism and Flexibility (New
York, 1992); Tom Rankin, New Forms of Work Organization: The Challenge for North
249

-

274; Koichi

American Unions (Toronto, 1990); Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing World
Markets and the Future of Labor Unions (Ithaca, 1991); Christian Berggren, Alternatives
Lean Production: Work Organization in the Swedish Auto Industry (Ithaca, 1992.
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to

manufacturing firms

is

only possible

strategies are conceived that

centerpiece.

Short of

when

well thought out shop-floor

have workers and

their skills as the

this, histories of decline, like the

one told here,

will

sadly remain the rule, with the Danaher story the exception. 34

34 Philip Scranton, "The Workplace, Technology, and Theory in American Labor History,"
International Labour and Working-Class History, 35 (Spring, 1989) p. 10.
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